Introduction

The United Arab Emirates is widely known for itshydrocarbon wealth, globally focused sovereignwealth funds, high-profile ‘soft power’ investments(Nye 2004), and – post- Arab Spring – itsextraordinarily intense efforts to re-shape regionalpolitics. As such, its international relations andinternational political economy dynamics haveattracted considerable scholarly attention. Notably,much has been written on the UAE's historical tiesto Britain, its subsequent multi-facetedrelationship with the United States and itsincreasingly formal links to Israel. Likewise,considerable attention has been paid to the UAE'sunwaveringly firm stance against Iran and itsperceived proxies (including Yemen's Houthimovement), its opposition to the transnationalMuslim Brotherhood and its actions againstputatively Islamist-enabling Qatar.

Moreover, with the UAE being a high GDP per capita‘rentier state’ with a relatively small number ofcitizens and a substantial expatriate workforce(Beblawi 1987), there has also been a strong focuson the nitty-gritty of its authority structures andrulers’ contemporary statecraft. Due emphasis, forexample, has been placed on the increasing politicaldominance of Abu Dhabi (the largest and wealthiestof the UAE's constituent emirates) (Davidson 2007,2009); the rise of Abu Dhabi's crown prince,Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (a.k.a. ‘MBZ’) (Roberts2020; Juneau 2020; Davidson 2006); the ostensiblycentral and acquiescence-ensuring role ofhydrocarbon-financed welfare and employment-based‘social contracts’ or ‘ruling bargains’ (Lucas 2014;Krane 2019); the careful co-option of tradition andreligion (Davidson 2008); and the – rather limited –range of ‘authoritarian upgrading’ efforts(Heydemann 2007; Cavatorta 2010; Hinnebusch 2012),including elections for the largely powerlessFederal National Council (Burton 2019).

As yet, however, comparatively little has been writtenon the ways in which MBZ's regime – presiding over aresource-rich and relatively technologicallyadvanced state (with a consequently high capacityfor repression) – has been developing a range of newauthoritarian tools to strengthen further itsposition. After all, although the UAE neverexperienced mass protests in 2011 and has been ableto avoid the sort of austerity drives seen in SaudiArabia and other Gulf states in the wake of the 2014oil price crash, MBZ has nonetheless faced sporadiccalls for reform from a small but vociferous elementof the local population, and on occasion evenexplicit domestic criticism – especially with regardto official stances on political Islam and, morelately, Israel (Freer 2017; Davidson 2013; Reuters2020; Council for Foreign Relations 2020).