For many years, many thousands of Vietnamese patriots have sacrificed themselves for a double objective—the unity and independence of Vietnam—and it was in pursuit of these aims immediately after the Second World War that, first the Viet-Minh, then the anti-Communist nationalists, brought into operation all the means at their disposal, both military and diplomatic. The Geneva Agreements of July 1954 confirmed the independence of Vietnam at international level. Yet, at the same time the country's unity, which for several years had no longer constituted a problem, was destroyed.

Sovietologists and Sinologists have found it extremely difficult to assess the position which the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam (DRV) occupies within the Communist bloc. Some have concluded that it is simply a satellite of Peking, basing their judgment upon its geographical position and the fact that the Vietnamese leaders closely followed the policies of the Chinese Communists, at least during the early years of the state's existence. Others have stated that the DRV is more closely bound to the Soviet Union than to China, and they quote extracts from the speeches of Vietnamese leaders to confirm this opinion. Still others maintain that the DRV enjoys a substantial measure of independence of both Russia and China and may, like Tito's Yugoslavia, break with the Communist bloc at some future date. They point out that the Vietnamese, like the Yugoslavs, won their own independence without the backing of the Russian or Chinese army. All of these conclusions are too facile and prove, if they prove anything at all, that their authors have not taken into account all the factors which have a bearing upon the events in the DRV. As in all Communist states, the formulation of policy is the responsibility of a few leaders, but these men, whatever their personal political inclinations, are restricted in their choice of policy by the circumstances in which they find themselves.

As in many other Communist states (and quite a few non-Communist ones) there is in the DRV (Democratic Republic of [North] Vietnam) a sharp difference between the theoretical and the actual structure of governmental powers.

Article 4 of the DRV Constitution of January 1, 1960, adequately covers the subject of the theoretical source of power in North Vietnam: “All powers of the DRV belong to the people, who exercise them through the intermediary of the National Assembly and of People's Councils at every echelon, elected by it and responsible to it….”

Of all intellectuals, the most highly respected and appreciated by Vietnamese society are the doctors. Indeed, it is hardly surprising that they should enjoy the esteem of a society the great majority of whose members are uneducated, impoverished, and beset by chronic disease and sickness. However, the reasons are twofold; medical degrees are academically superior to all others, and medicine, of all the professions, is the most useful on the purely practical plane. The doctors themselves are accorded the honorific title of “Thay,” and the medical profession is popularly referred to by the descriptive phrase “savers of people and helpers of life.” This is why, on the thirtieth anniversary of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party and the fifteenth anniversary of the Government of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, the “Doctor of Doctors,” Ho Dac Di, who is Chairman of the North Vietnamese Medical Association as well as Director of the University and Specialist Colleges, was invited to make a speech. Here is what Dr. Ho Dac Di said on that occasion:

The future of the intellectuals is a glorious one, because their activities bind them closely to the proletarian masses who are the masters of the world, the masters of their own country, the masters of their history, and masters of themselves…. On this, the thirtieth anniversary of the foundation of the Party, all those classes who work with their brains, and the scientists in particular, sincerely own their debt of gratitude to the Party and proclaim their complete confidence in the enlightened leadership of the Party, as well as in the glorious future of the fatherland. They give their firm promise that they, together with the other classes of the people, will protect the great achievements of the revolution.

The cultural level of North Vietnam is undoubtedly one of the lowest imaginable. Eighty per cent, of the population is illiterate, ignorant to an incredible degree and subject to the most extraordinary superstitions. Apart from the masses there remains the élite—and the hopes that one should be able to place in the youth. But here, also, we find the same deep division that was created in the population as a whole by the war—on the one hand the members of the Resistance and on the other those who remained outside it.

It would amount to a serious error of judgment to treat North Vietnam's economic development as a mere pocket edition of the Chinese or Soviet experiment. It is, of course, true that many features of economic policy adopted by the bearded ruler of Hanoi show clear signs of their Pekingese or Muscovite parentage. As far back as 1954 Ton Duc Thanh, chairman of the Vietnamese Popular Front, Lien Viet, had pointed to the current Soviet scene as his country's target for the future.

Until 1949, Communist rule was still restricted to states where wheat forms the basis of agricultural production. But when Mao Tse-tung extended his control to territories south of the Yangtse river, thereby enabling Ho Chi Minn to establish later a twin régime hi North Vietnam, the problem of collectivisation first appeared in tropical areas where rice is the main agricultural crop. From then on, an unforeseen problem of major importance has confronted the two Asian Communist leaders. Unlike their other colleagues in the Socialist camp, these two have had to adapt the rigorous norms of the collective system to the production of rice, an extremely delicate aquatic plant. Their relentless efforts to accomplish this are unprecedented and, now that the practical experiment has been in progress for several years, it is possible to make a preliminary appraisal of the results.

A belief widely current in the Western world is that Vietnamese in general dislike the Chinese, towards whom they experience a feeling of inferiority springing from the domination of Vietnam for over a thousand years by her powerful northern neighbour.

How good are Communist China's statistics? An attempt to answer this basic but vexing question has led me to investigate the working of its state statistical service. Since there was hardly any statistical system to speak of before 1949, did Peking manage to set one up that was actually workable? When did this happen and how did it develop? Where were official statistics produced and finalised? Were they used for planning purposes at different government levels? How were basic data obtained from the primary reporting units in different sectors of the economy? What mechanism was introduced to provide a degree of control over the quality of data? What were the size and quality of the statistical working force? What did occur in 1958 and 1959 when current official statistics had to be scaled down drastically from earlier officially authenticated claims? Are the revised figures satisfactory? Why have so few statistical materials been released since 1959? The search into these and many more questions has resulted in a volume on The Statistical System of Communist China, recently (1962) published by the University of California Press.

Any treatment of such a basic topic as the role of law in China, old or new, becomes meaningful only if it is related to a discussion of the philosophy of law in our own tradition. In order to make an evaluation that brings the Chinese situation into relief, one has to compare, contrast, or relate the role of law at the different stages of China's development with its role in the Western tradition. Since the basic philosophical assumptions, on which all definition and discussion of law are based, are themselves controversial in our own tradition, this is a very hazardous undertaking; but it is crucial to any understanding of China, past and present.

In the area under the rule of the Canton Government, the young Kuomintang members were full of revolutionary spirit and in favour of social change. In addition to this, the graduates of the Peasant Movement Training Institute, who were disciplined in the revolutionary atmosphere of the Institute, went out to the rural areas to organise the peasants. It is easy, then, to understand why the peasant unions developed rapidly in this area. Of course, even under the Canton Government, there were some countermovements among landlords, traditional local officials and their supporters.

Until the Chinese “volunteers” crossed the Yalu in November 1950, the Chinese involvement in North Korean politics seems to have been minimal. And yet, when the North Korean régime's very life and the Chinese border were threatened by the massive assault of the United Nations forces, the Chinese quickly came to the aid of the North Koreans. What is Chinese policy toward Korea? What are the prospects for Sino-Korean relations? Such questions will concern us for a long time. This article details part of the historical background to them.