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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2017

Veli Mitova
Veli Mitova
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University of Johannesburg
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Believable Evidence , pp. 254 - 263
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  • Bibliography
  • Veli Mitova, University of Johannesburg
  • Book: Believable Evidence
  • Online publication: 19 May 2017
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316981276.016
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  • Bibliography
  • Veli Mitova, University of Johannesburg
  • Book: Believable Evidence
  • Online publication: 19 May 2017
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316981276.016
Available formats
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  • Bibliography
  • Veli Mitova, University of Johannesburg
  • Book: Believable Evidence
  • Online publication: 19 May 2017
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316981276.016
Available formats
×