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Narratives, environments, and decision-making: A fascinating narrative, but one to be completed
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 May 2023
Abstract
I encourage Johnson et al. to ground Conviction Narrative Theory in more detail in foundational, earlier decision-making research – first and foremost in Herbert Simon's work. Moreover, I wonder if and how further reflections about narratives could aid tackling two interrelated grand challenges of the decision sciences: To describe decision-making environments; to understand how people select among decision-strategies in environments.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
Conviction Narrative Theory: A theory of choice under radical uncertainty
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Author response
Narratives, probabilities, and the currency of thought