This paper uses the examples of three nineteenth-century cities—London, Philadelphia, and New York—to explore both what is permanent about the problem of water provision (that consumers want it clean, accessible, and free) and what is mediated by the forces of government policy and economic constraints. In some cases, municipal authorities first claimed control over water supplies before figuring out how to pay for their works. In others, they calculated that such arrangements were both too expensive and too risky to bear alone. Both approaches were complicated by the high costs of providing water to urban areas and by urban dwellers' belief that water should flow from their taps without charge. The result was, and remains, a market in which price is largely dictated by political demand, set by what the government, rather than the market, will bear.

Historical scholarship on business—environment interactions has largely sidestepped the study of corporate innovations that had both economic and environmental benefits. This issue is examined through late-nineteenth-century initiatives sponsored by the British Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce, whose aim was to document and promote the creation of profitable by-products out of polluting industrial waste and emissions. A case is made that the individuals involved in this effort not only anticipated concepts and debates now at the heart of the modern sustainable development literature, but also that their work questions some fundamental premises of this discourse.

In the late 1800s, Latin American modernizers faced major obstacles to economic growth. In the Dominican Republic, elites embraced concessions as a policy to attract foreign capital to infrastructure, industry, and cash-crop agriculture. In contrast to Mexico, where concessions were public and impersonal but failed to create viable firms, Dominican concessions were public, yet corrupt, formally opposed to monopoly, yet prone to convey exclusive privileges. Dominican modernizers recognized that concessions created “monopolies that are always a hateful tyranny,” yet found no better way to attract investment. Only after the United States took control of Dominican finances in 1905 were the “burdensome” contracts canceled as an “impediment to future progress.”

In this essay, I grapple with three main questions: What effect did the nationalization of telegraphy in 1868–70 have on the structure of the news market in Britain? How did this market structure affect the pricing and supply of news? What effects did subsequent technological change have on the structure of the news market? I show that nationalization resulted in a tripartite market arrangement characterized by collusion that benefited the provincial press over the London press, but retarded the productivity of the General Post Office and the adoption of new technology.

The corporate history of Ford in Malaya from 1926 to 1957 reveals Ford Canada's global strategy to tap new British colonial markets. A combination of factors motivated Ford Canada to set up a subsidiary in Malaya, whose subsequent domestic sales and marketing success depended on maintaining mutually beneficial relations with the local merchant firms and Chinese entrepreneurs. After it was directed by the parent company to restructure its operations, Ford Canada imposed tight control on its own local operations to ensure that it could meet evolving consumer demands in Malaya and across the wider region. However, the company was careful to maintain its ties with these marketing and networking channels.