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Dividend policy from the perspective of social system theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2023

Przemysław Wechta Open the ORCID record for Przemysław Wechta [Opens in a new window]
Przemysław Wechta*
Affiliation:
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poland
*
Przemysław Wechta, Faculty of Sociology, Adam Mickiewicz University, Szamarzewskiego 89 Budynek C, Poznan 60-568, Poland. Email: wechta@amu.edu.pl
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Abstract

The aim of the article is to analyse the functions that dividends perform in contractual relationships between public companies’ executives and shareholders. The author analyses the income function of dividend, but also considers its sociological aspects. Talcott Parsons' social system theory is the main point of reference, especially, the concept of contract institution. The article justifies the thesis on the relevance of dividends in shaping the equilibrium of power, information policy and the composition of shareholders in a joint-stock company. Dividend policy has a great regulatory potential, which is important in the face of various crises occurring in contemporary capitalism.

Keywords

A14D86Z13Corporate governancecontractual relationshipsdividendsownershipexecutivesshareholdersTalcott Parsons
Type
Aspects of social justice
Information
The Economic and Labour Relations Review , Volume 33 , Issue 3 , September 2022 , pp. 610 - 627
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2022

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