We are still far from a religious history of Europe (l'histoire réligieuse de l'Europe) which would satisfy the requirements of modern religious scholarship. We do, however, have a picture of the religions of Europe, the old and the new, of their metamorphoses and effects on the intellectual world of European man, which we can use as a temporary survey. A modification in this survey concerns not only scholars; the religious history of Europe is our religious history, regardless of the value it has for the individual as creed or philosophical doctrine. Unlike religion, religious history cannot be repudiated on the basis of doubts as to its truth or its existential validity (could this be “my” religion?). What is more, such a history cannot be side-stepped, for even the repudiation of all religion is an act within religious history; and a presentation of the religious history of Europe which does not concern itself with Nietzsche would not satisfy our demands as scholars.

Criticism of the traditional periodization of history (antiquity, the Middle Ages, the modern age), generally centered on the medieval period as the crucial point, has not even stooped to consider what is called the “contemporary age.” This new and poorly defined phase, proposed by the methodologists to inclose in history the events and times which immediately precede us or in which we live, has not in general been accepted as such a theoretical unity by those who have been occupied with the other pretentious “ages” in order to deny their equal validity.

In the ingenious and controversial scheme outlined here, certainly, the contemporary age represents a concept so artificial, so devoid of unified personality and feeling and of clear differentiation, that it only disturbs the already slight harmony of this controversial and antiquated system.

Much has been written on the life of Muhammad, prophet of Islam. (“Mohammed” and the French “Mahomet” are the result of a long-standing and now traditional deformation.) Aside from his picturesque and romantic character, sure to excite the interest of Occidentals drawn to active, impassioned lives of genius, the importance of the Moslem achievement which he initiated has given rise to important works, the solid and honorable production of historians and specialists of Islam.

We see, then, that many pages have been written on this astonishing man. Critical discussions, often heated ones, have been devoted to the least of his words or deeds. However, very few of these pages have been devoted to the fundamental problems raised by his life in the minds of those who reflect on the evolution and the destiny of societies.

The history of philosophy, like every area of human endeavor, has given rise to criticisms and reservations. Nobody has expressed this more vehemently than Schopenhauer. “To study philosophy, not by reading the actual works of the philosophers, but with the aid of summaries of their doctrines in a history of philosophy, is like having someone else chew one's own food.”

In a general way, Schopenhauer's reservations apply to all history of philosophy, not only to one of its aspects. Nor are they directed against history itself, but specifically against the history of philosophy. The plight of the history of philosophy is worse than that of other fields of history precisely because philosophy itself happens to have the most favorable conditions. In effect, political or economic events are in the realm of the past, while philosophical events remain in the present in the form of manuscripts and books. For this reason political or economic history has a raison d'être: in it a historian reconstructs that which no longer exists, whereas a historian of philosophy merely reproduces what is.

à Mauritz Friis
en souvenir des soirées
de Görväln et de Pampachica

Francisco was born in 1573 in the old capital of the Incas, a pretty town stretching along a high valley of the Andes 11,000 feet above sea level but close enough to the earth's breast to enjoy a gentle springtime throughout the year, even in winter. 1573: forty-two years since the first Spaniards, three of them, reached the city as emissaries of the conqueror, who was then especially occupied with the last Inca whom he held prisoner in a northern village and of whom he demanded an enormous ransom. Guided and protected by officers of the empire, they came to hasten the despoiling of temples and palaces and to collect vases and plaques of gold ordered by Atahualpa, who vainly hoped to gain his freedom. Three years later, on March 23,1534, before an astonished crowd of Indians, opening a new era in the name of the king and the pope, the founding of the new Spanish and Christian order in Cuzco solemnly took place. Then, one after another, material catastrophes occurred: in 1536 the conqueror's brother, the first governor, endured the siege of an army of twenty thousand Indians commanded by a phantom Inca, the second Manco, and the city, its thatched roofs ravaged by fire, was blown up by mines and countermines; in 1538 the newly rebuilt houses were destroyed by the rivalry of Pizarro and Almagro; in 1541, after the assassination of the former, new troubles caused new ruins.

Human groups, such as families, tribes, and nations, are often perceived as possessing mental qualities and characteristics more or less common to the group as a whole. This ancient tendency to attribute properties of personality or individuality to human aggregates is particularly strong nowadays with regard to nations, the basic units of political action in this age of nationalism and internationalism.

In the recent UNESCO study by W. Buchanan and H. Cantril, How Nations See Each Other (1953), based on an eight-nation sample, few findings are more revealing than the low frequency of respondents who declare themselves unable to characterize their own nation. All but a very small proportion gave their views freely when asked to describe the character of their countrymen. When this same question was asked with regard to a series of other nationalities, the “Don't know” responses (“impossible to characterize”) were in some cases much more frequent—up to 71 per cent as in the case of the German sample in regard to the Chinese; in others again very low—down to 3 per cent as in the western European responses regarding the United States. These variations are assumed to reflect differences in the degree of familiarity of nations with each other, depending on their mutual relationships over time, their physical proximity or distance, and so on.

Everyone knows of the existence of intelligence tests. This is, in fact, the only aspect of applied psychology that is familiar to the general public. However, not so many people know that these tests have been the object of protracted studies and are integrated into a highly mathematized conceptual system. Our intention is to give a summary outline of this area of research which attempts to analyze man's performance, particularly in the area of the intellect.

The normal process of thought is to go from the concrete to the abstract. Therefore it seems natural to base this outline on an actual example of research carried out in the domain of intelligence and motor co-ordination tests and to use these as a point of departure for more general principles. In the first place, the material used—the actual tests—has a history that is in itself revealing. Second, the method of analysis employed is also deserving of study because it implies a certain number of postulates that must be understood in order to interpret the results it makes possible. Let us familiarize ourselves, then, with a typical factor analysis like the one made at the University of Neuchâtel in 1956.