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Legislative Authority in the Soviet Political System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

D. Richard Little
D. Richard Little*
Affiliation:
Northern Illinois University
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It is a settled principle of Soviet constitutional law that the USSR Supreme Soviet is the supreme representative organ, the supreme legislative body, and the supreme executor of the people's sovereignty. The 1936 Constitution subordinates all other organs of government to the Supreme Soviet, and it alone, on the national level, has the right to form governments, pass laws, and amend the Constitution. The Constitution also stipulates, however, that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is “the vanguard of the workers in their struggle for the construction of a communist society and constitutes the guiding core of all workers’ organizations, public as well as governmental.”

Type
Articles
Information
Slavic Review , Volume 30 , Issue 1 , March 1971 , pp. 57 - 73
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 1971

References

1. Article 126. The Constitution of the USSR is amended probably more frequently than any other in the world, so the date of publication is important. Throughout this paper we refer to Konstitutsiia SSSR (Moscow, 1966).

2. Soviet authorities refer to the Presidium as a “continuously operating body,” but according to the official parliamentary report (Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR), it met only twice in 1966, four times in 1967, and five times in 1968. These figures are probably misleading, however, since they refer only to plenary meetings at which a quorum is present and decisions are taken by majority vote. No doubt an inner circle of Presidium members meets more frequently in informal session, but there are no public records of such meetings.

3. See, for example, A. I., Denisov and M. G., Kirichenko, Osnovy sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava (Moscow, 1950), pp. 122–24.Google Scholar

4. Bespaly, I. T., Presidium Verkhovnogo Soveta Soiusnoi Respubliki (Moscow, 1959), p. 8–12.Google Scholar

5. See Kravtsov, B. P., Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR (Moscow, 1954), p. 78 Google Scholar, and G. V., Barabashev and K. F., Sheremet, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo (Moscow, 1965), p. 76–77.Google Scholar

6. An analogous case in the American political system would be the President's authority to make interim personnel appointments, subject to approval by the Senate at its next session. In doing so, the President is exercising not a congressional power but his own constitutional authority.

7. Intended or not, the point is an ironic one, because this power, which in practice has never been exercised, is one of the main bases for the Soviet claim to a democratic legislature. In Bespaly's argument, however, it tends to weaken that claim.

8. Bespaly, Presidium, p. 12.

9. L. Mandelshtam, “Istina i domysly,” Isvestiia, July 30, 1966, p. 3.

10. Among recent writings on the problem, the best brief summary is found in A. F., Shebanov, “Razvitie formy sovetskogo prava,” Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1967, no. 9, pp. 22–31Google Scholar. For a longer and more rewarding study see A. V. Mitskevich, Akty vysshikh organov sovetskogo gosudarstvo (Moscow, 1967).

11. See ibid., pp. 94-95, and I. N. Kuznetsov, “Kompetentsiia Prezidium Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR i pravovye problemy ee reglamentatsii,” Uchenye sapiski VNIISZ, n.d., no. 8, p. 11.

12. The issuance of normative acts “concretizing” laws is not an exclusive right of the Presidium, but is done by many other institutions, including public organizations, trade union councils, and government ministries. See S. N., Bratus and I. S., Samoshchenko, Obshchaia teoriia sovetskogo prava (Moscow, 1966), p. 144.Google Scholar

13. Mitskevich, Akty vysshikh organov, p. 98. For examples of the concretization of laws see D. I., Olkhov, “Novyi Zakon o vseobshchei voinskoi obiazannosti,” Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1968, no. 5, pp. 138–43Google Scholar (on the 1967 Law on Military Service), and Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1968, no. 39, pp. 672-73 (on the recent Law on Marriage and the Family). The Presidium's actions on an earlier law on military obligations provoked charges of illegality because its “concretization” allegedly resulted in substantive changes in the content of the law. See Kuznetsov, I. N., “K voprosu o iuridicheskoi prirode ukaza Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR i ego sootnoshenii s zakonom,” in Voprosy sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo prava (Moscow, 1959), p. 236–37.Google Scholar

14. These are discussed in Mishutin, A. N., “Nekotorye voprosy sovershenstvovaniia zakonodatel'stva v svete reshenii XXIII s“ezda KPSS,” in Kalinychev, F. I. et al., eds., XXIII s“esd KPSS i voprosy gosudarstvennogo stroitel'stva (Moscow, 1968), p. 29–44.Google Scholar

15. The original edict appears in Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 196S, no. 10, p. 186; for the interpretation see ibid., no. 37, p. S32.

16. Various facets of this point of view are presented in Umansky, Iakov N., Sovetskoe gosudarstvennoe pravo (Moscow, 1960), pp. 285–86 Google Scholar; Romashkin, P. S. et al., Teoriia gosttdarstva i prava (Moscow, 1962), pp. 417–18 Google Scholar; and Aleksandrov, N. G. et al., Osnovy teorii gosudarstva i prava (Moscow, 1963), p. 388–89.Google Scholar

17. See Mitskevich, Akty vysshikh organov, pp. 99-104; Kuznetsov, “K voprosu,” p. 203; Kerimov, D. A., Svoboda, pravo i sakonnosf (Moscow, 1960), pp. 177–81 Google Scholar; and Kravchuk, S. S., Voprosy rasvitiia sovetov na sovremennom etape (Moscow, 1966), pp. 41–48 Google Scholar. Kravchuk and Kerimov are agreed that the legislative actions of the Presidium are unconstitutional, but Kerimov suggests altering the Constitution to legitimize the practice, while Kravchuk wants to forbid the practice in fact as well as in law.

18. Mitskevich, , Akty vysshikh organov, p. 101 Google Scholar.

19. Kerimov, , Svoboda, pravo i sakonnost', p. 182 Google Scholar.

20. Kravchuk found that of thirty-four ukasy issued by the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and subsequently passed into law between 1959 and 1963, twelve were issued within two weeks of a legislative session. See Voprosy rasvitiia sovetov, p. 47.

21. Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1967, no. 39, pp. 561-62.

22. Quoted by A. N. Poskrebyshev, Izvestiia, Feb. 26, 1947, p. 7.

23. See, for example, I. P., Trainin, “O glave gosudarstva,” Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 1938, no. 1, p. 90 Google Scholar.

24. Kirichenko, M. G., Vysshie organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti RSFSR (Moscow, 1968), p. 214 Google Scholar (my emphasis). Kerimov also contends that the Presidium has “regulated social relations not intended to be within its jurisdictioa …” See Svoboda, pravo i eakonnosf, p. 180.

25. For discussion of the Soviet concept of a “workers’ assembly” see Kalinychev, F. and Lukianov, A., “Samye predstavitel'nye, postoianno rabotaiushchie …,” Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia, 1966, no. 9, pp. 7–12Google Scholar.

26. Complaints on this score from deputies to Soviets are numerous. One deputy to the Moscow City Soviet (a senior worker and former member of the executive committee of a district soviet) put it succinctly: “Sometimes it is necessary to take time off from work. The shift leader grumbles a little, but lets you go. But try to tell him that it is necessary to go to the Moscow Soviet, to a ministry, or other such office on the business of an elected official—no, you cannot go. He will say: do public business in your free time. And one can understand him. A brigade has a plan, and a master has an obligation to ensure its fulfillment. If he is often absent, who will see to the plan?” Markina, V, “Tem, kto idet na smenu,” Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia, 1966, no. 5, p. 27 Google Scholar.

Even members of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, if they are not otherwise important figures, have difficulty finding time for their legislative responsibilities. One such member complained: “I have worked as a weaver at the S. I. Balashov textile factory for sixteen years, and am freed from my work only during the time of the sessions.” Z. Pukhova, “Deputat i ego dolg,” in Vasiliev, V. I. et al., eds., Voprosy raboty Sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia (Moscow, 1968), p. 373 Google Scholar.

27. See Mitskevich, , Akty vysshikh organov, p. 130. 28Google Scholar. Scott, Derek J. R., Russian Political Institutions 3rd ed. (New York, 1966), p. 1966 Google Scholar.

29. Christian Duevel, “Unusual Awards for Gromyko,” Radio Liberty Dispatch, Aug. 7, 1969, p. 3.

30. Mitskevich, , Akty vysshikh organov, p. 102 Google Scholar.

31. Kravchuk, , Voprosy rasvitiia sovetov, pp. 44–46Google Scholar.

32. Ibid., p. 46. The desirability of reducing the Presidium's authority is argued also by A. S., Pigolkin, “Sovershenstvovanie zakonodatel'noi tekhniki,” Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1968, no. 1, p. 52 Google Scholar.

33. Most of the official documents on these matters, texts of relevant speeches at the Twenty-third Party Congress, and a collection of explanatory essays have been published in Vasiliev, Voprosy raboty Sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia.

34. During the Seventh Supreme Soviet (1966-70) the number of standing committees increased from four (five in the Soviet of Nationalities) to eleven in each chamber, while the number of elected deputies serving on these committees increased from 259 (18 percent) in the Sixth Supreme Soviet (1962-66) to 700 (nearly fifty percent) in the Seventh.

35. The law is published in Zasedaniio Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Sed'mogo sosyva, Third Session, Stenographic Report (Moscow, 1967), pp. 415-24.

36. See Korolev, Iu, “Vazhnoe zveno gosudarstvennogo kontrolia,” Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia, 1966, no. 5, pp. 20–24Google Scholar.