Book contents
- The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism
- Cambridge Studies in European Law and Policy
- The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism
- Copyright page
- Basic Table of Contents
- Detailed Table of Contents
- Figures
- Acknowledgements
- Table of Cases
- Table of Legislation, Treaties and Conventions
- Abbreviations
- Part I
- Methods and Introduction
- 1 The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism
- 2 The Maastricht Architecture of European Fiscal Federalism
- 3 The Failure and Abrogation of the Maastricht Model
- 4 Constitutional Criteria for EU Fiscal Federalism
- Part II
- Proposed Directions for Future Research and Reform
- Bibliography
- Index
1 - The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism
from Part I
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 April 2022
- The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism
- Cambridge Studies in European Law and Policy
- The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism
- Copyright page
- Basic Table of Contents
- Detailed Table of Contents
- Figures
- Acknowledgements
- Table of Cases
- Table of Legislation, Treaties and Conventions
- Abbreviations
- Part I
- Methods and Introduction
- 1 The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism
- 2 The Maastricht Architecture of European Fiscal Federalism
- 3 The Failure and Abrogation of the Maastricht Model
- 4 Constitutional Criteria for EU Fiscal Federalism
- Part II
- Proposed Directions for Future Research and Reform
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Chapter 1 evaluates competing EU and member state claims over the constitutional boundaries of ‘constitutional identity’ and Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the European legal order, and identifies two constitutional boundaries of the EU legal order which will impinge on the selection of fiscal federalism models for the EU. The first is fiscal sovereignty. Member state fiscal sovereignty is a permanent constitutional constraint on the application of fiscal federalism theory in the EU. The Union can have no powers other than what the member states have given it, and nemo plus iuris, what the member states have given it is limited by their own ‘constitutional identities’ – of which fiscal sovereignty lies at the core. The second is comprised of the fundamental guiding principles of price stability and ‘fiscal discipline’ (sound public finances, and sustainable balance of payments) binding on the mandate for EMU itself under Article 119(3) TFEU.
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- Information
- The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism , pp. 24 - 105Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022