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Henslowe's Relocation to the North: Playhouse Management in Renaissance London
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 July 2009
Extract
If the London theatre of the Renaissance was one of the earliest examples of theatre as a commercial entertainment, then its playhouses were its largest physical investment and central visual focus. The Theatre, Curtain, Rose, Fortune, Globe, Swan, Hope and Cockpit were not only architectural inventions designed to replace previous itinerant playing practices with performances in fixed spaces where the acting companies could control admissions. They were also major financial investments by playhouse owners. The increase in the building of playhouses between 1576 and 1616 reflect a growing industry creating custom-built places of production that became regular fixtures in the urban geography of Renaissance London. The unprecedented rate of playgoing also increased interest in the possibility of profits by investors, shareholders, and those who operated the playhouses. In short, the London theatre was organized to make money, and London's playhouses were profit centers for the production and consumption of an aesthetic product. Within such a commercial climate, the decisions of playhouse owners concerning building, rebuilding, or abandonment of each facility were critical choices based on profits rather than aesthetics. The location of a playhouse was as important as what went on inside it. Decisions regarding playhouse location, then, can be examined as successful or unsuccessful pragmatic responses to competitive pressures, changing audience response, and expectation of profits in a speculative new industry within a fast-growing city.
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