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Shared Intentionality, joint commitment, and directed obligation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2020

Margaret Gilbert Open the ORCID record for Margaret Gilbert [Opens in a new window]
Margaret Gilbert*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, CA92697-4555. mpgilber@uci.eduhttp://www.faculty.uci.edu/profile.cfm?faculty_id=5365
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Abstract

Tomasello frequently refers to joint commitment, but does not fully characterize it. In earlier publications, I have offered a detailed account of joint commitment, tying it to a sense that the parties form a “we,” and arguing that it grounds directed obligations and rights. Here I outline my understanding of joint commitment and its normative impact.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e71
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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