Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- 39 Compliance Management Systems: Do They Make a Difference?
- 40 Business Codes: A Review of the Literature
- 41 Third Party and Appointed Monitorships
- 42 Ethics and Compliance Training
- 43 The Social and Organizational Psychology of Compliance: How Organizational Culture Impacts on (Un)ethical Behavior
- 44 Organizational Factors and Workplace Deviance: Influences of Abusive Supervision, Dysfunctional Employees, and Toxic Work Environments
- 45 Corporate Social Responsibility, ESG, and Compliance
- 46 Agency, Authority, and Compliance
- 47 Life-Course Criminology and Corporate Offending
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- References
41 - Third Party and Appointed Monitorships
from Part VII - Management and Organizational Processes
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2021
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- 39 Compliance Management Systems: Do They Make a Difference?
- 40 Business Codes: A Review of the Literature
- 41 Third Party and Appointed Monitorships
- 42 Ethics and Compliance Training
- 43 The Social and Organizational Psychology of Compliance: How Organizational Culture Impacts on (Un)ethical Behavior
- 44 Organizational Factors and Workplace Deviance: Influences of Abusive Supervision, Dysfunctional Employees, and Toxic Work Environments
- 45 Corporate Social Responsibility, ESG, and Compliance
- 46 Agency, Authority, and Compliance
- 47 Life-Course Criminology and Corporate Offending
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- References
Summary
Abstract: This chapter outlines the history and use of monitors in various contexts, beginning with the original conception of a court-appointed monitor and ending with the more recent development of the public relations and modern-day court-ordered monitor. It next discusses how the specific type of monitorship alters the duties and confidentiality expectations of the parties to the monitorship in both formal and informal ways. Next, it analyzes the sparse regulation of monitorships, suggesting that reputation may currently be the most effective limit on monitor overreach and capture. Finally, it ends by proposing two areas for scholarly focus going forward: (1) mechanisms for formally regulating monitors, and (2) empirical study of the overall effectiveness of monitorships.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance , pp. 605 - 615Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
References
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