Research for this article was carried out with the assistance of a fellowship grant from the Canada Council. The author would like to record his thanks to Ian Armour and Jeanne Cannizzo for assistance during various stages of research, and to Phyllis Auty and Elisabeth Barker for comments and criticisms on earlier drafts. Sir Alexander Glen, T. G. Mapplebeck, and George Taylor discussed their recollection of events with the author, and he is grateful for the time and effort which they took and for their patience and tolerance with his many questions. Quotations from Crown copyright records in the Public Record Office appear by permission of the controller of H. M. Stationery Office.

1. Churchill, W. S., The Grand Alliance (New York, 1962), p. 131–37.Google Scholar

2. The official German analysis put full responsibility for the coup on the shoulders of the British, singling out BBC Serb-language broadcasts, and stating that “the activities of the British secret service in Belgrade went hand in hand with this agitation” (see German White Book containing documents relating to the conflict with Greece and Yugoslavia 6 April 1941, English trans., Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Papers, Record Group 371/29803, R7844 [hereafter cited at PRO F.O. 371], ). In this and following citations of Foreign Office files, the original references are given in abbreviated form only, so that the piece can be located in the current file number in the Public Record Office.

3. This traditional view has recently been challenged (see Martin van Creveld, “The German Attack on the USSR : The Destruction of a Legend, ” in European Studies Review, 2, no. 1 [January 1972]; and Martin van Creveld, Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941 : The Balkan Clue [Cambridge, 1973]).

4. Hugh, Dalton, The Fateful Years 1931-1945 (London, 1957), pp. 366–67 Google Scholar. The fullest memoir account of SOE activities in the Balkans is found in Sweet-Escott, Bickham, Baker Street Irregular (London, 1965), especially pp. 17–64Google Scholar. Two more recent and valuable accounts are : Julian, Amery, Approach March (London, 1973)Google Scholar; and Glen, Sir Alexander, Footholds Against a Whirlwind (London, 1975).Google Scholar

5. The recent memoir by Sir Cecil Parrot, tutor to King Peter in the 1930s, is an exception. In an account strongly sympathetic to Prince Paul and hostile to the coup d'état, he places the blame squarely on the SOE and states categorically that “there would certainly have been no coup d'état if the British had not planned it” (see Cecil Parrot, The Tightrope [London, 1975], p. 105).

6. Elisabeth, Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War (New York and London, 1976), p. 92.Google Scholar

7. Jozo, Tomasevich, The Chetniks : War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945 (Stanford, Calif., 1975).Google Scholar

8. Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 43 and 45.

9. The SOE “archives” (what may remain of them) have not been opened to public inspection and are unlikely to be opened in the near or middle future, if ever. Nevertheless, the memoirs and recollections of participants are sometimes available, and some SOE material can be found in various places.

10. For the diplomatic background, see Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe, pp. 78-91; and Phyllis, Auty, “Some Aspects of British-Yugoslav Relations in 1941,” in The 1941 Revolt in Yugoslavia and Europe (Belgrade : Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1973), pp. 89–112Google Scholar. The accounts by Woodward, Sir Llewellyn, in Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London, 1970), pp. 22 ffGoogle Scholar., and by Avon, Lord, in The Reckoning (London, 1965)Google Scholar are more circumspect.

11. Campbell to Cairo, no. 165, March 20, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30253, R2778/G.

12. Cairo to FO, no. 640, March 21, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30253, R2962/G. Campbell also recommended that Serbo-Croatian broadcasts should adopt a stronger line, working on the feelings of the Serbs in particular, in order to (1) increase popular opposition to signature, and (2) if signature occurred, to ensure a “vehement reaction” (see Campbell to Cairo, no. 168, March 20, 1941, in Public Record Office, Operational Papers of the Prime Minister's Office [hereafter cited as PREM 3] 3/510/511, no. 423). Serbo-Croatian broadcasts were stepped up considerably in the week prior to the coup.

13. Cairo to FO, no. 628, March 20, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30253, R2776/G.

14. Sargent minute, March 23, 1941; the gist of the minute was sent to Campbell and Eden on March 24 (PRO F.O. 371/30206, R2981).

15. Dalton diary entry for March 21, 1941, London School of Economics and Political Science (hereafter cited as Dalton Diary).

16. David, Dilks, ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945 (London, 1971), p. 365.Google Scholar

17. Campbell to Cairo, no. 171, March 21, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30253, R2854/G.

18. PREM 3/510/511, no. 369.

19. PRO F.O. 371/29782, R3016/G.

20. Cairo to FO, no. 650, March 22, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30253, R2871/G.

21. Eden to Belgrade, no. 122, March 22, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30253, R2872/G.

22. Sargent minute, March 25, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30253, R2962/G.

23. Eden to Belgrade, no. 140, March 24, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30206, R2964.

24. Campbell to Cairo, no. 194, March 23, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30206, R292S; and War Office 201/1575. See also Campbell to Cairo, no. 195, March 23, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30206, R2925.

25. Cairo to Belgrade, no. 137, March 24, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30253, R2916/G.

26. J. Nicholls, minute, ibid.

27. Campbell to Cairo, no. 206, March 24, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30206, R2977; for the War Cabinet, see WM31(41)2, in Public Record Office, Cabinet Papers [hereafter cited as CAB] 65/18.

28. Campbell to Cairo, no. 203, March 24, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30253, R2987/G. The question of arms supplies was referred to a special committee, but its deliberations were overtaken by the coup on March 27.

29. Ibid.; see also PREM 3/510/511, nos. 366-67.

30. Cairo to Belgrade, no. 152, March 25, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30253, R3030/G.

31. See Diary of C.I.G.S.'s tour to the Mediterranean, February-April 1941, in War Office 106/2145, entry for March 25 : “Meeting at Embassy at 10.00 hours to discuss telegrams from Belgrade about prospects of a coup d'etat in Yugoslavia. Various telegrams were then sent. It was agreed that nothing [need] now keep us … in Egypt.” The party then left for Malta where news of the coup reached them on March 27; Eden returned immediately to Athens.

32. Sargent minute, March 25, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30243, R3288/G.

33. Ibid.

34. PREM 3/510/511, no. 365.

35. Campbell to Cairo, nos. 215 and 216, March 25, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30253, R3032/G.

36. For the text of Amery's broadcast, see PREM 3/510/511, nos. 428-30.

37. For the formation of the SOE, see Foot, M. R. D., SOE in France (London, 1966)Google Scholar; and Stafford, David A. T., “The Detonator Concept : British Strategy, SOE, and European Resistance after the fall of France,” Journal of Contemporary History, 10, no. 2 (April 1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. There is every reason to believe that the SIS was as active in Yugoslavia as the SOE during this period. It is also worth noting that while SOE contacts with Yugoslavia were broken by the German invasion, this was not the case with the SIS.

38. Hanau's role was well known to the Germans who later contrived to have him expelled from Yugoslavia. He is referred to by name as the leader of the “British Intelligence Service” in Yugoslavia (see Otto, Leibrock, Der Südosten, Grossdeutschland, und das Neue Europa [Berlin, 1941], p. 296 Google Scholar). It is probable that he had been an SIS agent before entering Section D.

39. “Subversive Activities in Relation to Strategy, ” November 25, 1940, COS (40)27(0), in CAB 80/56; “Interference with German Oil Supplies, ” January 8, 1941, COS(41)3(0), in CAB 80/56.

40. DO(41)4th, January 13, 1941, in CAB 69/2. This meeting also led to a new directive to Bomber Command; see Webster, Sir Charles and Frankland, Noble, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945, 3 vols. (London, 1961), 1 : 158–62, 289-90Google Scholar. On the Taylor mission, see Dalton Diary, January 8, 1941; and George Taylor communication to David A. T. Stafford, February 6, 1975.

41. George Taylor communication, February 6, 1975.

42. DO(41)4th, in CAB 69/2. For the SOE Balkan Record, see Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular, pp. 52-63; and Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe, pp. 28-95.

43. Much of the following is based on the report of SOE activities in Yugoslavia written by Taylor and Masterson. This report, dated June 24, 1941, is to be found in the Dalton Papers at the London School of Economics and Political Science, under the title “Report to S.O. [Dalton] from A.D. [Taylor] and DHY [Masterson] on Certain S.O. 2 Activities in Yugoslavia.” The original report consisted of six sections. The last four, dealing with postoccupational matters (sabotage and guerrilla resistance), unfortunately, are missing; the first, dealing with the Danube sabotage, is not considered here.

44. Tupanjanin has been described by one Yugoslav source as “the principal agent of the British intelligence service among the Serbs” (see J. B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis [New York, 1962], p. 264). References to the subsidy can be found in PRO F.O. 371/30205, R1525/G, and in Dalton Diary, particularly his comment on March 27, that “the money we have spent on the Serb Peasant Party. and other opposition parties has given wonderful value.” Ironically, the subsidy led the British to regard intelligence provided by Tupanjanin with great skepticism.

45. As early as July 1940, the same month that the SOE began subsidizing the Peasant Party, the SOE had been involved in discussion with the legation and the Foreign Office about the usefulness of a coup d'etat in Yugoslavia. The conclusion then was that it would be premature, but that it should not be discarded as an alternative in the future (see Amery, Approach March, pp. 174-76; and Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe, p. 85).

46. PRO F.O. 371/29779, R2270/G.

47. SOE memorandum, p. 12.

48. In the SOE's view, it was Knežević who took the initiative in fomenting a coup, and his were “the brains behind the conspiracy.” The SOE considered Mirković, “while enthusiastic and energetic, to be unfortunately entirely without political capacity” (ibid., pp. 13-14).

49. See Dilks, ed., Cadogan Diaries, p. 365, entry for March 24, 1941 : ” … Cabinet at 5. After we met, I got Transocean message that 7 Jugs are off tonight to sign Pact. Told Cabinet. A [Eden] is doing all that is possible, and that is unavailing. Can only ask G. J. [Gladwyn Jebb, chief executive officer to Dalton] to blow up the Jug train. But he probably can't do that.” See also SOE memorandum, p. 14.

50. George Taylor, communication to David A. T. Stafford, December 1976.

51. Glen, Footholds, pp. 51, 61-63. Sir Alexander has also discussed the coup with the author in August 1976. See also Sulzberger, C. L., A Long Row of Candles : Memoirs and Diaries, 1934-1954 (New York, 1969), pp. 100 and 126.Google Scholar

52. That Mihailović was in contact with the military attache and Masterson over matters relating to postoccupational planning prior to the coup has been confirmed to the author by Sir Alexander Glen, who was, at least formally, assistant naval attaché in Belgrade. This may help explain the later sense of commitment to Mihailović. On the other hand, according to Taylor, Clarke (the military attaché) told Taylor nothing of such discussions, and Mihailovic's name did not appear in that part of the Taylor/Masterson report dealing with postoccupational matters.

53. Although Clarke saw Kosić, the army chief of staff, on March 25, his report of that meeting makes it clear that there was no discussion of any coup; rather, it indicates that Clarke was impressed by Kosic's resignation in the face of events, and deals with his unrealistic assessment of the army's ability to resist the Germans (see Campbell to FO, no. 537, March 26, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30259, R3069). More likely sources for army information about a coup would come from Clarke's contacts with the Reserve Officers’ Club, to which he and MacDonald were frequent visitors (see Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, p. 254).

54. Campbell to Sargent, July 1, 1942, in PRO F.O. 371/33490, R4S18/G. Emphases added.

55. Air attaché to FO, no. 536, March 26, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30253, R3071/G. See also War Office 201/1575 16a. A report of this meeting came immediately into German hands and was forwarded to Berlin the same day : “a lengthy conversation took place this morning between the British air attaché and General Simovitch, during which precise details were discussed regarding British aid in the event of war with the Axis powers, which Simovitch regards as unavoidable should the coup d'état proceed” (von Heeren to Berlin, March 26, 1941, quoted in the German White Paper, PRQ F.O. 371/29803, R7844).

56. Air attache to Air Ministry, March 31, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30209, R3711/G.

57. Tomasevich, The Chetniks, p. 45.

58. According to Campbell, in 1942 he was told by Ninčić (the Yugoslav foreign minister) that “Mirković had stated before a number of people in Egypt that while still in Belgrade before the coup d'état he had already been an agent of the British. This of course made his position impossible vis-à-vis other Yugoslavs and made it impossible for the Government to have anything further to do with him. If he was indeed an ‘agent’ I did not know of it; I knew he was in confidential contact with the Air Attaché and told him that a coup d'état was being planned but he never furnished details or dates, and I should doubt that he ever received pay from any of our Intelligence or other services” (Campbell to Sargent, July 1, 1942, in PRO F.O. 371/33490, R4518/G). Mirković, however, did later receive a pension from His Majesty's Government, and in 1968, while living in London, he admitted that “he had been passing on military intelligence to the British, derived from the Yugoslav mission in Berlin” (see Times [London], March 23, 1968).

59. T. G. Mapplebeck, discussion with David A. T. Stafford, August 1976. Mapplebeck places the day of his meeting with Mirković before the day claimed by Tomasevich.

60. MacDonald sent a series of reports to the Air Ministry after the coup, in which he reported claims by an informant close to Simovic that Yugoslav forces had crossed the frontier into Albania, and, later, information from Simović himself alleging that Prince Paul had been promised the crown and had twice tried to poison Prince Peter. Nicolls of the Foreign Office minuted : “this information … is very highly coloured and I am quite sure is untrustworthy… . I know, confidentially too, that the Air Ministry have not a high opinion of this officer's capabilities or character” (see the correspondence in PRO F.O. 371/30207/8, R3183/G, R3222/G, R3187, R3387/G, and R3496/G). On March 28, MacDonald reported that his informant had told him that “referring coup d'etat he said staff work had been excellent and had all been worked out by a senior Air Force Officer (J.K.).” As J.K. were the initials used to denote Mirkovic, it indicated that MacDonald was being told for the first time of Mirković's role—which must throw grave doubt on his later claim of March 31, that he was in close touch with Mirkovic throughout the events (see PRO F.O. 371/30207, R3183/G).

61. Mapplebeck's relations with both the minister and MacDonald were bad, and it is conceivable that he did not tell either one of them about his meeting with Mirković, or that, if he told MacDonald, MacDonald kept the information to himself. Exactly what Campbell learned from the air attaché's office, and when he learned it, must remain open to question. As for the SOE's information, it might be argued that even if Campbell failed to pass the information on in full to London, this would not be significant in view of the SOE's own communications with London. However, two points should be noted : (1) Taylor clearly operated on the assumption that Campbell was forwarding all information to London, and (2) the SOE did not have their own channel to London (they were dependent on SIS W/T, and Taylor did not send “separate reports, in any regular fashion, by any channels”) (George Taylor, communication to David A. T. Stafford, December 1976).

62. No one on the British side, however, knew the exact timing of the coup, because it was brought forward by twenty-four hours in order to take advantage of the prince regent's departure for his hunting lodge on March 26. The SOE, for example, was not informed of the change in plans, and initially assumed that a counter-coup was taking place.

63. New York Times, March 28, 1941.

64. Dalton Diary, March 27, 1941.

65. DO(41) 10th, March 27, 1941, in CAB 69/2. See also Dalton Diary, March 28, 1941; and COS(41)lllth, March 27, 1941, in CAB 79/10.

66. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular, p. 63.

67. Taylor to Nelson, March 31, 1941, in PRO F.O. 371/30213, R3466/G.

68. Dalton Diary, April 30, 1941. See also entries for April 3, 7, 17, 22, and 25.

69. Dalton to prime minister, September 2, 1941, in Dalton Papers.

70. Dalton, The Fateful Years 1931-1945, p. 373

71. After the final draft of this article was accepted and prepared for publication, the author had the opportunity to interview Sir Ronald Campbell in May 1977. With due allowance for the passage of thirty-six years, Sir Ronald's recollections largely support the author's arguments in that he recalls (a) that he had not finally decided by March 27 that a coup d'etat was the best response to signature of the Pact, and that he was still doubtful of its military advantages; (b) that he regarded SOE contacts as rather peripheral, and was unaware of the degree to which they were involved in preparations for a coup d'etat; (c) that his relations with MacDonald, the air attache, were distant, and he has no recollection of seeing the telegram of March 26 reporting the interview with Simovic; (d) that he was unaware of Mapplebeck's contacts with Mirkovic.

Thus, although it is incorrect to assume that the minister was informed of the air force contacts, it appears safe to say that he was less than enthusiastic about a coup d'etat, that his assessment and support of subversive activities was thereby affected, and that his reservations were what was reflected in his reports to London. The claim by one SOE member that the minister was “one hundred percent with us in working for the coup” is, therefore, quite mistaken.

The author would like to thank Sir Ronald for his help, time, and hospitality.