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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 June 2017

Carl Dahlström
Affiliation:
University of Gothenburg
Victor Lapuente
Affiliation:
University of Gothenburg
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Organizing Leviathan
Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Making of Good Government
, pp. 206 - 241
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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References

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