Some analysts blame the direct primary for the supposedly parlous state of the American party system; others assert that nominating procedures do not affect parties at all. The literature abounds with more or less judicious, and conflicting, estimates of the consequences of the primary mode of nomination. In fact, our present knowledge provides little basis for confident appraisal of the effects of the direct primary. This article reports an attack on a small part of the problem, viz., state legislative nominations in two-party states, by explicit methods of analysis, whose use may both make possible a minor substantive contribution as well as demonstrate the appalling amount of work necessary for a provisional solution of even the smallest aspect of the broad problem.

To cope with questions about the consequences of particular institutional arrangements requires both a working theory and a means of observation to determine whether it fits the facts. For lack of a better concept, the problem of the effects of the primary method of nomination may be regarded as a special case of the broader question of the nature of the interaction between formal and informal organization.

A rough measure of the resilience of the British Conservative party is indicated by the relatively rapid comeback from the electoral defeat of 1945. Instead of a twenty years' exile, like that of American Republicans, the Conservatives were out of office only six years. To be sure, their return to power was by a very slim parliamentary majority, representing less than half the popular vote cast in the General Election of 1951. And the ups and downs of the Conservative Goverment's popularity, as reflected in by-elections during 1952 and 1953, have shown little more than a capacity to hold the existing narrow margin. For many it must still seem difficult, as it did for Professor Herman Finer in the late 1940's, “to conceive a policy which, within some decades even, might win back for the Conservatives enough votes to support a solid government.” Naturally the Conservatives themselves have hardly accepted the fate of serving only an occasional interregnum between periods of Labour rule. Almost entirely without the spectacular issues which have characterized recent electoral successes of American Republicans, the British Right has sought to refute the assumption that it is incapable of presenting a sufficiently attractive political alternative to socialism.

Many Americans view “neutralism” as a new type of social disease. Its probable causes: intimacy in some form with communism; its symptoms: mental confusion and moral dereliction; its cure: unknown. This is a somber diagnosis, filled with implications of doom for the “victims.” But our warnings and protests have been to little avail. Most “neutralists” have deliberately rejected them, and the “disease”—if that be its proper designation—has approached epidemic proportions in many areas. Among the centers of infection, Asia is certainly the region where “neutralism” has shown its most consistent strength and taken its most diverse forms. And however much they may lament it, Americans must recognize the fact that Asian “neutralism” can be neither ignored nor talked out of existence. In our own interests, therefore, we should seek a more complete understanding of this highly complex force—its causes and effects, and possibly its implications for future American policy. Understanding does not necessarily mean acceptance; it does permit a more accurate calculation of alternative risks, and this is the vital element in decision making.

At the outset, the problems of definition and terminology must be raised. It is not easy to define or describe “neutralism” in such manner as to obtain the largest measure of agreement from all parties concerned. Frequently, the word is intended as an epithet, with connotations similar to those suggested in our opening sentences.

There was no change in the personnel of the Supreme Court during the 1952 Term. But following the close of the Term, on September 8, 1953, Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, who had been appointed to the Court by President Truman in 1946, died unexpectedly at the age of 63. To replace him President Eisenhower gave a recess appointment to Governor Earl Warren of California on October 2. The new Chief Justice was sworn in on October 5.

Two important developments in the constitutional law field during the period under review occurred outside the Court. One was the publication by the Government Printing Office, in 1953, of a newly revised annotated Constitution of the United States, prepared by the Legislative Reference Service under the editorship of Edward S. Corwin. The annotations come down to June 30, 1952. The last annotated Constitution was published in 1938 under the editorship of W. C. Gilbert. The new work, an ample book of about 1400 large pages, is indispensable for students of American government.

Noteworthy also was the appearance of the first two volumes of William Winslow Crosskey's monumental study of the American Constitution, under the title of Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States.

When the Council of Economic Advisers opened its doors in late 1946, many regarded the fledgling agency as a contingent of depression doctors armed with a “watered down” version of the Full Employment Bill. Instead, during the Truman era, the Council became, in the words of its second chairman, “an overall general economic advisory staff” generally concerned with major problems affecting the growth and stability of the American economy, including its adaptability to the special demands of international stress. Actually the “transition” of the agency to this broader role was more apparent than real, since the Employment Act itself clearly contained a charter for a general economic staff function if the new staff and its principal chose development in that direction. In the wartime deliberations which led up to the Act, the Congress was concerned not only to prevent a postwar depression but also to improve the integration of the whole economic policy formation process. And, in the final version of the Act, after making a very general policy declaration, the Congress decided, instead of drafting specific substantive solutions which would prejudge the source and nature of future economic problems, to establish procedural machinery to facilitate the intelligent diagnosis and solution of such problems when they did subsequently arise.

The period starting November 5, 1952 has been called “The Time of the Jitters” for the middle and upper levels of the federal bureaucracy. Political change is usually disruptive and always accompanied by uncertainty and insecurity. Intellectual acceptance of this truism does not insulate one from the effects any more than death and taxes, for all their recognized inevitability, cease to be sources of distress.

There were many reasons to anticipate that the 1952 election might result in a greater than usual degree of change, or at least of uncertainty. In many ways there were no real American precedents for the situation. The period of executive control by the outgoing party had been characterized by the unusual duration of 20 years, by highly controversial political policy, and by profound social change. This was the first change of administration under conditions of modern Big Government—the first since the American government found itself with accepted broad welfare and economic responsibility on the domestic scene and with major power responsibilities in a divided and warring world. Since the last full change, the size of the federal civil service had increased over 400 per cent, governmental expenditures over 16 fold. This was also to be the first full change of administration to show the effects of the 20th Amendment.

Recently two new and important proposals have been made concerning the character of the needed basin organization for the development and proper utilization of the resources of the Missouri Valley. A Missouri Basin Survey Commission was appointed by President Truman in 1952 to make a “thorough re-evaluation of the whole problem.” In its 1953 report this survey group recommended the establishment of a federal Missouri Basin Commission with authority to “direct and coordinate the activities of all federal agencies relating to resource development.” In December, 1952 the Missouri River States Committee, composed of the governors of the ten basin states, accepted a Council of State Governments' draft of a federal-interstate compact as the desirable framework for basin organization. Each of these proposals would create a new commission to integrate basin planning and secure coordination among all governmental agencies in the operation of water facilities.

At one point in its report the Missouri Basin Survey Commission describes the course of the Missouri as “a crude but large question mark across the surface of one-sixth of the nation” and uses the description to symbolize “the great array of problems which await satisfactory solution in the Basin.” Certainly the physical, planning, and policy problems of Missouri Basin conservation and development are difficult enough.

Although there is a voluminous literature on the organization and procedure of state legislatures, material on their politics is relatively sparse. The classic work of A. Lawrence Lowell, now more than a half-century old, still appears to be the chief reliance of scholars in the field. Lowell's thesis was that parties were relatively insignificant in state legislatures; virtually the whole of the subsequent literature agrees with this. In the case of the Connecticut legislature, it would seem that parties, far from being relatively insignificant, play a dominating role.

The study of party influence in a legislature necessitates a two-level approach: analysis of the role of the party leadership and of the voting behavior of the party membership. Several questions must be answered with regard to the party leadership. Are the party leaders an identifiable and cohesive group? Do they develop a definite program for legislative consideration? Is their authority shared with factional leaders capable of frequent disruption of the party program? Are committee chairmen or party leaders in the stronger position for actually forming legislative policy? Do pressure group leaders work through the formal party leaders or do they attempt to build ad hoc legislative majorities for their bills through independent action?

Teachers of public administration will welcome the challenging and provocative article of Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, “Reflections of a Law Professor on Instruction and Research in Public Administration,” which appeared in the September issue of the Review. It is my purpose to reply to some of his criticisms, to agree with him in some regards, and to discuss some of the issues which he raises. I am in entire agreement with him about the merits of the case method in teaching public administration, and I imagine that there would be little disagreement by other teachers of the subject, though as yet the collection and publication of cases suitable for undergraduate instruction has not reached the point where the use of texts of the conventional type may be discontinued. One of the first efforts to prepare and publish cases on public administration was undertaken fifteen years ago by the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council when I was a member of its staff, and resulted in three volumes which were published in 1940 and the following years. The Stein collection is a vast improvement over the earlier case studies, and is being widely used, particularly in graduate courses. The cases were produced by the cooperative efforts of teachers of public administration at a number of leading universities.