We use a political economy perspective to provide the first empirical analysis of the main political and economic determinants of asynchronous approval (AA) for a variety of countries over the period 2000–2015. The key results that emerge from our paper are the prominent role of regulatory quality and the number of internet users in a particular country in influencing AA across countries. We found that the higher the share of internet users in a country, the lower the AA. Consumer access to the internet makes them less exposed to negative news about genetically modified (GM) products, as they are less influenced by the negative bias of traditional mass media toward biotechnology. Additionally, the better the regulation quality (the more efficiently a government formulates and implements regulation), the shorter the time necessary to approve new GM events, and the lower the AA. Furthermore, our findings confirm that determinants such as corruption, trade relations with stringent markets, and the size of the rural population are also important in explaining AA of GM events.

Despite being at the forefront of the global policy agenda, fuel subsidy reform is understudied and its impact on trade is not particularly well understood. This type of reform could have a huge impact on market performance by increasing transportation costs. I present a case study from Ethiopia, which removed its fuel subsidies and increased the price of diesel price by 39% overnight on 4 October 2008. What is the impact of such an increase in diesel price on transportation costs and hence grain prices in developing countries such as Ethiopia? I use spatial difference-in-difference (sDID) on distance from major markets to assess the effects of removing the fuel subsidy on grain price dispersion. The sDID leverages distance from the national capital to investigate the impact of fuel subsidy reform on markets located at different distances from consumer centers. The results indicate that remote markets experienced high price dispersion compared to markets near the capital.

Geographical indications (GIs), signs used on products that identify their geographical origin and special quality or reputation, are atypical intellectual property. The conflicts of interest between the New World and Old World and the diversity of legal regimes have obstructed the international harmonization of GI protection. Neither the Lisbon Agreement nor the TRIPS Agreement have been able to establish a widely accepted international GI registration or protection system. Though the Geneva Act has remarkably improved the treaty regime of GIs, the different approaches of the European Union and United States still seem irreconcilable. This article examines the Chinese dual GI system from a treaty perspective and explores the common functions of GIs and Trademarks, concluding that China's Trademark Law can ensure GI protection that is compliant with the TRIPS Agreement and the Geneva Act. The Chinese solution can be a reference for other countries which protect GIs with a trademark system.

Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have been a huge success and brought a great number of benefits to the whole world. With different kinds of incentives, SEZs have created favorable conditions in order to attract foreign investors. In this article, several specific issues are considered. First, whether SEZs are legal under international economic law (IEL). Second, what kind of specific issues they raise under IEL. Thirdly, what measures governments can take in order not to be challenged. The first section illustrates the definition of SEZs and their rapid development; the second section will consider the interaction between SEZs and international tax law, especially the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) Action 5; the third section focuses on the relationship between SEZs and investment agreements and the disputes raised as a consequence; the fourth section will talk about SEZs and the World Trade Organization (WTO), as some incentives used by SEZs may not be compatible with WTO regulations. The article shows that SEZs can be harmful. For one thing, tax incentives applied in SEZs may lead to tax evasion, and the competitive circumstances between states may be changed. For another thing, the frequent changes of policies in SEZs may result in indirect expropriation, and investor-state arbitration under investment treaties can be used by foreign investors to protect their SEZ-related benefits. In addition, although WTO rules do not explicitly regulate SEZs, a number of measures, such as subsidies, do fall under the ambit of WTO rules, and these measures cannot be discriminatory.

Subsequent to the 2016 modifications concerning the strengthening of the administrative requirements on dolphin-safety outside the ETP fishery zone, the second WTO compliance proceedings have finally found the US Dolphin-Safe labelling scheme compatible with the multilateral trade system. We provide an overview of the long-running US–Mexico dispute and assess the final findings of the WTO adjudicators attempting to determine the effects of the multilateral litigation on the involved non-trade values and the real winners of the case. We find an improvement in dolphin protection, though more could be achieved through a qualification of the US measure under the principle of sustainable development also contemplated in the Preamble of the WTO Agreement, as well as an enhancement on consumer information, since declaration of dolphin-safety may now be better monitored and enforced through the new discipline for non-Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean tuna products. However, we also observe that with no change to the appearance of the label or an informational campaign, the improved credibility of the label may hardly be passed-through to the average consumer. Furthermore, despite an increase in the stringency of the regulation for their competitors, Mexican producers do not gain greater access to the US and instead have been diversifying towards other markets. We then highlight that the Appellate Body missed an opportunity to reinforce the transparency of the system by supporting the first-ever decision to grant partially open panel meetings.

This paper analyses how international economic law regulates measures aimed at the protection of domestic investors against foreign investors. It evaluates the logic of investment protectionism and assesses the incentives behind foreign entry barriers. It analyses and evaluates WTO GATS cases that dealt with the issue. It then develops a framework on how the facts of the China–Electronic Payments Panel decision could be assessed in international investment treaties. Several provisions common to those treaties would be applicable to the situation and the recent US–China Economic Agreement explicitly deals with the issue. However, adjudication under investment treaties would only be possible if some procedural conditions were present. The paper concludes that international economic law already covers a range of situations related to entry barriers to foreign investments. It also suggests that states can carefully tailor both substantive and procedural treaty rules to allow for coverage, or not, of situations involving domestic monopolies.

This article examines the effectiveness of the framework for the resolution of intra-African cross-border commercial disputes, arising from the projected increase in intra-African trade in goods, services, and investments under the African Continental Free Trade Area. It examines the peculiar nature of intra-African trade and of the participating entities to provide the context to discuss the three major processes adopted in commercial dispute resolution (litigation, mediation, and arbitration) in Africa. It then argues for the promotion of arbitration as the dispute resolution process of choice for such disputes. It reimagined the framework for arbitration at the continental level and made two proposals targeted at the greater efficiency of the process: the designation of Regional Arbitration Centres across the African Union's eight recognized Regional Economic Communities, to administer such references; and the establishment of an African Commercial Court as a one-stop court for the enforcement or annulment of the final award.

Western Europe's industrialization was powered largely by coal. Within 15 years after the end of the Second World War, however, governments were subsidizing coal and protecting producers from foreign competition while allowing their industries to contract in a way that avoided large-scale unemployment of miners. The oil-price shocks of 1973–1974 and 1979–1980 gave temporary reprieve to hard-coal production until international oil prices slumped in 1986. This event, combined with ever more stringent environmental regulations and, later, caps on carbon-dioxide emissions, led to the disappearance of subsidized coal mining in one country after another. As of the end of 2019, hard coal was still being mined – in small amounts – in only three Western European countries: Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom. This paper describes the history of the industry from 1945 through to the present, and the consequences of subsidy policy for trade in hard coal and its substitutes. A common observation is that a reduction in subsidized coal production by a country has not necessarily translated into increased imports of coal on a one-for-one basis.

This paper presents a legal-economic analysis of key aspects of the WTO Panel Report involving a challenge by Indonesia against the anti-dumping and countervailing duties imposed by the US on certain coated paper from Indonesia. We focus on the findings in this case relevant to the determination of a ‘benefit’ to the recipient, a core requirement to establish the existence and extent of a subsidy. We examine benchmarking for determining benefit in cases of predominant government ownership of a natural resource and the use of ‘adverse facts available’ against a non-cooperative respondent to infer the existence of a benefit. The benefit analysis in this case may have broader implications. First, it may limit the scope for governments to determine their own policies regarding the ownership and management of natural resources. Second, it may create a loophole allowing investigating authorities to fill gaps in the factual record by intentionally using the ‘facts available’ to the disadvantage of a respondent. In both cases, the panel's findings may open the door to potential misuse of these flexibilities to find a benefit where none exists, or to inflate the margin of benefit to allow for higher countervailing duties.

The case law on non-precluded measures clauses, when they are successful, and the customary rule of necessity, when it fails, transfers significant risks to foreign investors and host States, respectively, during severe economic crises. Some risk-sharing mechanisms should be explored to achieve a more balanced result. This article presents the policy reasons in support of this approach and its normative basis: the principle of acceptable compensation, and illustrates that one way to introduce such mechanisms is through the determination by investor/State tribunals of the length of the breakdown, which is marked by the dates for its beginning and end. The article discusses economic research on when crises conclude, which could be useful to tribunals, and explores the determination on the beginning of economic collapses as a risk-sharing tool and shows how decisions of the Argentinean saga have achieved this result.

This article introduces a new dataset on the intellectual property (IP) provisions included in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and makes it available for research and policy communities alike. Several PTAs include IP commitments that go well beyond the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). A sound knowledge of these TRIPs-plus commitments is essential in order to improve our understanding of what drives them and of their legal, social, and economic consequences. Yet, until now, these provisions have not been mapped in a comprehensive and systematic way. The T + PTA dataset fills this gap by documenting the existence of 90 types of IP provisions in 126 agreements signed between 1991 and 2016. We show that, even for like-minded countries, significant variations exist in their reliance on TRIPs-plus provisions, their degree of consistency across PTAs, and their preferences for some IP rights. We also find that strong TRIPs-Plus provisions are correlated with the depth of PTAs, the asymmetry between trade partners, and the strength of their domestic IP law. By making the T + PTA dataset available, we hope to create the opportunity for a new generation of research on TRIPs-plus agreements.

Recently, a group of eminent Chinese/US economists and legal scholars issued a thought-provoking Joint Statement on ‘US–China Trade Relations: A Way Forward’. However, the Joint Statement does not provide practical solutions to the real issues in the bilateral negotiations. Moreover, by granting excessive policy space to the two largest trading nations, it would encourage them to further deviate from WTO rules and undermine the multilateral trading system. Drawing on the Theory of Distortions and Welfare, we put forward an alternative framework for the parties to tackle protectionist and trade distortive policy instruments while leaving sufficient policy space for them to pursue non-protectionist policy goals. Our framework would minimize WTO-inconsistent outcomes and prevent further erosion of the multilateral system as we encourage the parties to negotiate in a WTO-consistent manner. Hopefully, this would also provide the groundwork for more inclusive trade negotiations under the multilateral trading system.

The Appellate Body report in EU–PET (Pakistan) raises distinct questions regarding the need for findings in relation to expired measures, the conditions under which duty drawback schemes may constitute subsidies and the causation methodology to apply under the SCM Agreement. We conclude that the report offers no clear guidance on whether the function and design of WTO dispute settlement require or preclude findings in case of expired measures. We welcome the Appellate Body's conclusion that, in case of duty drawback schemes, the financial contribution element of the subsidy is limited to the excess remission or drawback of import charges. Finally, although the Appellate Body rightly found that authorities are free to choose the methodology for the causation analysis provided that the analysis is complete and objective, the methodology used by the investigating authority in this case shows a number of deficiencies that were not recognized by the Appellate Body.

These compliance proceedings concern a second revised measure adopted by the United States regarding the labelling of dolphin-safe tuna products (the 2016 Tuna Measure). The 2016 Tuna Measure places three types of conditions on the use of the dolphin-safe label: (i) conditions relating to the automatic disqualification of certain tuna products (eligibility criteria); (ii) conditions relating to certifications (certification requirements); and (iii) conditions relating to record keeping and segregation of dolphin-safe and non-dolphin-safe tuna (tracking and verification requirements). Regarding the eligibility criteria, tuna harvested using large-scale driftnets on the high seas and tuna products containing tuna harvested by setting on dolphins anywhere in the world are automatically disqualified for the dolphin-safe label. Regarding the certification and tracking/verification requirements, the 2016 Tuna Measure makes a distinction between the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) large purse seine fishery, on the one hand, and all other fisheries, on the other hand.

We critically assess the Appellate Body (AB) report on the Brazil–Taxation dispute, taken to the World Trade Organisation by the European Union and Japan, and encompassing seven different Brazilian industrial programmes granting tax benefits to different firms and products. The trigger of the dispute was most likely the automotive sector programme, instituted under pressure from the local industry and without much attention to effects on consumers or imports. The resulting WTO case underscores some salient issues related to the WTO compatibility of subsidy programmes, in particular the application of the National Treatment rules to subsidies provided exclusively to domestic producers, and the identification of local content requirements, prohibited under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). The AB diverged from the Panel report and its jurisprudence on those issues. The AB tried to reconcile the existence of legitimate eligibility criteria in subsidy programmes and their discriminatory features with WTO rules under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the SCM. However, the legal test, developed by the AB in this dispute to distinguish prohibited local content requirements from legitimate eligibility criteria, may facilitate circumvention of the SCM prohibition of local content requirements and have important impacts on trade flows.

For a multilateral system to be sustainable, it is important to have several escape clauses which can allow countries to protect their national security concerns. However, when these escape windows are too wide or ambiguous, defining their ambit and scope becomes challenging yet crucial to ensure that they are not open to misuse. The recent Panel Ruling in Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit is the very first attempt by the WTO to clarify the scope and ambit of National Security Exception. In this paper, we argue that the Panel has employed a combination of an objective and a subjective approach to interpret this exception. This hybrid approach to interpret GATT Article XXI (b) provides a systemic balance between the sovereign rights of the members to invoke the security exception and their right to free and open trade. But has this Ruling opened Pandora's box? In this paper, we address this issue by providing an in-depth analysis of the Panel's decision.

This compliance proceeding under Article 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) concerned measures adopted by the United States to comply with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) recommendations and rulings in US–Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint). The types of measures at issue that were found to have caused adverse effects to the European Union (EU, formerly European Communities) in the original Panel and Appellate Body proceedings were NASA aeronautics R&D instruments; United States Department of Defence (DOD) military research instruments (‘assistance instruments’); the business and occupancy (B&O) tax rate reduction in the State of Washington in relation to Boeing's production of the 787; property and sales tax abatements related to Industrial Revenue Bonds issued by the City of Wichita, Kansas; and the FSC/ETI subsidies.