In the context of the financial governance of the IMF, what are the equity implications of the manner in which the IMF distributes the cost of running its regular (non-concessionary) lending operations as well as the modalities of funding its concessionary lending and debt relief operations? While the IMF charges borrowers roughly what it pays its creditor members for the resources used in its regular lending operations, its overhead costs (administrative budget plus addition to reserves) are shared between the two groups of members in a less equitable manner. With the overhead costs rising inexorably to meet an increasing number and range of responsibilities being placed upon the institution – largely at the instance of the IMF's principal creditors by virtue of their dominant majority of voting power – the under-representation of the IMF's debtors undermines the legitimacy of its decision-making. With regard to the concessionary lending and debt-relief operations, some of the IMF's funding modalities have involved a substantial contribution by IMF debtors, sometimes under pressure. While this has been accepted as part of an intra-developing country burden-sharing exercise, it has also meant a significant burden shifting away from the developed countries in the cost of meeting their responsibilities to the poorest members of the international community.

The system of quotas and voting power in the IMF has, over the years, created distortions and lacks equity. A group of 24 industrialized countries controls 60 per cent of the voting power, while more than 85 per cent of the membership – 159 out of 183 IMF members – together hold only 40 per cent of the vote … The existing imbalance is seen as evidence of the lopsidedness of governance of the international monetary system. Thus a more equal distribution of quotas and voting power between the developing world and the industrial countries should enhance the IMF's governance and credibility …