‘Philosophy begins in wonder. And, at the end, when philosophic thought has done its best, the wonder remains’ (Whitehead 1938: 232). This book has focused on the relation between language and the world, not in order to provide answers or a scheme that is to be learned and applied, but in an attempt to reinvigorate our thoughts and appreciation of both language and the world. Words and the world can be both wonderful and terrible. The predominance in contemporary academic thought of strains of both analytic philosophy (which attempts to demystify language) and semiology (with its emphasis on the determining role of external structures) risks diluting the ‘wonder’ of both language and the world. The questions and arguments set out in the previous chapters have attempted to reinstate some of the imagination and speculation that Whitehead views as essential both to philosophy and to the world.

Yet, as I have argued elsewhere (Halewood 2018), speculation should be treated with caution. Recent moves to reinsert speculation into philosophy and social theory may be welcomed, but should be treated with restraint. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Whitehead insists that ‘Speculative boldness must be balanced by complete humility before logic, and before fact. It is a disease of philosophy when it is neither bold nor humble, but merely a reflection of the temperamental presuppositions of exceptional personalities’ (Whitehead 1978: 17). Philosophy and robust thinking require a specific form of speculation, which Whitehead describes as ‘imaginative generalization’ (Whitehead 1978: 5). This mention of ‘generalization’ is important as it distinguishes philosophical speculation from idle speculation about who may or may not be the next president or prime minister, or financial speculation on the stock market. Speculation, for Whitehead, involves moving beyond the concerns and problems of a specific field to a wider field of thought. This freedom of thought, however, must be balanced by a humility in the face of both logic and fact. This balance is to be tested by assessing the appropriateness of the generalisations developed with their applicability in other areas, and with respect to other problems. ‘The success of the imaginative experiment is always to be tested by the applicability of its results beyond the restricted locus from which it originated’ (Whitehead 1978: 5).