Book contents
- Humanomics
- Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society
- Humanomics
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Cover Art Note
- Note on the Text
- 1 Humanomics Spans the Two Worlds of Adam Smith
- 2 Words and Meaning in Adam Smith’s World
- 3 Conduct in the Social Universe
- 4 Frank Knight Preemptively Settles the Horse Race
- 5 Axioms and Principles for Understanding Human Conduct
- 6 Propositions Predicting Context-Specific Action
- 7 Propriety and Sympathy in a Rule-Governed Order
- 8 Trust Game Discoveries
- 9 The Ultimatum Game as Involuntary Extortion
- 10 Designing, Predicting, and Evaluating New Trust Games
- 11 Reconsidering the Formal Structure of Traditional Game Theory
- 12 Narratives in and about Experimental Economics
- 13 Adam Smith’s Program for the Study of Human Socioeconomic Betterment
- Index
- References
4 - Frank Knight Preemptively Settles the Horse Race
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 January 2019
Book contents
- Humanomics
- Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society
- Humanomics
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Cover Art Note
- Note on the Text
- 1 Humanomics Spans the Two Worlds of Adam Smith
- 2 Words and Meaning in Adam Smith’s World
- 3 Conduct in the Social Universe
- 4 Frank Knight Preemptively Settles the Horse Race
- 5 Axioms and Principles for Understanding Human Conduct
- 6 Propositions Predicting Context-Specific Action
- 7 Propriety and Sympathy in a Rule-Governed Order
- 8 Trust Game Discoveries
- 9 The Ultimatum Game as Involuntary Extortion
- 10 Designing, Predicting, and Evaluating New Trust Games
- 11 Reconsidering the Formal Structure of Traditional Game Theory
- 12 Narratives in and about Experimental Economics
- 13 Adam Smith’s Program for the Study of Human Socioeconomic Betterment
- Index
- References
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- HumanomicsMoral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 49 - 66Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
References
Andreoni, James and Douglas Bernheim, B.. 2009. “Social Image and the 50–50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects,” Econometrica 77(5): 1607–36.Google Scholar
Bénabou, Roland and Tirole, Jean. 2006. “Incentives and Prosocial Behavior,” American Economic Review 96(5): 1652–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bolton, Gary E. and Ockenfels, Axel. 2000. “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition,” American Economic Review 90(1): 166–93.Google Scholar
Bortoft, Henri. 1996. The Wholeness of Nature: Goethe’s Way of Science. Glasgow, UK: Floris Books.Google Scholar
Camerer, Colin F. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Camerer, Colin F. and Loewenstein, George. 2004. “Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future,” in Advances in Behavioral Economics, Camerer, Colin, Loewenstein, George, and Rabin, Matthew (eds.). New York, NY: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Cappelen, Alexander, Hole, Astri Drange, Sørenson, Erik, and Tungodden, Bertil. 2007. “The Pluralism of Fairness Ideas: An Experimental Approach,” American Economic Review 97(3): 818–27.Google Scholar
Charness, Gary and Rabin, Matthew. 2002. “Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(3): 817–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, James C., Friedman, Daniel, and Gjerstad, Steven. 2007. “A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness,” Games and Economic Behavior 59: 17–45.Google Scholar
Dufwenberg, Martin and Kirchsteiger, Georg. 2004. “A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity,” Games and Economic Behavior 47(2): 268–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Falk, Armin and Fischbacher, Urs. 2006. “A Theory of Reciprocity,” Games and Economic Behavior 54, 293–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, Ernst and Schmidt, Klaus M.. 1999. “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3): 817–68.Google Scholar
Frank, Adam. 1997. “Quantum Honeybees,” Discover Magazine. Available online: http://discovermagazine.com/1997/nov/quantumhoneybees1263#.UXA6f0raix0.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. A. 1963. “Rules, Perception and Intelligibility,” Proceedings of the British Academy 48: 321–44.Google Scholar
Kimbrough, Erik O. and Vostroknutov, Alexander. 2016. “Norms Make Preferences Social,” Journal of the European Econonomic Association 14(3): 608–38.Google Scholar
Knight, Frank H. 1922. “Ethics and the Economics Interpretation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 36(3): 454–81.Google Scholar
Knight, Frank H. 1997 [1924]. “The Limitations of Scientific Method in Economics,” reprinted in The Ethics of Competition. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.Google Scholar
Knight, Frank H. 1925. “Economic Psychology and the Value Problem,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 39: 372–409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krupka, Erin and Weber, Roberto A.. 2009. “The Focusing and Informational Effects of Norms on Pro-social Behavior,” Journal of Economic Psychology 30(3): 307–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krupka, Erin and Weber, Roberto A.. 2013. “Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary?” Journal of the European Economic Association 11(3): 495–524.Google Scholar
Levine, David K. 1998. “Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments,” Review of Economic Dynamics 1(3): 595–622.Google Scholar
López-Pérez, Raúl. 2008. “Aversion to Norm-breaking: A Model,” Games and Economic Behavior 64(1): 237–67.Google Scholar
Mayo, Deborah G. 1996. Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rabin, Matthew. 1993. “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,” American Economic Review 83(5): 1281–1302.Google Scholar
Roth, Alvin E. 1995. “Bargaining Experiments,” in The Handbook of Experimental Economis, Kagel, John and Roth, Alvin (eds.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 253–91.Google Scholar
Schoeck, Helmut. 1987 [1966]. Envy: A Theory of Social Behaviour. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.Google Scholar
Smith, Kip and Dickhaut, John. 2005. “Economics and emotion: Institutions matter,” Games and Economic Behavior 52: 316–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel. 1991. “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(4): 1039–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Watson, John B. 1913. “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It,” Psychological Review 20: 158–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, Bart J. 2010. “Social Preferences Are Not Preferences,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 73(1): 77–82.Google Scholar
Wilson, Bart J. 2012. “Contra Private Fairness,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 71(2): 407–35.Google Scholar