No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
More than one way to skin a cat: Addressing the arbitration problem in developmental science
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 July 2022
Abstract
David Pietraszewski's theory of social groups offers a developmentally plausible account of how we reason about group membership, as it delineates clear boundaries to the hypothesis space that children must navigate. Merits notwithstanding, the account remains silent with respect to the arbitration problem: It does not explain how children can appropriately select among competing frames when interpreting social interactions.
- Type
- Open Peer Commentary
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
Boseovski, J. J., & Lee, K. (2006). Children's use of frequency information for trait categorization and behavioral prediction. Developmental Psychology, 42(3), 500.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Geraci, A. (2021). Toddlers’ expectations of corporal third-party punishments against the non-defender puppet. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 210, 105199.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hamlin, J. K. (2013). Moral judgment and action in preverbal infants and toddlers: Evidence for an innate moral core. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22(3), 186–193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kanakogi, Y., Inoue, Y., Matsuda, G., Butler, D., Hiraki, K., & Myowa-Yamakoshi, M. (2017). Preverbal infants affirm third-party interventions that protect victims from aggressors. Nature Human Behaviour, 1(2), 1–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kazem, A. J., & Aureli, F. (2005). Redirection of aggression: Multiparty signalling within a network. Animal communication networks, 191–218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mascaro, O., & Csibra, G. (2014). Human infants’ learning of social structures the case of dominance hierarchy. Psychological Science, 25(1), 250–255.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Powell, L. J., & Spelke, E. S. (2013). Preverbal infants expect members of social groups to act alike. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(41), E3965–E3972.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rhodes, M., Hetherington, C., Brink, K., & Wellman, H. M. (2015). Infants’ use of social partnerships to predict behavior. Developmental Science, 18(6), 909–916.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Thomsen, L., & Carey, S. (2013). Core cognition of relational models. In Banaji, M. R., & Gelman, S. A. (Eds.), Navigating the social world: What infants, children, and other species teach us (pp. 16–22). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Target article
Toward a computational theory of social groups: A finite set of cognitive primitives for representing any and all social groups in the context of conflict
Related commentaries (29)
A neuroscientific perspective on the computational theory of social groups
Advantages and limitations of representing groups in terms of recursive utilities
Are we there yet? Every computational theory needs a few black boxes, including theories about groups
Beyond folk-sociology: Extending Pietraszewski's model to large-group dynamics
Can group representations based on relational cues warrant the rich inferences typically drawn from group membership?
Coalitionary psychology and group dynamics on social media
Compassion within conflict: Toward a computational theory of social groups informed by maternal brain physiology
Conciliation and meta-contrast are important for understanding how people assign group memberships during conflict situations
Developmental antecedents of representing “group” behavior: A commentary on Pietraszewski's theory of groups
Group? What group? A computational model of the group needs a psychology of “us” (not “them”)
How do we know who may replace each other in triadic conflict roles?
Interacting with others while reacting to the environment
Internal versus external group conflicts
Latent structure learning as an alternative computation for group inference
Learning agents that acquire representations of social groups
More than one way to skin a cat: Addressing the arbitration problem in developmental science
On vagueness and parochialism in psychological research on groups
Paranoia reveals the complexity in assigning individuals to groups on the basis of inferred intentions
Private versus public: A dual model for resource-constrained conflict representations
Psychological and actual group formation: Conflict is neither necessary nor sufficient
Shadow banning, astroturfing, catfishing, and other online conflicts where beliefs about group membership diverge
Shared intentionality and the representation of groups; or, how to build a socially adept robot
Signals and cues of social groups
Social groups and the computational conundrums of delays, proximity, and loyalty
Societies and other kinds of social groups
The labelled container: Conceptual development of social group representations
Towards a computational network theory of social groups
Triadic conflict “primitives” can be reduced to welfare trade-off ratios
Using laboratory intergroup conflict and riots as a “stress test”
Author response
More “us,” less “them”: An appeal for pluralism – and stand-alone computational theorizing – in our science of social groups