This book aims at transcending the dichotomy between deontology and consequentialism by accounting for reasons, obligation, and value in an integrated normative framework. In that framework, the consequences of our actions include more than what we caused by acting, and the main focus of deliberation is conduct. Deliberation should take account of the moral value our conduct realizes. That in turn may have intrinsic value or intrinsic disvalue. The importance of moral value is illustrated and shown to be central for deontological ethics but also of major importance for the view – consequencism – that the overall consequences of our conduct, organically understood, provides the widest and deepest moral standard. Consequencism is neither purely deontological nor purely consequentialist; it is pluralistic and accommodates all three dimensions of value; it incorporates the virtue-theoretic requirement on moral motivation; and its normative demand is a preferential standard stronger than satisficing but weaker than maximization.