Kautilya is believed to have been Chanakya, a Brahmin who served as Chief Minister to Chandragupta (321–296 B.C.), the founder of the Mauryan Empire. Chandragupta gained his first successes, soon after the death of Alexander the Great, in campaigns against some of the satraps the Macedonian conqueror had established west of the Indus. He then turned against the Nanda Empire and succeeded in destroying it. The victory over the Nandas and his subsequent conquests gave him control over a large part of the Indian subcontinent, including the Ganges and Indus valleys and parts of the Deccan.

In the literature on political parties in the United States Congress two points are usually stressed. First, it is said that the political party label lacks a precise programmatic content because “party government” in the British sense is absent in the American Congress. Second, however, it is contended that the party label is the single most important and reliable attribute in predicting the voting behavior of a Senator or Representative.

Between these two contentions lies a sizeable area of unexplored territory. If party is the best predictive device in analyzing voting behavior in Congress then, despite the lack of “party government,” the party machinery in both houses must have effects that deserve study. Professor Huitt has suggested the necessity and importance of this kind of study: “… the preoccupation with reform has obscured the fact that we have no really adequate model of party leadership as it exists in Congress, and that none can be constructed because we lack simple descriptions of many of the basic working parts of the present system.” Huitt himself and a few others have filled some of these gaps.

Recent applications of more elaborate quantitative methods (e.g., bloc cluster analysis and Guttman scale procedures) to legislative politics have sharply improved the ability of political scientists to specify significant dimensions of voting behavior. Party affiliation, constituency characteristics and cohesion within state delegations have been correlated with the congressional vote in a number of subject matter areas. Because of the masses of data to be handled, however, even the best of these studies have been limited in scope to a single year or to one Congress. This restriction has not prevented the authors of these works from demonstrating clearly the utility of their methodology, but it has limited correspondingly either the generality or the reliability of their conclusions. The present study, limited to the single issue of congressional voting on foreign aid, is an attempt to discover, by the application of quantitative methods to votes over longer time periods, how far the relationships previously suggested persist over time or are peculiar to the individual sessions in which they occur.

In a revolutionary century political science as a discipline has been transformed along with its subject matter. In no more than a generation the discipline has gone through at least three theoretical ages, from a naive Jeffersonianism to a mongrelized Madisonianism to a kind of liberal Burkeanism. It has been going through still another transformation in methodology. The failure of one democratic institution after another has bred uncertainty, and uncertainty has encouraged a vast expansion of the apparatus of inquiry. Even if all the questions might be found in the Great Books, the quest is new—for conditions rather than truths, for degrees rather than absolutes.

Pragmatism and the group theory of politics are closely related both historically and philosophically; and both have a continuing importance for contemporary political science. Yet these two intellectual traditions have seldom been related in a systematic fashion. This failure to examine both the tree and the branch—the parent tradition of pragmatism and its offshoot, group theory—has foreshortened and distorted theoretical perspective. In this article I have tried to amend this situation by relating the two traditions, setting both in a larger historical and theoretical perspective, and examining their common philosophical suppositions.

It is not uncommon for a major writer to be seen by his critics in widely divergent, even contradictory terms; Alexis de Tocqueville shares this fate. To the familiar causes of controversy, Tocqueville added his own—a veil of neutrality or objectivity concealing his deepest views. The publication in 1835 of the first part of Democracy in America thus gave rise to an effort, still continuing, to discover Tocqueville's true intent: behind the façade of neutrality does he favor one social system, aristocracy or democracy, over the other?

On the one hand, does he not reveal in his writings the ineradicable bias of his aristocratic origins? Was he not hostile to the openended, unformed, and unforeseeable consequences of the democratic revolution? Did he not intend by his criticisms of the democratic system to “carry the reader to the point of wishing for its destruction?” Was not the liberty he defended a “restricted liberty, protecting a small group of privileged people who were really independent so far as economic circumstances went?” Was it not “a liberty for believers, [a] liberty for owners…an aristocratic liberalism?” Did he not believe that “the mass of men should remain bereft of political power?”

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between two concepts which have lately enjoyed an increasing popularity among students of the politics of the developing areas. A couple of arbitrary definitions might dispose of the problem in facile fashion, but our present interest is neither in systematic abstraction nor in generalizing the significance of narrow-gauge empirical research. The method pursued rests upon the assumption that both national integration and political development are situationally bound phenomena. Hence, the conclusions drawn from the present exploration are meant to have a temporary, but practical relevance. Because of this assumption, arriving at an appropriate understanding of the problem of national integration in relation to political development is the goal rather than the starting point of this paper.

Whatever happened to the “radical,” “moderate,” and “conservative” African states we used to talk about not so long ago—say in early 1961? One wonders if the snapshot of African orientations, then in fair focus, has not become badly blurred.

President Sekou Touré, once the radical foe of neo-colonialist African regimes, has more recently offered assurances that his nation opposed intervention in the internal affairs of other states and thus tacitly acknowledged the legitimacy of the states he had formerly condemned. Touré helped to prepare the way for the reconciliation of “radical” and “conservative” states at Addis Ababa, in May 1963, where the Organization of African Unity was formed. At that conference, another stormy petrel of West African radicalism, President Modibo Keita of Mali, observed that though the colonial system divided Africa, “it permitted nations to be born.” “African unity,” he declared, “requires full respect for the frontiers we have inherited from the colonial system.”

Although there has been considerable work on voting patterns in the United Nations, almost none of it has contributed cumulatively to existing theories of international relations. Methodological problems or a descriptive intent have often stood in the way of such advancement. For example, the main findings of Thomas Hovet, Jr.'s Bloc Politics in the United Nations, the most comprehensive work to date, are based on trends in the voting cohesion of regional and caucusing groups in the Assembly and time-series data on how often these groups vote with the majority.

Among students of political philosophy, Montesquieu is chiefly honored as author of The Spirit of the Laws. His earlier important work, The Persian Letters, is more often cited than read and is considered primarily as a collection of fragments, some of which may be useful for clearing up some disputed point or other in the interpretation of the magnum opus. In these notes I propose to treat it as a meaningful whole—as a book which in fact has the theme which it purports to have, the theme of love and its relation to social institutions. This is not an altogether novel approach, even among political scientists. The late Franz Neumann, for example, has pointed out the importance of this theme in his introduction to the Hafner edition of The Spirit of the Laws. Nevertheless, I believe that Montesquieu's conception of love is sufficiently important and the implications of his conception sufficiently interesting, so that a closer analysis will not be redundant.

During the last few years the standard guides to elections, and the Nuffield studies of elections, have given attention to candidates' experience in elections. Nevertheless, the number of unsuccessful contests before a seat was finally won has been reported only since 1951.

During 1963 I talked with a number of M.P.s, and also with national, regional, and constituency agents of both major parties, and encountered a frequently expressed presumption that most careers in the House of Commons began with one or two unsuccessful contests. Chairmen of constituency committees stated this view in a way which implied that most M.P.s earned their way into the House, so to speak, by gaining experience in the course of losing an election or two. If they lost gallantly in an adverse constituency, they might then seek adoption in a more favorable community, having established their right to be considered for candidacy where the chances of winning would be better.