Introduction

Usually when conflicts break out in the developing world attempts are made to mediate between the warring parties by outside powers. These often result in peace agreements. Why is it so difficult to sustain peace agreements following civil wars in developing countries? Well-known examples of broken peace agreements are the Addis Ababa Agreement (Sudan 1972); the Arusha Agreement (Rwanda 1993); and the Angola Peace Agreements (1991 and 1994). Not only do peace treaties need to be brokered by outside powers (Nordic countries or United Nations agencies, for example), but their continued engagement as financiers and enforcers of the peace is required if the negotiated settlement that is mediated is to last. In other words, most peace agreements between warring factions in contemporary developingcountry civil wars are not self-enforcing. Walter (2002) points out the empirical regularity with which peace deals break down, and civil war resumes. She also points out to the fact that it is much more likely that belligerents will agree to a deal if they are able to share power following the agreement, and when a third-party guarantees the peace arrangement. Similarly, Fortna (2004) extends the analysis as to why some peace treaties endure while others flounder. Hastily cobbled power sharing deals, in particular, do not always ensure that the peace will last because of various temptations to renege on current undertakings in the future, see Rothchild (2005). And, in many instances this future period may not be too far away, as is often the case when valuable resource rents are at stake, or if long-standing collective grievances exist, calling into question the credibility of the peace agreement in the first place.

Arguably, therefore, the greatest impediment to sustaining peace agreements is the imperfect or insincere nature of the commitment to peace. The theme of commitment in the context of modern conflict can be traced back to the work of Schelling (1960). More generally, a costly commitment problem arises when an agreement or contract may be reneged upon, usually because the undertaking cannot be enforced by a third party or court of law; see, Hart (1995) on commercial applications of contracts that require re-negotiation. If breaches of contract cannot be remedied, the credibility of the agreement is questionable.