The United States and Africa are in deep trouble when the head of the National Endowment for the Humanities disowns its sponsorship of the Ali Mazrui series The Africans on the grounds that it is an “anti-Western diatribe…and politically tendentious.” It bodes ill for the U.S. because it marks a return to the “know nothing” approach to Africa which has dominated American thinking about the African continent throughout most of our history. And it lends respectability to a cold war view of that continent which can only lead to greater misunderstanding, confrontation, and bloodshed for African peoples. What is so disturbing about the reaction of the NEH and a number of the series' reviewers is their exclusive focus on Mazrui's view of the West. Of the many important themes running through the series, did they not see or hear anything else? This self-indulgent preoccupation with the occasional opinion about “the West” is all too indicative of our times.

That criticism of colonialism can somehow be interpreted as “anti-American” points not only to a profound lack of comprehension of the nature of colonialism, but to the proclivity in U.S. policy toward Africa to identify with the wrong side. “Colonization should not be attacked,” claim many on the American right, “because that era was not only the apex of African development but a time when there was no communist threat on the continent.”

The right wing, however, has no monopoly on such myopia and misperception. America and Africa are also in deep trouble when specialists attribute all of Africa's maladies to colonialism or neo-colonialism.

Early in this decade a political observer, looking at one of Africa's least known and most sanguinary states, described Equatorial Guinea as “Cambodia minus ideology” (Pélissier, 1980:13). During the eleven year presidency (1968-1979) of Francisco Macias Nguema, up to half of the population was liquidated or went into exile. Little is known on the internal workings or ideology of the regime. However, just as we can no longer say that there are peoples without histories, we can no longer assume that there are rulers without ideologies. Much statistical and other information on Equatorial Guinea is fragmentary or missing. It is possible, however, to trace the lineaments of the rise and fall of the first post-independent government. It is the purpose of this essay to examine that development. We shall seek an explanation, although it be a partial one, of the ideological and economic conditions which provided the context for the creation of a mass concentration camp in the tropics.

Since the nineteenth century, the materialist/idealist dichotomy has been at the center of much historiographical debate. A sub-theme has been the role of the individual in history. An increasingly wide range of scholars have used material conditions as the basis for their analysis. The individual is not an automous historical force, but rather represents a class and its interests as the class acts to maintain or establish its hegemony. Others, on the contrary, continue to maintain that the individual can, under certain circumstances, mold history to his or her will. It can and has been maintained that the idiosyncratic behavior of a leader can be an important independent variable in history.

Tanzania is one of only a few African countries which have had a long political stability guided by a “national ideology.” The evolution of goals of development policy can be traced back to the period of the independence struggle, especially since the mid-1950s with the establishment of the Tanganyika (later Tanzania) African National Union (TANU), the party of independence. It was not until 1967, however, with the Arusha Declaration, that a clear orientation was explicitly spelled out in terms of a country economic and political ideology: the policy of socialism and self reliance. The period from independence in 1961 to Arusha (1967) has been characterized as a period of shaping a new state and a new ideology while allowing the economy to a large extent to carry on its own pre-independence tracks (Wangwe and Mabele, 1985). The Arusha Declaration articulated TANU's aspirations for a formal development manifesto in a “declaration of intent,” with the main objectives of: a gradual and directed transition to socialism; creating an egalitarian society through the reduction of inequality and universal provision of basic public goods; and building a self-reliant economy in the medium to long term.

Two developments subsequent to Arusha constituted the pillars of the evolving socio-economic setup: the increased and dominant role of the public sector in the economy, and the evolution of an incomes policy meant to enhance egalitarianism.

The public ownership and/or control of the major means of production and distribution (the so-called “commanding heights”) in the economy is an essential feature of socialism.

The system of comprehensive price controls in Tanzania was established under the Regulation of Prices Act of 1973. Prior to that, price controls applied to a few urban consumer staples including beer, matches, sugar, beans, rice, wheat and maize flour, bread, grey sheeting and khanga, a popular dressing material. By May, 1973, four hundred items had been put on the price control list. The timing of the act was due to several possible influences. As a result of the Arusha Declaration in 1967, the early 1970s had seen an increasing regulation of the economy with the nationalization of rental housing, the enactment of a drastically progressive income tax, and the nucleation of the rural population in villages. In 1967 the government adopted a wages, incomes and prices policy which placed restraints on the growth of wages. The control of prices was, therefore, a logical consequence of this policy. On the economic front, there had been drastic price increases in late 1972 and early 1973 partly arising from a worldwide spurt in inflation.

In the subsequent period, starting mid-1970s, inflation increased even faster. Using 1976/77 as the base year, the National Consumer Price Index (hereafter, NCPI) increased from 42.4 in 1970 to 52.8 in 1973, 156.7 in 1980 and 775.2 in 1986. The minimum wage earners' price index in the principal city of Dar es Salaam which was 33.4 in 1970, rose to 41.7 in 1973, 165.2 in 1980 and hit 787.9 in 1986. For the same sub periods, the middle-grade civil servants' price indices were 42.3, 50.7, 176.6, and 911.5. Increasingly, the response of the government to these developments was to resort to price controls for the management of inflation.

The Sultan of Sokoto, locally known as the chief of Muslims (Sarkin Musulmi), was the most influential traditional ruler in Nigeria during the colonial era. His influence came from his predecessor, the caliph, who was the political head of the Sokoto Caliphate which was comprised of about twenty emirates. Under the colonial administration, however, the sultan and the other emirs of northern Nigeria were powerless.

Many scholars have imputed northern Nigeria's socioeconomic backwardness, when compared to southern Nigeria, to the emirs' “sluggishness, conservatism and egocentricity” (Heussler, 1968: 187-89; Fika, 1978: 273; Ozigi and Ocho, 1981: 40-41; Hubbard, 1973: 192). It is generally assumed that under the indirect rule system which the British allegedly practiced in Nigeria during the colonial period, the emirs had powers to initiate development projects to improve socioeconomic development. It is currently argued that they failed to do this so as not to jeopardize their positions (Heussler, 1968: 119; Ozigi and Ocho, 1981: 41). Such assertions are based on a misconception of the emirs' powers under colonial rule, a misconception that is largely due to a misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the system of indirect rule.

The purpose of this essay is to assess the sultan's performance as an administrator of the Sokoto emirate in his dual role of responsibility toward the colonial regime and duty toward his people during the first forty years of colonial rule. Students of the colonial history of northern Nigeria have ignored this subject, but it is essential for understanding the nature and effects of colonialism in Nigeria.

The economic development and relative political stability of the Ivory Coast over the last three decades has attracted sharply contrasting views. The interpretations range from enthusiastic endorsements of the Ivory Coast as a model for other developing African countries to sharp criticisms of the liberal economic policies which the state has pursued. In the view of the World Bank, the economic accomplishments of the Ivory Coast illustrate how the correct incentives to rural producers and a liberal investment code can result in sustained economic growth. Between 1960 and 1975 the economy grew at an annual rate of seven percent. Although the Ivory Coast is beginning to regain some momentum after five years of economic recession, its economy has still fared better than many other African economies. Critics, however, contend that the economic crisis is a manifestation of the structural limits of the liberal economic model adopted by the Ivorian political elite. While there is no consensus on whether the liberal approach adopted by the government benefitted the majority of Ivorians or has made the country extremely dependent on France and other Western nations for capital and technology, the Ivorian state is at the center of the various interpretations. The state takes on a different role depending on the form of analysis applied to its activities; nevertheless, the fact that the state played a pivotal role in the country over the last three decades is not a matter of argument. What is contested is whose interest the Ivorian state serves: the Ivorian peasant, a small planter bourgeoisie, or the bureaucratic elite itself?

Wartime causes [of the 1942 agitation] include the hardship caused by…sudden strain to which the workers have been subjected in an effort to increase efficiency and output simultaneously; inescapable privations necessary to satisfy the needs and demands of the Metropolis of the Empire.

Memorandum of the Land and Survey African Technical Workers Union of Nigeria (Great Britain, 1946: 117)

Maybe it would be better to have employees controlled by Mr. Patrick than by Mr. Stalin and to be quite candid I think that is at the bottom of it all. I think that we have got to face the fact that if we don't get labour organised and controlled we shall be up against much bigger problems when they organise themselves.

An elected member of the Kenya Legislature in 1947 (Quoted in Singh, 1969: 194)

A wave of general strikes and urban protest, reaching from Durban to Tunis, and from Dakar to Dar es Salaam, took place in Africa in the years immediately following the Second World War. While each general strike possessed its own specific features, taken together the strikes shared several common characteristics. They were all primarily economically motivated, and African workers initiated and led them. The most salient feature of this unrest was the participation of all segments of the urban population, because its structural causes were economic conditions which deleteriously affected whitecollar civil servants and unskilled laborers alike. Furthermore, railway and dock workers in particular often assumed prominent roles. The strikes demonstrated the existence of contradictions in colonial social formations which required resolution, and authorities throughout British Africa reacted in a similar manner.

Judicial research from a cross-national perspective has been a relatively neglected subject among American scholars. Since the founding of Law and Society Review, approximately twenty-two articles have appeared on comparative judicial topics, with one issue (summer 1978) devoted exclusively to a European sociology of law. Of these articles, five address African problems. In fifteen years of International and Comparative Law Quarterly, only seven articles treat the African judiciary. A perusal of the British Journal of Law and Society reveals a similar neglect of the cross-national perspective. More revealing, in two of the respected comparative politics journals, Comparative Politics and Comparative Political Studies, only 0.3 percent of the total number of articles published between 1968 and 1981 dealt with judicial systems. Out of twenty-nine subject headings, courts and constitutions finished in a tie for last place-only 7.1 percent of all articles (Sigelman and Gadbois, 1983: 293-94).

Unfortunately, the journals specializing in African affairs offer us no more enlightenment about judicial systems on that continent. While the prestigious Journal of Modern African Studies has published approximately ten articles on judicial issues, the other journals have been decidedly remiss. Two specialized journals are devoted to the topic: Journal of African Law and African Law Studies. Competent articles have been published in these outlets but, due to their general inaccessability, they have failed to become part of the research knowledge on African political systems.

Why has there been a relative neglect of cross-national studies of the African judiciary? This article first provides explanations for why these institutions have not enjoyed scholarly visibility.