² Allen, J. W., A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century (London 1941) 400.Google Scholar

³ Bodini, I. De republica libri sex (Paris 1586) 1.8 (p. 85), 1.10 (p. 147), et passim. Google Scholar

⁴ Ibid. 1.6 (p. 46; my translation); cf. ibid. 2.2 (p. 189).Google Scholar

⁵ Ibid. 1.8 (pp. 83, 86, 97).Google Scholar

⁶ Ibid. 1.8 (ρ. 107; my translation).Google Scholar

⁷ Cardascla, G., ‘Machiavel et Jean Bodin,’ Bibliothèque d'humanisme et renaissance 3 (1943) 165f.Google Scholar

⁸ Reynolds, Beatrice, Proponents of Limited Monarchy in Sixteenth Century France (New York 1931). Chauviré, R. Jean Bodin, auteur de la République (Paris 1914) 479. Sabine, G. H. A History of Political Theory (New York 1937) also points out that Bodin was ‘profoundly religious both by temperament and conviction’ (401), but also notes that the importance of the Republic was ‘less due to its elaborate effort to revive the system of Aristotle than to the fact that it took the idea of sovereign power out of the limbo of theology in which the theory of divine right had left it’ (399; italics mine). Cf. Carlyle, R. W. and Carlyle, A. J. A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West VI (Edinburgh and London 1936) 417–429; and McIlwain, C. H., The Growth of Political Thought in the West (New York 1932) 386. These various commentators show how it is possible to discuss a problem in Bodin from either an exclusively religious or an exclusively secularist point of view.Google Scholar

⁹ Bodin, J., Method for the Easy Comprehension of History . translated by Reynolds, B. (Records of Civilization 37; New York 1945) 15 (hereafter cited as Method); idem, Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem, edited (from the Paris edition of 1572) by Mesnard, P. in Œuvres philosophiques de Jean Bodin (Corpus général des philosophes français: Auteurs modernes 5.3; Paris 1951)114^b.14–16 (hereafter cited as Methodus). (In the present passage Miss Reynolds’ translation has been twice modified: ‘sacred’ stands for ‘holy,’ ‘religion’ for ‘faith.’) — Cf. in the same volume of 1951 the Iuris universi distributio, pp. 71–73. — Of no slight value for the understanding of Bodin is the dissertation (Catholic University of America) of Brown, John L., The Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem of Jean Bodin (Washington, D.C. 1939).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics . trans. by Rackham, H. (Cambridge, Mass. 1947) 6.3.2, 4.1–3, 7.7 (hereafter cited as Nic. Ethics).Google Scholar

¹¹ Ibid. 6.12.6Google Scholar

¹² Ibid. 6.13.2–3, 6.Google Scholar

¹³ Method 15; Methodus 114^b.24–37.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Gilson, E., Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin (Paris 1929) 139–154, and especially 149. Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate 14.1.3.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Nic. Ethics 2.6.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Methodus 123 ^b.6–22 (my translation).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid. 123^b; cf. Method 39. Apparently Bodin refers here to Republic 4.441–444, where Plato assigns sophia to the highest part of the soul and gives his usual definition of justice as the harmony of the parts of the soul. In this case, sophia would have been translated as prudentia. The argument then proceeds on the assumption that justice is a moral virtue (as in Aristotle) and therefore is situated in the lower soul (just as Aristotle had situated the moral virtues in the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul). Then Bodin turns to the Roman lawyers to show that prudence and not moral virtue is the virtue that judges what one must render to others (cf. Cicero, De officiis 3.17.70–71).Google Scholar

Whatever the source of Bodin's argument, however, it rests on a misunderstanding of Aristotelian ethics and psychology. Aristotle places virtues in the irrational powers of the soul only insofar as these lower powers can and do obey reason. Thus St. Thomas — whom I have chosen to represent the Aristotelian tradition in Christian philosophy — states in the Summa Theologiae 1.2 q. 56 a.4: ‘Quod enim in irascibili et concupiscibili sint aliquae virtutes, patet. Actus enim qui progreditur ab una potentia secundum quod est ab alia mota, non potest esse perfectus, nisi utraque potentia sit bene disposita ad actum … In his igitur circa quae operatur irascibilis et concupiscibilis secundum quod sunt a ratione motae, necesse est ut aliquis habitus perficiens ad bene agendum sit non solum in ratione, sed etiam in irascibili et concupiscibili.’ In the replies to objections one and two St. Thomas insists that the irrational powers (and caro hominis) can be virtuous insofar as they obey reason. Bodin, however, argues that to attribute justice to the lower soul is to link men with animals by an association of law and justice, an argument that is clearly meaningless when we consider St. Thomas's exposition of Aristotle. For the existence of virtue in the lower powers arises only through reason itself — which obviates the necessity or even the possibility of associating men and animals by placing justice in a power they happen to hold in common. The origin of Bodin's position is his recurrent Platonism. Plato's emphasis on the opposition of the parts of the soul (Republic 4.438–444; Phaedrus 246–248); his location of the parts of the soul in specific parts of the body (Timaeus 69–72); his insistence that man is a soul and would be better off without a material body to interfere with the perception of reality (Republic 9.584–585; Laws 8.828; Phaedo 66–67, 78–80; Alcibiades 129–130) — these are the doctrines that dominate Bodin's psychology. The meaning of these doctrines for Plato himself may be debatable; but Aristotle rejected them in favor of his own views of the unity of the soul and its union with the body (De anima 1.1.10–19; 1.5.4–6, 24–30; 2.2.8–17; 3.9–10). St. Thomas also felt that there were real differences between Aristotle and Plato here (Summa contra gentiles 2.67–68). It is this kind of Platonism that seems to be behind Bodin's unwillingness to attribute justice to the ‘lower soul,’ an unwillingness that anticipates his insistence later that all virtues are intellectual (see infra, 375). This latter position is clearly based on the dualism of Bodin's Platonic view of the human soul. E. Zeller agrees with the interpretation of Plato presented here. He speaks of a dualism in metaphysics, ethics, and psychology that dominates Plato's philosophy and results in an ‘idealistic system’ based on the opposition between ‘mind and matter, God and the world, body and soul’ (Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy [London 1931] 127–128; for Aristotle, 158–192). See also infra, n. 30.

¹⁸ Methodus 123 ^b.28–32.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Nic. Ethics 6.1-3.Google Scholar

²⁰ Ibid. 1.13.18–19.Google Scholar

²¹ Ibid. 2. Cf. Thomas, S. Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.2 q. 49 a.1, 3; q. 50 a.1, 3.Google Scholar

²² Method 15; Methodus 114^b.20 ‘humanae vitae moderatricem.’Google Scholar

²³ Method 17; Methodus 115^b-2–16.Google Scholar

²⁴ Nic. Ethics 6.13.7.Google Scholar

²⁵ Ibid. 6.7.7, 12.9–10.Google Scholar

²⁶ Ibid. 6.6.1–2. Bodin's idea of history and Aristotle's idea of political science are similar. Both Bodin and Aristotle were looking to find, in their respective disciplines, principles to guide future action.Google Scholar

²⁷ Ibid. 6.13.6.Google Scholar

²⁸ ‘ Le Discours au Senat et Peuple de Toulouse,’ in Œuvres philosophiques 14 (translation mine, as are the italics). Bodin's justifications of secular knowledge reveal again the religious side of his thought. He is squarely in the Christian tradition here. Cf. Gilson, E., op. cit. Google Scholar

²⁹ Bodin, J., Method 16; Methodus 115^a.0–24. Cf. Lovejoy, A. O. The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, Mass. 1950) 61–64, 88–94; and Kristeller, P. O., The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino (New York 1943) 253–255, et passim. Google Scholar

³⁰ Le paradoxe moral de Iean Bodin Angevin (Paris 1598; on microfilm from the Bibliothèque Nationale) 8–9 (I have kept the original accents, punctuation and spelling; the translations are mine. Hereafter cited as Le paradoxe): ‘Or Ion void que no seulement Aristote s'est mepris en ce qu'il ha fait le mal contraire au bien, ains aussi en ce qu'il estime le bien estre fini et le mal infini, et que le mal procede de la matière.’ For the ‘infinity’ of evil see Nic. Ethics 2.6.14; its relevance to Bodin's discussion, however, is doubtful. For a brief survey of dualism in ancient philosophy see Masson, E. art. ‘Mal(Le),’ DThC 9.2 (1926) 1680–1686. Important statements for the study of the problem of metaphysical evil are Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.6; Physics 1.9; Plato, Laws 896–898; Timaeus 29ff., esp. 48–49; and Plutarch, Of Isis and Osiris. B.A.G. Fuller, The Problem of Evil in Plotinus (Cambridge 1912) and S. Pètrement, Le dualisme chez Platon, les gnostiques et les manichéens, (Paris 1947) deal with the problem in detail. See also Burnet, J. Greek Philosophy : Part I, Thales to Plato (London 1924) 333–349; B.A.G. Fuller, History of Greek Philosophy, 3 vols. (New York 1923–31) 393–423, 154–156; Gomperz, T. Greek Thinkers, 4 vols. (London 1901–1913) 206–217; Zeller, E. Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, 2 vols. (London and New York 1897) I 342–380; II 336–343; Zeller, E. Plato and The Older Academy (London 1876) 293–360.Google Scholar

³¹ He had not been as careful in the Method: ‘How difficult is [divine history] to men who have not yet been admitted to the mysteries of revealed philosophy is understood well enough by those who have trained themselves somewhat in meditation on great matters. While they raise their minds little by little above their senses, as though over the waves (quasi supra fluctus) in which the majority of mankind are submerged, they can, however, never liberate themselves far enough to avoid images created by their senses, like nebulae, placing themselves in opposition to the truth (Method 16; Methodus 114^b.54–115^a.4). Google Scholar

³² Le paradoxe 8-9.Google Scholar

³³ Ibid. 15–17. Chauviré has said this about Bodin's attacks on Aristotle: ‘Ce qui prouve dans Bodin la préoccupation constante de son grand devancier, c'est son acharnement à l'attaquer. Sans doute if y a là le sentiment de l'humaniste pour qui Aristote représente le passé, le moyen âge, la barbarie de l’école, Platon la pure et splendide antiquité récemment reveillée; mais peut-être y a-t-il là autre chose, l'expression de la jalousie envers un rival’ (op. cit. [supra n. 8] 177f.).Google Scholar

³⁴ Ibid. 19–20.Google Scholar

³⁵ Cf. Summa Theologiae 1.2 q.1-q.2. Google Scholar

³⁶ Le paradoxe 22: ‘F… . ie desire scauoir ce qui peut rendre la vie de l'homme tres heureuse. P. C'est le plus grād plaisir et le plus durable de tous, ne peut estre sensuel, qui est si court et si cher vendu qu'il tire apres soy la mort et ruine de l'homme. En quoi s'abusoit le Grec Eudoxe cuidant que le plaisir sensuel fust le souuerain bien, parce qu'il estoit ardemment desiré de tous animaux.’Google Scholar

³⁷ Nic. Ethics 10.2.1.Google Scholar

³⁸ Le paradoxe 23-24, 26–30.Google Scholar

³⁹ Ibid. 43: ‘F: Puis donc que le ioüissance du souuerain bien dépend de l'amour, l'amour dépend de sa cognoissance, et la cognoissance d'iceluy dépend de la science de ses œuures, de ses loix et iugemens, laquelle science prouient d'vne effusiõ de sa lumiere qui est d'autant plus grande en ceux la qui ont fait plus grād amas de vertus, dites moy s'il vous plaist que c'est de vertu.’Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Ibid. 48–51: ‘Parce que l'appetit est vne qualité de l'ame brutale: et la volonté est l'act de l'entendemẽt vsant de son franc arbitre, soit à fuir le mal, soit à suiure le biẽ; en quoy Aristote s'est mespris, pensant que la volõté ne s'addresse sinon à choses honestes et non pas aux vicieuses: et s'il estoit ainsi, non n'offẽseroit iamais: car il n'y a point de peché s'il n'est fait vne franche volõté, qui est nõ seulement plus grãde que la raison, ains aussi que l'entendement.’Google Scholar

⁴¹ Ibid. 52: ‘Si ceste definitiõ estoit receuable, la volõté seroit suiette à la raison: or tant s'en faut que la volonté soit suiette à la raison, qu'elle maistrise l'intellect: car combien que la force de l'intellect git en la discretion de ce qui est vray ou faux: et la volonté en ce qui est bon ou mauuais; si est ce neantmoins que l'intellect est en la puissance de la volonté: car il est certain que nul ne peut estre contraint d'entendre ni de contempler, s'il ne luy plaist receuoir les demonstrations et arguments qu'on luy monstre, et ne croira rien de ce qui est bien verifié si la volonté si oppose.’ For the Scotist idea of the will see Gilson, E. Jean Duns Scot (Paris 1952) 574–624; and Harris, C. R. S., Duns Scotus (Oxford 1927) II 281–300. But while the opinions are Scotist, the argument is not. And it would be misleading to place Bodin in any scholastic tradition.Google Scholar

⁴² Cf. Plato, , Phaedrus 246 Timaeus 69–72, Republic 4.431, 435–442.Google Scholar

⁴³ Le paradoxe 53-56.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ The Ethics of Aristotle . trans. by Thomson, J. A. K. (London 1953) 52 (2.6.17. Cf. 4.3.8.)Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Le Paradoxe 63-66: ‘… Il adiouste aussi la prudẽce, comme princesse de toutes vertus, et maistresse de la vie humaine, qui fait iugement du bien et du mal, et de ce qui est honeste et deshoneste …’ For the idea of moral virtue as an absence of passion see Nic. Ethics 2.3.5.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Ibid. 67: ‘… car la sciẽce remarque ce qui est vray et faux en toutes choses naturelles, diuines, et principalemẽt ès discours des mathematiques, que les anciẽs ont posé entre les choses naturelles et diuines, et qu'ils ont propremẽt appelé sciences, pour leuidẽce et certitude d'icelles.’Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Cf. Summa Theologiae 1.2 q.9. Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Le paradoxe 69-73: ‘car prudence est le genre de toutes les vertus que nous auons dit, par la definition mesme d'Aristote, qui appelle prudence action conuenable à la raison: or les actiõs des hommes iustes, magnanimes, temperans, sont conuenables à la raison: il sensuit donc que la iustice, magnanimité, temperance sont prudences.’Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Ibid. 72Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Ibid. 73–79.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Nic. Ethics 6.12.9–10.Google Scholar

⁵² Ibid. 6.13.6.Google Scholar

⁵³ In the Juris universi distributio Bodin says that prudence can be found in evil men: ‘JURISPRUDENTIA est ars tribuendi suum cuique, ad tuendam hominum societatem, et quia virtus est mentis, in sceleratos etiam cadit, qui prudenter judicent, quo quaeque modo constituenda civitas est, quid quemque cuique dare facere oporteat’ (in Œuvres philosophiques 72^a.39–44). In this statement, Bodin's prudence may correspond either to the Thomistic prudentia imperfecta or to the prudentia per similitudinem. Duns Scotus also declared that prudence can exist without moral virtues but his argument is totally different from Bodin's. For Scotus does not formulate a second kind of prudence — a secular prudence. He merely argues that prudence, being a perfection of the reason, is prior to moral virtue, a perfection of the will, and that consequently prudence cannot depend on moral virtue; see Fr. Hieronymus de Montefortino, Ioannis Duns Scoti … Summa Theologica 4 (Rome 1902) 325–329. Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Le paradoxe 88-90 (italics mine). ‘… La Charité ou amour diuin, qu'ils font la principale vertu, est fondee sur les principes de nature, qui nous montre clairmẽt qu'il faut aymer de toute sa puissance ce grand Dieu eternel, createur et conservateur du monde, tresbõ et trespuissant: qui n'est autre chose que la vraye sapience qui git en l'amour de Dieu tresardent, que les theologiens apellent charité … et de dire que ceste vertu la est infuse diuinement aussi sõt toutes les vertus et graces de Dieu, et generalement tout bien vient de Dieu.’Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Summa Theologiae 2.2 q.23 a.7.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Le paradoxe 90-91 (italics mine): ‘… seulement pour la seule bonté et sagesse de Dieu il est raui à l'aimer, et si cet amour procedoit de la pure volõté et affection interieure de l'homme, la vertu en seroit beaucoup plus grande et plus illustre que d'estre infuse diuinement, comme il faut iuger en case pareil de la foy.’ ‘… La vray foy dépend d'vne pure et franche volonté, qui croit sans force d'argumens, ny de raisons necessaires: et qui est en cela contraire à la science qui est fonde en demonstration forcee et necessaire: or si la foy est forcee, ce n'est plus foy: et si elle est diuinement infuse, elle ne despend pas de la volonté intérieure de l'homme, ce qui est principalement requis en la joy, ains du commandement exterieur; il y a donc plus de merite quãd elle procede, d'vne pure volonté, que quand elle est infuse, et qu'elle vient d'autry.’ Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Ibid. 92–93 (italics mine): ‘mais c'auoir ceste ferme fiance ou esperance, ou amour ardent enuers Dieu, que nous auons dit estre le comble de sapience, il est bien difficile, et presque impossible, si Dieu mesme ne nous rauit à luy.’ ‘Tout cela est beau à dire, mais oyez ce que dit l'amie de ce grand Roy, aprez auoir remarqué ses rares beautez, ses grandes richesses, ses perfections et puissances, Tirez moy, dit elle mõ amy, et nous courrons ensemble: elle est bien enflamée d'vn ardent amour, si est-ce neantmoins qu'elle desire et prie son amy de la tirer pour aller ensemble, et non pas deuant ny derriere.’Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Summa Theologiae 2.2 q.6 a.1. St. Thomas first outlines the Pelagian heresy and then concludes: ‘… Gum homo, assentiendo his quae sunt fidei, elevetur supra naturam suam, oportet quod hoc insit ei ex supernaturali principio interius movente, quod est Deus. Et ideo fides quantum ad assensum, qui est principalis actus fidei, est a Deo interius movente per gratiam.’Google Scholar