Judicial review and democracy are at odds. Democracy demands that public policy issues be decided by the demos or their representatives while judicial review inevitably involves some of those decisions being made by a small group of typically nonelected judges. There are a number of building blocks to successful judicial review, some perhaps necessary, none sufficient. Because federalisms are essentially free trade cartels, each member has strong incentives to cheat in favor of its own economy. Judicial review provides a strong policy mechanism against such cheating. Judicial review provides some enforcement of the boundaries between executive and legislative branches. Review is often illusory because of the far greater political powers of those branches. Judicial independence is a necessary building block, but excessively bold review is likely to lead to its curtailment so judicial judgment of how far it can go is essential. Allegiance to common law traditions and a strong legal profession may bolster review. A regime may support even adverse judicial decisions on rights if it believes that benefits to it support by a rights regarding public outweigh its losses from occasional adverse review.