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Authors' reply

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

A. S. Henderson*
Affiliation:
9 Timbarra Crescent, O'Malley ACT 2606, Australia. E-mail: ashenderson@netspace.net.au
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Abstract

Type
Correspondence
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 The Royal College of Psychiatrists 

Dr Crichton's points are most useful. He can be assured that I tried to make the topic as easy as possible for the reader, not for myself. He is correct that I have not considered whether free will really exists, simply choosing to make volition the central topic of the editorial. Yes, what I have said applies just as much to minds free of mental illness. There, biological contributions to behaviour are equally likely to be present. What I wrote deliberately did not consider the unconscious, whether or not its presence might be revealed by readiness potentials preceding an action. We are all aware that psychoanalytic theory has made extensive proposals about unconscious origins for normal behaviour. But psychoanalysis and free will are matters to be considered elsewhere, preferably by philosophers rather than clinicians. For myself, I simply retain an interest in the place of personal responsibility in the presence of mental illness. It has been encouraging that the editorial has already caught the attention of some senior judges and lawyers.

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