¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fourteenth Australia–New Zealand Association of Medieval and Renaissance Studies Conference held at the University of Sydney. Thanks are due to O. Paul Kristeller, Elizabeth A. R. Brown, Allison Holcroft, and Constant Mews for suggestions which improved the content and composition of the text.Google Scholar

² These later medieval treatments of habitus are surveyed in Fuchs, O., The Psychology of Habit According to William of Ockham (St. Bonaventure 1952); for bibliography see xii.Google Scholar

³ On the institutional context for the thirteenth-century study of ethics, see Gauthier, R.-A., ‘Le cours sur l'Ethica nova d'un maǐtre ès arts de Paris (1235–1240),’ Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen ǎge 42 (1975) 71–141; Grabmann, M., ‘Das Studium der aristotelischen Ethik an der Artistenfakultät der Universität Paris in der ersten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts,’ Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft 55 (1940) 339–54; and Lottin, O., Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles (Louvain 1948–60) I 505–34.Google Scholar

⁴ Ibid. III² 99–104 and 142–50.Google Scholar

⁵ See Kristeller, P. O., Renaissance Thought and its Sources (New York 1979) 128; Southern, R., Medieval Humanism (Oxford 1970) 55–56; and Haren, M., Medieval Thought (London 1985) 189–90.Google Scholar

⁶ Wieland, G., The Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle's Ethics,’ in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (edd. Kretzmann, N., Kenny, A., and J. Pinborg; Cambridge 1982) 657.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁸ ‘Nous sommes ici sur un terrain purement philosophique’: Lottin, Psychologie et morale III² 103.Google Scholar

⁹ For the influence of the doctrine of habitus, see ibid. III² 103–15. Lottin also shows (125–42) how the concept of habitus became enmeshed in and central to twelfth-century discussions of baptism, particularly such questions as whether the sacrament of baptism conveys virtue and the condition of the infant prior to baptism. Similarly, caritas was commonly construed in the theological literature as a habitus: see Landgraf, M. A., Einführung in die Geschichte der theologischen Literatur der Frühscholastik, unter dem Gesichtspunkte der Schulenbildung (Regensburg 1948).Google Scholar

¹⁰ On the recovery of the Nicomachean Ethics, see Gauthier's, R.-A. introduction to his edition of the Latin Ethica Nicomachea (Aristoteles Latinus XXVI, i–iii; Leiden 1971–74) I xvi–cxlvii.Google Scholar

¹¹ Citations from the Nicomachean Ethics are taken from the edition by Rackham, H. (Cambridge, Mass. 1934); my translations are based on Rackham.Google Scholar

¹² Nicomachean Ethics, II.i.1103a17–24.Google Scholar

¹³ Ibid. II.vi.1106a24–31.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Ibid. II.v.1106a7–14.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Ibid. II.v.1106a14, VI.xii.1143b24–25.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Ibid. I.x.1100b2.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid. II.i.1103a31–33, 1103b1–3.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Ibid. II.i.1103b22–24.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Ibid. II.iv.1105a35–b1.Google Scholar

²⁰ References to the Organon are to the Loeb edition; the Categories is edited by Cooke, H. P. (Cambridge, Mass. 1938) and the Topics by Forster, E. S. (Cambridge, Mass. 1960). My translations are based on these versions. Latin translations of Aristotle given in the notes are from the contemporary version of the text given in the Aristoteles Latinus edition; the Categories is edited by L. Minio-Paluello in Aristoteles Latinus (Bruges-Paris 1961) I i–v and the Topics also by Minio-Paluello, in Aristoteles Latinus (Leiden 1969) V i–iii.Google Scholar

²¹ ‘… habitus genus virtutis … Amplius habitus quidem quid est significat virtus …’: Topics VI.vi.144a16–18. See also Categories VIII.8b29, and Topics IV.ii.121b37–39.Google Scholar

²² ‘Differt autem habitus affectione quod permanentior et diuturnior…. Similiter autem et in aliis, nisi forte in his quoque contingit per temporis longitudinem in naturam cuiusque translata et insanabilis vel difficile mobilis, quam iam quilibet habitudinem vocet’: Categories VIII.8b28 and 9a2–4.Google Scholar

²³ ‘Similiter autem et virtus, et iustitia vel castitas et singula talium non videtur facile posse moveri neque facile permutari’: ibid. VIII.8b33–35.Google Scholar

²⁴ ‘Non enim quoniam sunt affecti aliquo modo, unumquodque huiusmodi dicitur, sed quod habeant potentiam naturalem vel facere quid facile vel nihil pati’: ibid. VIII.9a16–18. For elaboration of this position, see 9a14–17.Google Scholar

²⁵ For Aristotle's explanation of the sense in which virtue and vice, because they are contraries, cannot be ‘possessive’ and ‘privative,’ see ibid. X. 13a17–36.Google Scholar

²⁶ ‘… consuetudinem sermonemque …’: ibid. X.13a23.Google Scholar

²⁷ ‘… et hoc saepius factum perfecte in contrariam habitudinem consistere, nisi tempore prohibeatur’: ibid. X.13a29–31.Google Scholar

²⁸ ‘Et omnino quae a natura dantur animo et corpori considerabuntur. Nam quae industria comparantur, ad habitum pertinent, de quo posterius est dicendum’: Cicero, De inventione (ed. Hubbell, H. M.; Cambridge, Mass. 1949) I.xxiv.35; my translations from Cicero are based on Hubbell's rendering.Google Scholar

²⁹ ‘Habitus autem, quoniam in aliqua perfecta et constanti animi aut corporis absolutione consistit, quo in genere est virtus, scientia et quae contraria sunt’: ibid. II.xx.30.Google Scholar

³⁰ ‘Habitum autem appellemus animi aut corporis constantem et absolutam aliqua in re perfectionem, et virtutis aut artis alicuius perceptionem aut quamvis scientiam et item corporis aliquam commoditatem non natura datam, sed studio et industria partam’: ibid. I.xxv.36.Google Scholar

³¹ Ibid. II.liii.160.Google Scholar

³² Boethius, , De topicis differentiis (trans. Stump, E.; Ithaca 1987) 51, 89.Google Scholar

³³ ‘Virtus enim nisi difficile mutabilis non est. Neque enim qui semel iuste iudicat, iustus est, neque qui semel adulterium faciat, est adulter, sed cum ista voluntas cogitatioque permanserit’: Boethius, In Aristoteles Categoriae commenta (PL 64) 242b.Google Scholar

³⁴ ‘Virtus est habitus mentis bene constitute, et vicium habitus est mentis male constitute’: given in Lottin, Psychologie et morale V 59.Google Scholar

³⁵ For this proposed chronology of Abelard's works, see Mews, C., ‘On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard,’ Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen ǎge 52 (1985) 73–134, esp. 122–26.Google Scholar

³⁶ This view Abelard expresses in the Dialogus inter Philosophum, Judaeum et Christianum (ed. Thomas, R.; Stuttgart 1970), 1341–42, and the prologue to Sic et Non (edd. Boyer, B. B. and R. McKeon; Chicago 1974).Google Scholar

³⁷ Luscombe, D. E., ‘The Ethics of Abelard: Some Further Considerations,’ in Peter Abelard (ed. Buytaert, E. M.; Leuven – The Hague 1974) 71.Google Scholar

³⁸ Abelard, , Dialogus 1936–63. Abelard's familiarity with habitus extended beyond ethical concerns to his logic; see his Dialectica (ed. de Rijk, L. M.; Assen 1956) 93–95, 101–2, and passim. Google Scholar

³⁹ Abelard, , Dialogus 1971–75. Google Scholar

⁴⁰ ‘Virtus, inquiunt, est habitus animi optimus; sic e contrario vitium arbitror esse habitum animi pessimum’: ibid. 1987–88. The translations from this text are mine.Google Scholar

⁴¹ ‘Unde hanc, quam naturalem in quibusdam castitatem nominant ex corporis videlicet frigiditate vel alique complexione nature, que nullam umquam concupiscentie pugnam sustinet, de qua triumphet, nec meritum optinet, nequaquam virtutibus connumeramus”: ibid. 1992–96. Google Scholar

⁴² Abelard, , Ethica (ed. Luscombe, D. E.; Oxford 1970) 4. Translations from this text have occasionally been revised.Google Scholar

⁴³ Abelard, , Dialogus 1988. Google Scholar

⁴⁴ ‘Est igitur habitus qualitas rei non naturaliter insita, sed studio ac deliberatione conquisita et difficile mobilis’: ibid. 1990–92.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ ‘… virtus habitus sit animi, quem, ut ex superioribus liquet, per applicationem vel studium magis quam per naturam haberi constat’: ibid. 2164–66.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ ‘… virtutem omnem difficile mobilem …’: ibid. 2005. Google Scholar

⁴⁷ ‘… quecunque animi qualitates facile sunt mobiles’: ibid. 1996–97. Google Scholar

⁴⁸ ‘… beatitudinem promeremur bonis, que in bono consistunt obediencie’: Abelard, Ethica 128.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ ‘Que fortassis voluntas nonnunquam esse poterit, si ad tempus habita nondum ita firma sit ac difficile mobilis, ut virtus dici possit’: ibid. 128.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ ‘Ut enim philosophis placuit, nequaquam virtus in nobis dicenda est, nisi sit habitus mentis optimus, sive habitus bene constitute mentis. Quid vero habitum vel dispositionem dixerint, Aristoteles in prima specie qualitatis diligenter distinxit, docendo videlicet eas qualitates que non naturaliter nobis insunt, set [sed] per applicationem nostram veniunt, habitus vel disposiciones vocari. Habitus quidem, si sint difficile mobiles, quales, inquit, sunt sciencie vel virtutes. Disposiciones vero, si e contra fuerint facile mobiles’: ibid. 128.Google Scholar

⁵¹ ‘Si ergo secundum hoc habitus sit dicenda quelibet virtus nostra, non absurde videtur nonnunquam voluntas ad obediendum parata, cum sit facile mobilis, antequam firmetur nequaquam dicenda virtus, sicut nec habitus’: ibid. 128.Google Scholar

⁵² See ibid. 128–30.Google Scholar

⁵³ Ibid. 4. See also Luscombe's, n. 1 for further references.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ ‘Optimus vero est ille animi habitus, qui ad vere beatitudinis meritum nos informat’: Abelard, Dialogus 2012–13. Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See Nederman, C. J. and Brückmann, J., ‘Aristotelianism in John of Salisbury's Policraticus,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (1983) 203–29; Nederman, C. J., ‘Aristotelian Ethics and John of Salisbury's Letters,’ Viator 18 (1987) 161–73; and idem, ‘Knowledge, Virtue and the Path to Wisdom: The Unexamined Aristotelianism of John of Salisbury's Metalogicon,’ Mediaeval Studies 51 (1989), 268–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁶ John describes his association with Abelard in the Metalogicon (ed. Webb, C. C. J.; Oxford 1929) 867b. Translations from this text are based on the translation by D. McGarry, D. (Berkeley 1955).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ John's awareness of the process of transmission is witnessed by a letter to Richard l'Évěque, ca. 1167, which requests a copy ‘of the books of Aristotle which you have’: Letter 201, in The Letters of John of Salisbury (edd. Millor, W. J. and C. Brooke, N. L.; Oxford 1979), II 295. John's own testimony in Metalogicon 902c–d shows that he was among the first in Western Europe to possess a complete Latin text of Aristotle's Topics. Google Scholar

⁵⁸ For a detailed account of John's career and its implications for his thought, see Guth, K., Johannes von Salisbury (1115/20–1180): Studien zur Kirchen-, Kultur- und Sozialgeschichte Westeuropas im 12. Jahrhundert (Ottilien, St. 1978) and Forhan, K. L., The Twelfth-Century “Bureaucrat” and the Life of the Mind: John of Salisbury's Policraticus’ (diss. Hopkins, Johns University 1986).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See Nederman, , ‘Aristotelian Ethics’ 172–73.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ For recent reflections on the identity of ‘Cornificus,’ see Tobin, R. B., ‘The Cornifician Motif in John of Salisbury's Metalogicon,’ History of Education 13 (1984) 1–16 and Tacchella, E., ‘Giovanni di Salisbury e i Cornificiani,’ Sandalion 3 (1980) 273–313.Google Scholar

⁶¹ For further discussion of the philosophical precepts of the Cornificians and of John's response, see Nederman, , ‘Knowledge, Virtue and the Path to Wisdom’ (n. 55, supra) and ‘Nature, Sin and the Origins of Society: The Ciceronian Tradition in Medieval Political Thought,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 49 (1988) 11–14.Google Scholar

⁶² ‘Operis scilicet assiduitas … vias tamen parat intelligentiae’: John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 835b.Google Scholar

⁶³ ‘Arte, quae usu et exercitatione firmata est, provenit facultas exequendi ea, quae ex arte gerenda sunt’: ibid. 853a.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ ‘Quod difficile fuerat in prima agitatione, ab assiduitate usus reddatur facilius; et cum regulas hoc faciendi deprehenderit, fiat, nisi desuetudinis et negligentiae torpor obsistat, facillimum’: ibid. 838c.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ ‘His enim perfecte cognitis, et habitu eorum per usum et exercitium roboratis’: ibid. 902b.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ ‘… si non usu et exercitio assiduo roboretur: nisi forte in habitum transient dispositio’: ibid. 932c.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ John of Salisbury, Policraticus (ed. Webb, C. C. J.; Oxford 1909 rpt. 1965) 544a. All translations are from my forthcoming English translation of the Policraticus, to be published by Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ ‘Mos autem mentis habitus ex quo singulorum operum assiduitas manat’: ibid. 544d.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ ‘Non enim si quid fit semel aut amplius, statim moribus aggregatur, nisi assiduitate faciendi vertatur in usum’: ibid. 544d–45a.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ ‘Assiduitas ergo amandi et obsequendi contulit usum, et ille versus in habitum me semper amare compellit etiam non amantes’: Letters of John of Salisbury II 512.Google Scholar

⁷¹ The notion of an altera natura is discussed at Policraticus 489b and in Letters II 144.Google Scholar

⁷² ‘Hic autem virtutes et vitia aeque complectitur, licet vitia non mores esse sed a plerisque dicantur moribus obviare’: Policraticus 545a.Google Scholar

⁷³ ‘Bonus tamen aut malos dicimus mores, vitia distinguimus et virtutes’: ibid. 545a.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ ‘In quo planum est solas virtutes censeri nomine morum…. Unde moratos a bono sive morigeros’: ibid. 545a.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ ‘… iniustitia mentis habitus quae a regione morum exterminat aequitatem’: ibid. 537c.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Lottin, Psychologie et morale III ii 105 and n. 5.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ The full text of the Tractatus is edited in Lottin, Psychologie et morale VI 45–92. Translations from this text are mine. On the Tractatus and its place in twelfth-century ethics, see Delhaye, P., ‘La vertu et les vertus dans les œuvres d’Alain de Lille,’ Cahiers de civilisation médiévale X^e–XII^e siècles 6 (1963) 13–25.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ For Simon's disputation, see Lottin, , Psychologie et morale III ii 106–9. The translation is mine.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ ‘Est enim qualitas genere predicamenti’: ibid. 107. For similar statements, see ibid. 106 and Alan, Tractatus 47, 49.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ ‘Que qualitas quamdiu est dispositio facile mobilis non dicitur virtus, sed tunc demum cum versa est in tenacem habitum. Unde virtus non videtur momentanea, sed diuturna’: Simon of Tournai (n. 78, supra) 106.Google Scholar

⁸¹ ‘Quamdiu enim homo fluctuat utrum qualitate perpetuo utatur vel non, cum ad tempus utatur qualitate, qualitas dicitur dispositio; cum vero constanter assentit ut utatur illa qualitate animi, dicitur tenax habitus, quamvis tamen perpetuo non utatur sed ad tempus’: ibid. 106–7.Google Scholar

⁸² ‘De qua voluntate dicitur ab Apostolo: velle adiacet michi, perficere autem bonum non invenio [Rom. 7.18]; talis dispositio non est habitus, et ideo non est virtus; sed quando habet voluntatem efficaciter perseverandi ita ut habeat voluntatem nullo modo recedendi ab hac voluntate, tunc non est ibi dispositio, sed habitus, et tunc est virtus’: Alan, Tractatus 49.Google Scholar

⁸³ ‘… quando mens bene constituta est ad exsequendum quod virtus exigit…. Si tamen mens bona constitutione habilis est ut, si emergat adversitas vel prosperitas, nec frangatur adversis nec extollatur prosperis, dicitur habitu habere fortitudinem. Idem iudicium de ceteris’: Simon of Tournai (n. 78, supra) 108.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ ‘Virtus ex accidente; cum enim primo mentem constituit ad exsequendum debitum officium fine debito, incipit esse virtus; cum vero cessat constituere, desinit esse virtus … quia modo incipit esse virtus, modo desinit esse virtus, ideo virtus dicitur abesse et adesse more accidentis’: ibid. 107–8.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ ‘Natura, qualiter omnis virtus habetur ab omni rationali, quia rationale aptum natum est’: ibid. 108.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ ‘Si enim rationalitas est homini substantialis licet homo quandoque ratione non utatur, quia tamen aptus natus est ad utendum ratione’: ibid. 107.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ ‘Qui ergo habet unam natura, et omnes natura, ut omnes tam boni quam mali’: ibid. 108–9.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ ‘… esse naturales qualitates homini et immobiles et ex accidenti esse virtutes’: ibid. 108.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ ‘A creatione confertur anime virtus; non tamen quod confertur est virtus, sed qualitas. Accidentale est enim ei esse virtutem, sed substantiale est esse qualitatem’: Alan, Tractatus 47.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ ‘Sunt enim virtutes naturales potentie rationali creature a creatione indite. Sicut enim gressibilitas vel rationalitas est potentia homini indita a creatione, ita potentia non elevandi prosperis vel frangendi adversis, potentia reddendi quod suum est, est homini a creatione indite’: ibid. 47.Google Scholar

⁹¹ ‘Sed quamvis homo a natura habeat has potentias, tamen adveniente etate non denominatur ab eis fortis, iustus, temperatus, quia huiusmodi denominationes potius sumuntur ab usu potentie quam a potentia’: ibid. 48.Google Scholar

⁹² ‘Ista enim potius predicant usum potentiarum quam potentias usuum’: ibid. 48.Google Scholar

⁹³ ‘Videamus ergo que concurrunt ad hoc ut potentia virtus sit’: ibid. 48.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ See ibid. 50.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ ‘Homo non dicitur fortis a potentia illa qua aptus est ad hoc vel illud faciendum, sed potius ab usu potentie; unde, cum ventum est ad annos discretionis, si homo utitur illa potentia bene que dicitur fortitudo vel illa que dicitur prudentia, fortis vel prudens dicitur. Unde ante annos discretionis, virtutes homo habere non dicitur, cum non habeat eas ut virtutes, sed ut potentias’: ibid. 48.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ See Nederman, C. J., ‘Aristotelian Ethics before the Nicomachean Ethics: Sources of Aristotle's Concept of Virtue in the Twelfth Century,’ Parergon N.S. 5 (1989) 55–75.Google Scholar