This article is a summary of the conclusions of a work in progress on “Biology and Cognition;” from this stems the rather general character of the following observations. In order to compare cognitive and biological mechanisms, we must first state that the former are an extension and utilization of organic auto-regulations, of which they are a form of end-product. To demonstrate this, one can begin by noting the close parallels between the major problems faced by biologists and those faced by theoreticians of the intelligence or of cognition. Secondly, one can analyze the functional analogies and especially the structural isomorphisms between organic life and the means of cognition: “nested” structures, structures of order, multiplicative correspondence, etc. One can also attempt a sort of comparative epistemology of the different levels of behavior (the “logic” of the instincts or of the learning processes, etc.). Finally, one can examine the explanations current among biologists to account for the formation of intelligence. But if these various analyses bring into relief the continuity between organic life and cognitive mechanisms, on the other hand it still remains to be seen that the latter constitute differentiated and specialized organs for reacting physiologically to the external world. Or in other words, that at the same time that they are an elaboration of organic structures in general, they fulfill particular functions, although still of a biological nature. The following pages are based on this premise, but it should be understood that it is not a question of contrasting cognition with organic behavior but rather of placing the functions of the former within the framework of the latter.

I believe that in world history today the question of the interdependence and mutual relation of various cultural regions arises with renewed urgency. Against those tendencies which place racial, national and cultural complexes in sharp opposition and underline only antagonistic tendencies and conflicts between them, it is necessary to emphasize the basic continuity and uniformity of the development of the human race, and to realize that the world, despite all its complexity and variety, has unity. No human group exists in isolation, and the higher its culture, the more fertile and numerous are its relations with other cultures.

In the final analysis it is evident that two economic events have influenced the life of humanity more strongly than any other phenomena, especially if we consider their global consequences.

The first was the neolithic revolution, which marked the passage from a human society based on berry and fruit picking and hunting—implying very low population densities—to a society based on agriculture and cattle raising, which permitted higher population densities.

As a social group intellectuals everywhere are almost always gripped by certain tensions and uncertainties. Some of these tensions are inherent in the universal role of intellectuals as creators and carriers of culture; others reflect the particular socio-economic and political milieu in which they live. Although, for instance, the American intellectual has been enjoying more power and status in society, he still must “avoid the twin temptations of total withdrawal and total integration.” As intellectuals are being increasingly absorbed and recognized by various parts of the American “establishment,” they seem haunted by the fear of selling out or losing part of their creative and critical role in society.

Conversely, total detachment or alienation may also be self-defeating. Likewise, some observers have found the English intellectual “gentlemanly, amateurish and unrigorous, too near the upper classes and to established power to exercise real independence of mind and creativity.” The French intellectual also appears to be plagued by the same paradox. “There is no country in the world where intellectuals have more influence, attract more attention, or enjoy more prestige than they do in France. But the relationship between French intellectuals and the society to which they belong is a paradoxical one.”

In tracing the history of emotions and of mentalities, one is immediately confronted with a question of method resulting from the interplay of emotions and language.

The emotions whose history we wish to retrace are accessible to us only from the time when they find expression, verbally or by other means. For the critic, for the historian, an emotion exists only beyond the point at which it attains a linguistic status. No facet of an emotion can be traced before it is named, before it is designated and expressed. It is not, then, the emotion itself which comes before us; only that part which has passed into a given form of expression can be of interest to the historian.

We are living today at such a pace of technological development that it is no longer enough for the businessman or the intellectual, when they consider the problems related to their specific interests, work, politics or specialization, to look just at what these problems mean in present, immediate, strictly modern terms. In fact, the very prestige of this word—modern—is in a state of crisis.