Since the initial meeting of the U.S.-Soviet Symposium on Contemporary Problems of sub-Saharan Africa in 1982 considerable change has occurred in the relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in regard to African issues, as well as in the relationship between the American and Soviet specialists on Africa. Apprehension was the quality that infused the initial meeting in November of 1982 of the first-ever formal exchange of views between Soviet and American Africanists. Both American and Soviet participants wondered whether the discussions would be substantive, scholarly, and constructive. Conversly, would their opposite numbers simply repeat official government positions, make debating points rather than engaging in discussion, and adopt an ideological and baiting posture? In other words, “would the Symposium simply turn into another forum for the exchange of “cold war rhetoric?

Modification of the system of apartheid which started in the late 1970s initially in “pure economic” fields gradually led to the necessity of revising the very foundations of the political structure in the RSA. The reforms provided fresh impetus for the democratic movement in the country and, in the final analysis, it did not slow down, but, on the contrary, stepped up the decay of the system of apartheid. Demarcation of the interests of social groups of the white population and the government’s attempts to reform apartheid brought about the irreversible phenomena of crisis in the camp of supporters of the regime. Many white leaders are facing a dilemma: either bend further efforts to preserve the material well-being of their community at the price of the policy which has no future either socially or politically, or try to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict at the price of their privileged position.

As remote and improbable a venue for a crisis in American foreign policy as Quemoy or the Gulf of Tonkin, Angola (1975) came to assume a Munich-like symbolism in the calculations of Americans who perceived a threat of Soviet expansionism into the third world during the latter years of the Brezhnev era. Smarting from a political/military shutout in Angola that came on the heels of a humiliating American exodus from Saigon, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pointed to Angola as the “principal” cause of a deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations. Subsequent policy confrontations over Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Cambodia reinforced this perception of Angola as the beginning of the end of detente.

Public opinion of late has been riveted to Africa’s southwest. The prospects of a settlement are glimmering on the horizon. Although the prospects are not completely clear, we can begin to view concrete steps toward a peaceful settlement in the region.

Ironically, the present security and development crisis in Southern Africa presents an unusual opportunity for early progress toward stability and justice in the region via peaceful parallel action and co-operation between the USA and the USSR. By seizing the opportunity to co-operate in what is now a worst case emergency in Mozambique, the superpowers can lay the groundwork for a security system acceptable to their interests and to those of the Africans as well. Violence and hunger in Mozambique may be the worst in the world. Their basic linkage to the efforts of the present South African regime to de-stabilize the country is unquestionable.

The situations in Angola and Mozambique are very much alike. How can one define them: civil war, foreign intervention, economic breakdown, or destabilization?

There is a grain of truth in each of these definitions. Still, none of them fully reflects the developments in these countries. What we find in Angola and Mozambique is a unique crisis which has hit weak, nationally disunited countries. (By contrast, Afghans are united by a religious culture, and Nicaraguans by national sentiments.)

A week before the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Washington, a group of American and Soviet scholars met in Moscow to explore how a new spirit of cooperation could be applied in Africa. The challenge was to find ways of transforming the well-established pattern of hostile competition between the two countries in that area of the world into one of collaboration for the mutual benefit of both countries and Africa. The results of the Moscow workshop are highly promising.

A critical problem for Africa is that of food production and distribution, highlighted by declines in food production, widespread hunger, and famine. There are several interrelated sources of this problem, both domestic and external. Among them are ecological problems, engendered by climatic and natural conditions; land fertility depletion in many regions of sub-Saharan Africa; the extreme scarcity of financial resources, accentuated by the debt burden and falling terms of trade; a deficit of investment goods and research and development facilities needed for agricultural development; and weaknesses in rural infrastructure, both economic and social. Unbalanced interaction between the rural and urban economies as well as archaic socioeconomic structures play a major role in the problems of food distribution, with consequent effects on food production.

Another critical problem for Africa, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa is that of desertification. The crisis of desertification in the Sahel and other dryland regions of Africa increases exponentially, that is, its effects are incrementally debilitating. Each year of delay in dealing with this problem in an effective way, using available technology and resources, moves the problem further beyond our capacity to handle it. Furthermore, desertification has many direct and indirect effects on, among others, food production, land use, transport, housing, and weather patterns, further compounding the problem. The scale of the problem is enormous, and neither African governments nor international organizations organizations have mounted an effective response. The problem of desertification in Africa is, however, to a great extent, a tale of opportunities missed. The application of existing technology and resources has encountered obstacles and resistance, while potential resources have failed to materialize.

Several African countries with rich endowments of mineral resources and petroleum have, paradoxically, achieved less by way of economic development than other African states without such wealth. In the African mineral economies there is less diversification of production, less investment, higher foreign debt, greater unemployment, and weaker overall productive growth. The causes of this poor economic performance involve both external factors, such as declining prices of primary commodity products, and internal factors, such as rent-seeking activities of politically powerful groups which give their support to governmental leaders in return for access to wealth. Inevitably, the mineral industries, which depend on timely investments and good management, decline. As a result the governments then resort to heavy foreign borrowing.

Africa is by far the weakest region of the world in terms of communication, including telecommunications and the use of satellite relays. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have experience in the establishment of communications networks over continent-wide areas, and, by co-operation for Africa, they can assist Africa in improving communications. Improved communications can have major direct and indirect benefits to Africa in terms of economic output, productivity, environmental protection, health care, education and many other areas.

The overwhelmingly dominant regional power of southern Africa, South Africa, attempts to contain the political, economic, and military interdependence of neighboring states, irrespective of ideological preference. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) founded in 1980, is the response of the other states in the region to South Africa’s ambitions to maintain regional hegemony. Its nine member state are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and an independent Namibia is expected to join. The specific objectives of SADCC, as stated in the 1980 Lusaka Declaration, are the reduction of economic dependence in general (not only on South Africa); the forging of links to create a genuinely meaningful and equitable system of regional integration; the mobilization of resources to support national, interstate, and regional policies; and concerted action to secure international cooperation for the purpose of economic liberation.

The principles embodied in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime internationally, including Africa, would serve international peace and security. Nonproliferation is an area of common interest between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., in which the two countries have a good record of cooperation.

Soviet-American cooperation for Africa can be an important confidence-building measure in reducing tensions, correcting misperceptions, promoting mutual understanding, fostering improved bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, and creating trust. It could also lead to further cooperation in other fields or regions. At various times people have cited trade, cultural exchanges, exchanges of visitors, student exchanges, arms control agreements, and cooperation in space as initiatives that could be interpreted as confidence-building measures. All are valuable, and each can play a role in improving bilateral relations.

Three separate but related issues made an unforgettable impression on me during 1982-1985, the three years that I chaired the African Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Today, they seem daunting and no less diminished: 1) the perennial threats of severe cuts in federal Title VI funding for international language and area studies, 2) the apparent demoralization of area studies graduates owing to a gloomy job market picture, and, despite these blows, 3) the continuing, demonstrated importance of African Area Studies to our campuses and society at large.