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5 - Ride-Hailing Platforms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2020

Francesco Ducci
Affiliation:
New York University
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Summary

This chapter reaches more ambiguous conclusions with regard to the natural monopoly features of ride-hailing platforms such as Uber. While ride-hailing service providers benefit from indirect network externalities between drivers and passengers, which therefore represent a potential source of natural concentration on the demand side, their force is not infinite, and is likely to taper off after a thick and sufficiently large network is reached. The possibility of natural monopoly is as a result largely dependent on the local conditions of demand in a given geographical market. Given these more ambiguous conclusions, this chapter evaluates alternative policy approaches that may be pertinent to ride-hailing depending on the strength of natural concentration, including regulation, franchise bidding, and competition policy enforcement.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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  • Ride-Hailing Platforms
  • Francesco Ducci, New York University
  • Book: Natural Monopolies in Digital Platform Markets
  • Online publication: 30 June 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108867528.005
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To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Ride-Hailing Platforms
  • Francesco Ducci, New York University
  • Book: Natural Monopolies in Digital Platform Markets
  • Online publication: 30 June 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108867528.005
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Ride-Hailing Platforms
  • Francesco Ducci, New York University
  • Book: Natural Monopolies in Digital Platform Markets
  • Online publication: 30 June 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108867528.005
Available formats
×