Photostasis is a phenomenon where the photoreceptor outer segment (OS) length and its rhodopsin content vary depending on environmental lighting. When light is reduced for extended periods, it is argued that OS lengthen and its rhodopsin concentration rises to increase photon capture in darker environment. Increases in OS length may occur because the retinal pigment epithelium (RPE) cells reduce OS consumption in prolonged darkness. But sample sizes in assessing changes in OS length have been small, and results highly varied with no statistical analysis ever offered. Further, animals used were often albinos, which have abnormal RPE cells. Here we keep pigmented and albino mice for 21 days in darkness and compare OS length with those in a normal 12:12 light/dark environment. We measured approximately 1300 OS but found no statistically significant difference in their lengths between light and dark groups in either pigmentation phenotype, although there was a small trend in the data favoring OS extension in the dark. Given that earlier studies were undertaken on limited samples with no statistical analysis, our data pose serious questions for the notion of mammalian photostasis in terms of significant OS plasticity.

Linking propositions have played an important role in refining our understanding of the relationship between neural activity and perception. Over the last 40 years, visual evoked potentials (VEPs) have been used in many different ways to address questions of the relationship between neural activity and perception. This review organizes and discusses this research within the linking proposition framework developed by Davida Teller, and her colleagues. A series of examples from the VEP literature illustrates each of the five classes of linking propositions originally proposed by Davida Teller. The related concept of the bridge locus—the site at which neural activity can be said to first be proscriptive of perception—is discussed and a suggestion is made that the concept be expanded to include an evolution over time and cortical area.

The rapid advances in brain imaging technology over the past 20 years are affording new insights into cortical processing hierarchies in the human brain. These new data provide a complementary front in seeking to understand the links between perceptual and physiological states. Here we review some of the challenges associated with incorporating brain imaging data into such “linking hypotheses,” highlighting some of the considerations needed in brain imaging data acquisition and analysis. We discuss work that has sought to link human brain imaging signals to existing electrophysiological data and opened up new opportunities in studying the neural basis of complex perceptual judgments. We consider a range of approaches when using human functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify brain circuits whose activity changes in a similar manner to perceptual judgments and illustrate these approaches by discussing work that has studied the neural basis of 3D perception and perceptual learning. Finally, we describe approaches that have sought to understand the information content of brain imaging data using machine learning and work that has integrated multimodal data to overcome the limitations associated with individual brain imaging approaches. Together these approaches provide an important route in seeking to understand the links between physiological and psychological states.

Retinal ganglion cells (RGCs), the output neurons of the retina, have axons that project via the optic nerve to diverse targets in the brain. Typically, RGC axons do not branch before exiting the retina and thus do not provide it with synaptic feedback. Although a small subset of RGCs with intraretinal axon collaterals has been previously observed in human, monkey, cat, and turtle, their function remains unknown. A small, more recently identified population of RGCs expresses the photopigment melanopsin. These intrinsically photosensitive retinal ganglion cells (ipRGCs) transmit an irradiance-coding signal to visual nuclei in the brain, contributing both to image-forming vision and to several nonimage-forming functions, including circadian photoentrainment and the pupillary light reflex. In this study, using melanopsin immunolabeling in monkey and a genetic method to sparsely label the melanopsin cells in mouse, we show that a subgroup of ipRGCs have axons that branch en route to the optic disc, forming intraretinal axon collaterals that terminate in the inner plexiform layer of the retina. The previously described collateral-bearing population identified by intracellular dye injection is anatomically indistinguishable from the collateral-bearing melanopsin cells identified here, suggesting they are a subset of the melanopsin-expressing RGC type and may therefore share its functional properties. Identification of an anatomically distinct subpopulation in mouse, monkey, and human suggests this pathway may be conserved in these and other species (turtle and cat) with intraretinal axon collaterals. We speculate that ipRGC axon collaterals constitute a likely synaptic pathway for feedback of an irradiance signal to modulate retinal light responses.

Almost 40 years ago, Davida Teller developed the forced-choice preferential looking method for studying infant visual capabilities and used it to study infant color vision. About 10 years ago, she used infant looking preferences to study infant color perception. Here, we examine four data sets in which the infant looking preference was measured using a wide range of saturated colors. Three of those data sets, from papers by Marc Bornstein and by Davida Teller and Anna Franklin and their respective collaborators, were fit successfully using MacLeod and Boynton’s model of the equiluminant plane in color space, in spite of the varied luminances used in those studies. A fourth data set, from a paper by Zemach, Chang, and Teller, was less well fit by that model. Apparently, infants are able to ignore luminance, and pay attention just to the color of stimuli. These results are discussed in the context of Davida Teller’s work on the philosophy of vision science.

The current study tested the development of face and object processing in young children (mean age = 5.24 years), adolescents (mean age = 15.8 years), and adults (mean age = 21.1 years) using stimuli that were equated for low-level visual characteristics (luminance, contrast, and spatial frequency make-up) and methods that equate for difficulty across ages. We also tested sensitivity to luminance and chromatic contrast (i.e., thought to be mediated primarily by the subcortical Magnocellular (M) and Parvocellular (P) pathways, respectively) to determine whether age-related improvements in face or object discrimination were driven by age-related changes in the M and/or P pathways. Results showed a selective age-related improvement in face sensitivity and a relationship between age-related increases in face sensitivity and luminance contrast sensitivity. These results add to the mounting evidence that the M pathway may influence face processing.

Lateral spatial interactions among elements of a scene, which either enhance or degrade visual performance, are ubiquitous in vision. The neural mechanisms underlying lateral spatial interactions are a matter of debate, and various hypotheses have been proposed. Suppressive effects may be due to local inhibitory interactions, whereas facilitatory effects are typically ascribed either to the function of long-range horizontal projections in V1 or to uncertainty reduction. We investigated the development of lateral spatial interactions, facilitation and suppression, and compared their developmental profiles to those of potential underlying mechanisms in the visual system of infant macaques. Animals ranging in age from 10 weeks to 3 years were tested with a lateral masking paradigm. We found that suppressive interactions are present from very early in postnatal life, showing no change over the age range tested. However, facilitation develops slowly over the first year after birth. Our data suggest that the early maturation of suppressive interactions is related to the relatively mature receptive field properties of neurons in early visual cortical areas near birth in infant macaques, whereas the later maturation of facilitation is unlikely to be explained by development of local or long-range connectivity in primary visual cortex. Instead our data favor a late developing feedback or top-down cognitive process to explain the origin of facilitation.

Because targeted early experiential manipulations alter both perception and the response properties of particular cells in the striate cortex, they have been used as evidence for linking hypotheses between the two. However, such hypotheses assume that the effects of the early biased visual input are restricted to just the specific cell population and/or visual areas of interest and that the neural populations that contribute to the visual perception itself do not change. To examine this assumption, we measured the consequences for vision of an extended period of early monocular deprivation (MD) on a kitten (from 19 to 219 days of age) that began well before, and extended beyond, bilateral ablation of visual cortical areas 17 and 18 at 132 days of age. In agreement with previous work, the lesion reduced visual acuity by only a factor of two indicating that the neural sites, other than cortical areas 17 and 18, that support vision in their absence have good spatial resolution. However, these sites appear to be affected profoundly by MD as the effects on vision were just as severe as those observed following MD imposed on normal animals. The pervasive effects of selected early visual deprivation across many cortical areas reported here and elsewhere, together with the potential for perception to be mediated at a different neural site following deprivation than after typical rearing, points to a need for caution in the use of data from early experiential manipulations for formulation of linking hypotheses.

Over the last 35 years or so, there has been substantial progress in revealing and characterizing the many interesting and sometimes mysterious sensory abnormalities that accompany amblyopia. A goal of many of the studies has been to try to make the link between the sensory losses and the underlying neural losses, resulting in several hypotheses about the site, nature, and cause of amblyopia. This article reviews some of these hypotheses, and the assumptions that link the sensory losses to specific physiological alterations in the brain. Despite intensive study, it turns out to be quite difficult to make a simple linking hypothesis, at least at the level of single neurons, and the locus of the sensory loss remains elusive. It is now clear that the simplest notion—that reduced contrast sensitivity of neurons in cortical area V1 explains the reduction in contrast sensitivity—is too simplistic. Considerations of noise, noise correlations, pooling, and the weighting of information also play a critically important role in making perceptual decisions, and our current models of amblyopia do not adequately take these into account. Indeed, although the reduction of contrast sensitivity is generally considered to reflect “early” neural changes, it seems plausible that it reflects changes at many stages of visual processing.

The present paper deals with the classical question how a psychological experience, in this case apparent lightness, is linked by intervening neural processing to physical variables. We address two methodological issues: (a) how does one know the appropriate physical variable (what is the right x?) to look at, and (b) how can behavioral measurements be used to probe the internal transformation that leads to psychological experience. We measured so-called lightness transfer functions (LTFs), that is the functions that describe the mapping between retinal luminance and perceived lightness for naturalistic checkerboard stimuli. The LTFs were measured for different illumination situations: plain view, a cast shadow, and an intervening transparent medium. Observers adjusted the luminance of a comparison patch such that it had the same lightness as each of the test patches. When the data were plotted in luminance–luminance space, we found qualitative differences between mapping functions in different contexts. These differences were greatly diminished when the data were plotted in terms of contrast. On contrast–contrast coordinates, the data were compatible with a single linear generative model. This result is an indication that, for the naturalistic scenes used here, lightness perception depends mostly on local contrast. We further discuss that, in addition to the mean adjustments, one may find it useful to consider also the variability of an observer’s adjustments in order to infer the true luminance-to-lightness mapping function.

The dissociation of a figure from its background is an essential feat of visual perception, as it allows us to detect, recognize, and interact with shapes and objects in our environment. In order to understand how the human brain gives rise to the perception of figures, we here review experiments that explore the links between activity in visual cortex and performance of perceptual tasks related to figure perception. We organize our review according to a proposed model that attempts to contextualize figure processing within the more general framework of object processing in the brain. Overall, the current literature provides us with individual linking hypotheses as to cortical regions that are necessary for particular tasks related to figure perception. Attempts to reach a more complete understanding of how the brain instantiates figure and object perception, however, will have to consider the temporal interaction between the many regions involved, the details of which may vary widely across different tasks.

Many complex behaviors rely on guidance from sensations. To perform these behaviors, the motor system must decode information relevant to the task from the sensory system. However, identifying the neurons responsible for encoding the appropriate sensory information remains a difficult problem for neurophysiologists. A key step toward identifying candidate systems is finding neurons or groups of neurons capable of representing the stimuli adequately to support behavior. A traditional approach involves quantitatively measuring the performance of single neurons and comparing this to the performance of the animal. One of the strongest pieces of evidence in support of a neuronal population being involved in a behavioral task comes from the signals being sufficient to support behavior. Numerous experiments using perceptual decision tasks show that visual cortical neurons in many areas have this property. However, most visually guided behaviors are not categorical but continuous and dynamic. In this article, we review the concept of sufficiency and the tools used to measure neural and behavioral performance. We show how concepts from information theory can be used to measure the ongoing performance of both neurons and animal behavior. Finally, we apply these tools to dorsal medial superior temporal (MSTd) neurons and demonstrate that these neurons can represent stimuli important to navigation to a distant goal. We find that MSTd neurons represent ongoing steering error in a virtual-reality steering task. Although most individual neurons were insufficient to support the behavior, some very nearly matched the animal’s estimation performance. These results are consistent with many results from perceptual experiments and in line with the predictions of Mountcastle’s “lower envelope principle.”

In the 1990s, seminal work from Newsome and colleagues made it possible to study the neuronal mechanisms of simple perceptual decisions. The key strength of this work was the clear and direct link between neuronal activity and choice processes. Since then, a great deal of research has extended these initial discoveries to more complex forms of decision making, with the goal of bringing the same strength of linkage between neural and psychological processes. Here, we discuss the progress of two such research programs, namely our own, that are aimed at understanding memory-guided decisions and reward-guided decisions. These problems differ in the relevant brain areas, in the progress that has been achieved, and in the extent of broader understanding achieved so far. However, they are unified by the use of theoretical insights about how to link neuronal activity to decisions.