Law is practical. Legal reasoning is practical reasoning. We could make nothing of a judge who having listened to counsel's arguments and reflected about the law governing his case thought that the state of knowledge that he had achieved was the natural termination of his enterprise and submitted his conclusions to the editors of Halsbury's Laws of England rather than performed the action of giving judgment. The parties would be outraged, and rightly. And if the judge continued to do such a thing he would be dismissed. Legal reasoning is practical in the sense that its natural conclusion is an action (in the judge's case the action of giving judgment) rather than a state of knowledge. This is taking “practical” in a strong sense. By this definition thought is practical whose natural conclusion is an action (or decision against action): its strongest contrast is with theoretical thought whose natural conclusion is knowledge. But it also contrasts with hypothetical thought about action (say, my thinking it would be good to play cricket again). I do not call this practical because it does not conclude in an action or decision against action (others do; for example John Finnis in Fundamentals of Ethics; my reasons for differing in this matter will emerge). A judge's practical reasoning towards the action of giving judgment has priority for our understanding of law over that vast range of practically idle things that lawyers do, from the construction of digests like Halsbury to casual reflection about the rule in Shelley's case (of course there is one sort of doing involved in both these, but not legal doing). It is important here to be clear about this priority. It is a priority of practicality, not a priority of judges or lawyers.

This article attempts to investigate an aspect of the English law on limitation of actions which has received little academic attention—its application to restitutionary claims. It will be suggested that, as the essence of a plaintiff's claim is the injustice of the defendant retaining a benefit gained at his expense, the running of time should be a defence to a restitutionary action where its passing has sufficiently eroded the injustice of that retention. In theory this should be a matter for decision purely on the facts of each case, but additionally the societal need to discourage stale litigation often requires an overall time bar based on the Limitation Act 1980. This perspective suggests a number of particular conclusions which are summarised at the end of the discussion.