I wish to thank Helge Blakkisrud, Tor Bukkvoll, Geir Flikke, Henry Hale, Robert Horvath, Alexander Verkhovsky, and two anonymous reviewers for the Slavic Review for reading and providing insightful comments to draft versions of this article. Research for the article was financed by the Research Council of Norway through the project “Nation-building, nationalism and the new ‘other’ in today’s Russia (NEORUSS),” project number 220599, under the NORRUSS program.

1 For reactions of Russian nationalists to the Euromaidan revolution, readers are referred to Robert Horvath’s brilliant survey “The Euromaidan and the Crisis of Russian Nationalism,” Nationalities Papers 43, no.6 (2015): 819–39. 2. Mikhail A., Alexseev and Henry E., Hale, “Rallying ‘Round the Leader More than the Flag: Changes in Russian Nationalist Public Opinion 2013–2014,” in Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, eds., The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000–15 (Edinburgh, 2016), 192–220 Google Scholar.

3 Viktor Yanukovich fled on February 21, 2014 and six days later the first units of local militias and Russian soldiers without insignia forced their way into the Crimean Parliament and government buildings. See Aleksandr, Gol΄ts, “Chetvertoe vziatie Kryma,” Proet Contra, (May-August 2014): 45–56; 46 Google Scholar. Marléne Laruelle believes that Putin personally made the decision to annex Crimea against the advice of those close to him, including the ministers of foreign affairs and defense. Marléne, Laruelle, “Russian Nationalism and Ukraine,” Current History 113 no. 765, (October 2014): 272–77Google Scholar; 274.

4 See, e.g., Anton Shekhovtsov “The ‘Ukraine crisis’ is a long-planned operation,” Anton Shekhovtsov’s blog, August 29, 2014, at anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.no/2014/08/the-ukraine-crisis-is-long-planned.html (last accessed April 22, 2016).

5 Serhiy, Kudelia, “Domestic sources of the Donbas insurgency,” PONARS Eurasia policy memo, memo 351, September 2014 Google Scholar; Richard, Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands (London, 2014), 180–81Google Scholar. Opinion polls show that before the Euromaidan revolution, roughly one third of the population of Donbas supported separatism and unification with Russia. Taras, Kuzio, “Competing Nationalisms, Euromaidan, and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 15, no 1, (April 2015): 157–69; 163Google Scholar.

6 Andrew, Wilson, Ukraine Crisis: What it Means for the West (New Haven, 2014), 133 Google Scholar.

7 Andrew, Wilson, Interview with the Norwegian Broadcasting Service, June 11, 2015, at tv.nrk.no/serie/urix/NNFA53061115/11–06–2015#t=22m24s (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

8 Henry, Hale, “How Nationalism and Machine Politics Mix in Russia,” in Kolstø and Blakkisrud, The New Russian Nationalism, 221–48Google Scholar.

9 Emil, Pain, “The Imperial Syndrome and its Influence on Russian Nationalism,” in Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, eds., The New Russian Nationalism, 46–74 Google Scholar; Marléne, Laruelle, In the Name of the Nation: Nationalism and Politics in Contemporary Russia (New York, 2009)Google Scholar.

10 Marléne, Laruelle, “Russia as an Anti-liberal European Civilisation,” in Kolstø and Blakkisrud, The New Russian Nationalism, 275–97Google Scholar.

11 Hale, “How Nationalism and Machine Politics Mix” in Witold Rodkiewicz and Jadwiga Rogoża, Potemkin Conservatism: An Ideological Tool of the Kremlin (Warsaw, 2015), at http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_48_potemkin_conservatism_net.pdf (last accessed April 22, 2016).

12 See, e.g., Joshua, Tucker, “What is motivating Putin?” The Washington post, The monkey cage blog, March 18, 2014, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/18/what-is-motivating-putin/ (last accessed April 23, 2016)Google Scholar.

13 See, e.g., Aleksandr, Prokhanov, “Prokhanov: sobytiia v Krymu i na Donbasse— eto vozrozhdenie Rossiiskoi imperii,” Pravdoryb, October 31, 2014, at pravdoryb.info/prokhanov-sobytiya-v-krymu-i-na-donbasse--eto-vozrozhdenie-rossiyskoy-imperii.html (last accessed April 22, 2016) Google Scholar.

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15 Konstantin, Krylov, “Umeret΄ ili pomuchit΄sia? K sporam o liberalizme, imperstve, i russkom natsionalizme,” Voprosy natsionalizma, no. 6 (2011): 3 Google Scholar.

16 Konstantin Krylov, interview, Moscow, October 2013.

17 Sevast΄ianov, A. N., Russkii natsionalizm: ego druz΄ia i vragi (Moscow, 2001), 20 Google Scholar.

18 Vladimir, Putin, “Rossiia na rubezhe tysiacheletii,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, December 30, 1999, at http://www.ng.ru/politics/1999–12-30/4_millenium.html (last accessed July 29, 2016)Google Scholar.

19 Nicu, Popescu, Eurasian Union: The Real, the Imaginary and the Likely. Institute for Security Studies. Chaillot Papers, no. 132, September 2014 Google Scholar.

20 Egor Kholmogorov, interview, October 2013.

21 Marléne, Laruelle, “The three colors of Novorossiya, or the Russian nationalist mythmaking of the Ukrainian crisis,” Post-Soviet Affairs 32, no. 1 (January 2016): 55–74 Google Scholar.

22 Stephen D., Shenfield, Russian Fascism; Traditions, Tendencies, Movements (Armonk, 2001)Google Scholar; Marléne, Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire (Baltimore, 2008)Google Scholar.

23 Laruelle, “The three colors of Novorossiya.” Novorossiia is the historical name of the steppe region north of the Black Sea which was annexed by the Russian Empire in the 1790s. Culturally and linguistically it has a more Russian character than the rest of Ukraine, and Russian nationalists insist that the entire region must be united with Russia.

24 Vladimir Tor, NDP leader, interview, October 2013.

25 In 2013 blogger and corruption-fighter Aleksei Naval΄nyi won 27 percent of the vote in the Moscow mayoral election against all odds, thereby establishing himself as the undisputed leader of the antiregime opposition. He hailed from the liberal camp but adopted some nationalist rhetoric, in particular, the need to defend the country from the perceived deluge of immigrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Naval΄nyi began his political career in the liberal opposition party Yabloko, but was expelled in 2007 for his nationalist deviation. See Konstantin, Voronkov, Aleksei Naval΄nyi: Groza zhulikov i vorov (Moscow, 2012), 215–23Google Scholar. His ability to position himself as both a nationalist and a democrat was a major reason for his electoral success (along with his high-profile anticorruption campaigns and media-savvy use of the Internet). See Pål, Kolstø, “Russia’s Nationalists Flirt with Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 25, no. 3 (July 2014): 120–34Google Scholar, and Marléne, Laruelle, “Alexei Navalny and challenges in reconciling ‘nationalism’ and ‘liberalism,’ ” Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no. 4 (July 2014): 276–97Google Scholar.

26 Aleksei, Naval΄nyi, “Naval΄nyi vystupil protiv prisoedineniia Kryma k Rossii,” Lenta.ru, March 12, 2014, at http://www.lenta.ru/news/2014/03/12/Navalny/ (last accessed August 1, 2016)Google Scholar. In late February 2014, Naval΄nyi, then leader of People’s Alliance, had been sentenced to house arrest and barred from using the Internet. He was therefore unable to communicate his thoughts on the Crimean crisis himself, but his friends conveyed them to the public.

27 Stanislav, Eliseev, “Naval΄nyi: Martovskie tezisy, ili razvernutaia pozitsiia po Ukraine i Krymu,” March 12, 2014, at http://www.slon.ru/fast/russia/navalnyy-martovskie-tezisy-ili-razvernutaya-pozitsiya-po-ukraine-i-krymu-1069397.xhtml Google Scholar (last accessed August 1, 2016); Kolstø, “Russia’s nationalists Flirt.”

28 Vladimir, Milov, “Ukraina: pochemu tak poluchilos΄ i v chem uroki dlia Rossii,” March 24, 2014, at http://www.slon.ru/world/milov_pro_ukrainu_-1060888.xhtml (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

29 Il΄ia, Lazarenko, “Prisoedinenie Kryma dlia Rossii velikii minus,” Vkontakte, 2014 Google Scholar, at http://www.vk.com/video-25801613_168203407 (Site blocked; likely no longer accessible).

30 Konstantin, Krylov, “O pozitsii po ukrainskomu voprosu”, Russkii obozrevatel΄, March 4, 2014, at http://www.rus-obr.ru/blog/29883 (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

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32 This early promise was later reneged upon.

33 Mikhail, Beliaev, “Pro Krym bez illiuzii,” Livejournal, March 12, 2014, at http://www.rosndp.org/pro-krim-bez-illyuzij.htm (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

34 Aleksandr, Khramov, “Prisoediniaia Krym, Rossiia vozlagaet na sebia otvetstvennost΄ za russkikh,” Svobodnaia pressa, March 13, 2014, at http://www.svpressa.ru/politic/article/83647/ (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

35 Pavel, Sviatenkov, “Rossiia perestala oshchushchat΄ sebia koloniei,” Russkii obozrevatel΄, March 26, 2014, at http://www.rus-obr.ru/ru-web/30341 (last accessed August 1, 2016)Google Scholar.

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37 Konstantin, Krylov, Zapis΄iz Feisbuka, April 7, 2015, 09:47, at http://www.krylov.cc (last accessed April 22, 2016; no longer available)Google Scholar.

38 Andrei, Tsygankov, “Vladimir Putin’s last stand: The sources of Russia’s Ukraine policy,” Post-Soviet affairs, 31, no. 4, (July 2015): 279–303; 294 Google Scholar.

39 Vladimir, Putin, “Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Kremlin.ru, March 18, 2014, at http://www.kremlin.ru/news/20603 (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar. See also Kimberley, Marten, “Vladimir Putin: Ethnic Russian Nationalist,” The Washington Post, the Monkey Cage blog, March 19, 2014, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2014/03/19/vladimir-putin-ethnic-russian-nationalist/ (last accessed 22 April 2016)Google Scholar.

40 See Vladimir, Putin, “Rossiia: natsional΄nyi vopros,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, January 23, 2012, at http://www.ng.ru/politics/2012–01–23/1_national.html (last accessed August 1, 2016)Google Scholar.

41 Pål, Kolstø, “The ethnification of Russian nationalism,” in Kolstø & Blakkisrud, eds., The New Russian Nationalism, 18–45; 18–19 Google Scholar.

42 Oleg, Nemenskii, “Nasledie i vybor,” Voprosy natsionalizma, 9 (2012): 17–21 Google Scholar.

43 Quoted in Elizabeth Piper, “Patriot’s handbook’ may give insight into Putin’s thoughts,” Global Post, June 9, 2014, at http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/thomsonreuters/140609/patriots-handbook-may-give-insight-putins-thoughts (last accessed April 22, 2016). The “Russian world” (russkii mir) is a policy concept with several aspects and possible interpretations. In a broad sense it denotes all who speak Russian and/or love Russian culture and literature, wherever they live. In a more narrow sense, it pertains to those regions of the former Soviet Union where Russians continue to live (virtually the entire post-Soviet space). In 2007, the Kremlin established a “Russian World Foundation” as a public diplomacy instrument. See Marléne Laruelle, The Russian World: Russia’s Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination, Center on Global Interests, Washington DC, May 2015, at http://globalinterests.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FINAL-CGI_Russian-World_Marlene-Laruelle.pdf. For a perspective that more strongly underlines the spiritual message of the Russian world concept as it is used by the Russian Orthodox Church, see Nicolai N. Petro, “Russia’s Orthodox Soft Power,” Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, March 23, 2015, at http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/727 (last accessed April 22, 2016).

44 Valerii, Solovei, “Natsiia, ne imperiia,” March 18, 2014, at http://novayasila.org/lenta/news602 (no longer available; page later removed)Google Scholar. The page was later removed from the internet, but Solovei has conirmed the content and that this remains his view. Author’s personal communication with Valerii Solovei, December 18, 2015.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Author’s personal communication with Solovei, March 20, 2014.

48 See Egor, Kholmogorov, Zashchitit li Rossiia Ukrainu? (Moscow, 2006 Google Scholar).

49 Egor, Kholmogorov, “Otkrytoe pis΄mo ukraintsam,” March 10, 2014, at http://www.holmogor.livejournal.com/6196638.html (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

50 Aleksandr, Sevast΄ianov, “Ukraino, moia Ukraino!”, March 5, 2014, at http://www.razumei.ru/lib/article/2157 (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

51 Ibid., (emphasis added).

52 Vladimir, Putin, “Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Kremlin.ru, March 18, 2014, at http://www.kremlin.ru/news/20603 (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

53 Aleksei, Naval΄nyi,’ “Naval΄nyi vystupil protiv prisoedineniia Kryma k Rossii,” Lenta.ru, March 12, 2014, at http://www.lenta.ru/news/2014/03/12/Navalny (last accessed August 10, 2016)Google Scholar.; “Zaiavlenie ‘Demokraticheskogo vybora’ o nedopustimosti rossiiskogo voennogo vmeshatel΄stva na Ukraine,” Demokraticheskii vybor, March 1, 2014, at http://www.demvybor.ru/declaration/1387-zayavlenie-demokraticheskogo-vybora-o-nedopustimosti-rossijskogo-voennogo-vmeshatelstva-na-ukraine.html (last accessed April 22, 2016).

54 Svetlana, Kriukova and Sergei, Liamets, “Vladimir Milov: Putin—ne v adekvate,” Ukrainskaia Pravda, January 27, 2015, at http://www.epravda.com.ua/rus/publications/2015/01/27/523756/ (Last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

55 “Zaiavlenie ‘Demokraticheskogo vybora’ o nedopustimosti.”

56 “Russian spring” (russkaia vesna) is the term, apparently coined by Egor Kholmogorov, commonly used in Russian nationalist discourse to describe the anti-Kyiv mobilization and occupation of public buildings in east Ukrainian cities in March–April 2014.

57 Il΄ia, Lazarenko, “Donetskaia mnogonatsionaliia,” May 9, 2014, at http://www.rufabula.com/author/ilya-lazarenko/1 (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

58 See “Putin claims Russian forces ‘could conquer Ukraine capital in two weeks,’ ” The Guardian, September 2, 2014, at at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/02/putinrussian-forces-could-conquer-ukraine-capital-kiev-fortnight (last accessed April 22, 2016).

59 Konstantin, Krylov, Zapis΄ iz Feisbuka, April 7, 2015, at http://www/krylov.cc (last accessed 22 April 2016), capitalization in the originalGoogle Scholar.

60 Anton, Kulikov, “ ‘Russkii marsh’ protiv ‘Russkoi vesny’?”, Pravda.ru, October 10, 2014, at http://www.pravda.ru/politics/parties/other/10–10-2014/1230494-rusmarsh-0/ (last accessed August 10, 2016)Google Scholar.

61 Oleg, Nemenskii, “Reshaetsia v Donbasse,” Literaturnaia gazeta, July 18, 2014, at http://www.riss.ru/my-v-smi/3408-reshaetsya-v-donbasse#.U-n1AqM4Xcs (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar. “Polite people” is a Russian euphemism for the Russian soldiers, with balaclava helmets and no insignia, who appeared in Crimea prior to the Russian takeover. This is the Russian equivalent of the western term “little green men.”

62 Oleg, Nemenskii, “Reshaetsia v Donbasse,” Literaturnaia gazeta, July 18, 2014, at http://www.riss.ru/my-v-smi/3408-reshaetsya-v-donbasse#.U-n1AqM4Xcs (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

63 See Vsevolod, Nepogodin, “Geroi nashego vremeni,” Svobodnaia pressa, August 1, 2014, at http://www.svpressa.ru/blogs/article/94172/ (last accessed August 10, 2016)Google Scholar; and Pain, “The Imperial Syndrome,” 46–74 Google Scholar. According to Nepogodin, in the summer of 2014 Strelkov’s name figured on the Russian Internet just as oft en as “Vladimir Putin.”

64 “Zametka ot Kholmogorov o vstreche so Strelkovym,” at snr24.com/dnr/3517-zametka-ot-egora-holmogorova-o-vstreche-so-strelkovym.html, November 18, 2014 (last accessed April 22, 2016).

65 Maksim, Petrenchuk (Interview with Egor Kholmogorov), “Nyneshnie sobytiia— eto konets vsekh liberal΄nykh elit,” at http://www.holmogor.livejournal.com/6621155.html (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

66 Egor, Kholmogorov, from Facebook, May 26, 2014, at http://www.svoboda.org/contentlive/liveblog/25399831.html (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

67 Aleksandr, Sevast΄ianov, “Sud΄ba russkogo naroda reshaetsia v Donetske i Luganske,” June 1, 2014, at http://www.apn.ru/publications/article31762.htm (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

68 Aleksandr, Sevast΄ianov, “Rokovaia oshibka Putina: K kakim posledstviiam mozhet privesti sdacha Novorossii banderovskoi Ukraine?”, January 11, 2015, at http://www.концептуал.рф/rokovaya-oshibka-putina/print (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar. Boldface in original.

69 Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine, 164–65Google Scholar.

70 Gennadii, Ziuganov, “Politicheskii Chernobyl: Vystuplenie G.A. Ziuganova na plenarnom zasedanii Gosdumy,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, February 27, 2014, at http://www.sovross.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=596151&pagenum=5 (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

71 Vladimir, Zhirinovskii, “Vystuplenie v Ialte 14 August, Krym: Putin Verkhovnyi pravitel΄, Imperator,” Youtube, August 15, 2014, at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MVWjMVvX8ic (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

72 Prokhanov, “Klevetnikam Rossii,” Zavtra, April 10, 2014, at http://www.zavtra.ru/content/view/klevetnikam-rossii/ (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

73 Ibid.

74 Prokhanov, “Aleksandr Prokhanov schitaet Putina krupneishim politicheskim liderom Rossii i mira,” Argumenty nedeli, March 26, 2014, at http://www/argumenti.ru/politics/2014/03/328155 (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

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78 Dugin, “Zdravstvui, Krym! Vperedi bitva za Novorossiiu,” Otdel΄nyi divizion, March 17, 2014, at http://www.odivizion-ru.livejournal.com/205356.html (last accessed August 1, 2016)Google Scholar.

79 Eduard, Limonov, “Vy prizyvaete ne meshat΄ karateliam zagnat΄ krymskii narod opiat΄ v ukrainskii lager,” Livejournal, March 6, 2014, at http://www.limonov-eduard.livejournal.com/446033.html (last accessed August 1, 2016)Google Scholar.

80 Prokhanov, “Prokhanov: sobytiia v Krymu i na Donbasse—eto vozrozhdenie.”

81 Limonov, “Vystuplenie na Triumfal΄noi ploshchadi,” Livejournal, May 31, 2014, at limonov-eduard.livejournal.com/490535.html (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

82 Limonov, “Kreml΄, ty chego molchish΄,” Livejournal, July 5, 2014, at http://www.limonoveduard.livejournal.com/?skip=70 (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

83 Aleksandr, Dugin, “Rozhdenie Novorossii,” Evrazia, May 19, 2014, at http://www.evrazia.info/article/4805 (last accessed August 1, 2016)Google Scholar. “Sixth columnists” in Dugin’s terminology were fift h columnists in Putin’s immediate entourage.

84 Dugin, “Za Akhmetova grud΄iu vstala rossiiskaia ‘shestaia kolonna’,” Nakanune. ru, May 21, 2014, at http://www.evrazia.info/article/4806 (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

85 Dugin, Prizrak poruchika: nashe imia Strelkov, May 25, 2014, at http://www.evrazia.info/topic/16/ (last accessed 22 April 2016)Google Scholar.

86 Pavel, Baev, “Geopolitika samoizoliatsii,” Pro et Contra, (May-August 2014): 73–86, on 77 Google Scholar.

87 Dugin, from his Vkontakte page, June 4, 2014, at http://www.vk.com/wall18631635_2898 (last accessed April 22, 2016).

88 Dugin, “Uspekhi shestoi kolonny. Moia lichnaia plata za Novorossiiu,” June 27, 2014, at http://www.facebook.com/alexandr.dugin/posts/804580389552003 (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

89 Dugin, “Protiv Putina gotovitsia zagovor,” IB Novorossiia, October 3, 2014, at http://www.novorossia.su/ru/node/7471 (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

90 Prokhanov, “Evoliutsiia maidana,” Izborskii klub, July 14, 2014, at http://www.dynacon.ru/content/articles/3624/ (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

91 Prokhanov, “Razlozhenie ukrainskoi armii,” Izborskii klub, August 4, 2014, at http://www.dynacon.ru/content/articles/3643/ (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

92 Ibid.

93 Aleksandr, Gamov, “Aleksandr Prokhanov: Donbass predavat΄ nel΄zia. Esli eto sluchitsia, Rossii ne pomogut nikakie antikrizisnye mery,” Komsomol΄skaia pravda, February 13, 2015, at http://www.kp.ru/daily/26341/3224169 (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

94 Andrew E., Kramer, “Ukraine’s Reins Weaken as Chaos Spreads” New York Times May 4, 2014, at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/05/world/europe/kievs-reins-weaken-aschaos-spreads.html Google Scholar (last accessed April 22, 2016); Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine, 97–99.

95 Sergei, Sokurov, “Prezidentu Putinu—srochnoe pis΄mo,” Zavtra, May 4, 2014, at http://www/zavtra.ru/content/view/prezidentu-putinu-srochnoe-pismo/ (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

96 Maksim, Kalashnikov, “Novorossiia—zavtrashniaia real΄nost΄,” Zavtra, May 29, 2014, at http://www.zavtra.ru/content/view/novorossiya-zavtrashnyaya-realnost/ (last accessed August 1, 2016)Google Scholar.

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98 Ibid.

99 Andrei, Mozzhegorov, “Chem grozit RF nashe predatel΄stvo Novorossii. Krov΄ nadvigaetsia,” Imperskii kazachii soiuz, at http://www.iks2010.info/?p=65703 (last accessed August 10, 2016)Google Scholar.

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101 Aleksei, Polubota, “Razocharovanie patriotov: kak povliiaet na reiting vlasti otkaz ot vvoda voisk v Donbass,” Svobodnaia pressa, at http://www.svpressa.ru/politic/article/91987/ (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

102 Marléne, Laruelle, “Is anyone in charge of Russian nationalists fighting in Ukraine?,” Washington Post, Monkey cage, June 26, 2014, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/26/is-anyone-in-charge-of-russian-nationalistsfighting-in-ukraine/ (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar.

103 Alexseev and Hale, “Rallying ‘Round the Leader.”

104 Steven Fish, M., “The end of the Putin mystique,” Washington Post, April 3, 2014, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/03/the-end-of-the-putinmystique/ (last accessed April 22, 2016)Google Scholar

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108 Kolstø and Blakkisrud, The New Russian Nationalism; Pål Kolstø, “Moscow: City of Xenophobia,” TOL Transitions Online, July 26, 2013, at http://www.tol.org/client/article/23876-moscow-city-of-xenophobia.html (last accessed April 22, 2016).

109 “Xenophobia and Nationalism,” Levada Center, September 7, 2015, at http://www.levada.ru/eng/xenophobia-and-nationalism (last accessed April 22, 2016).

110 Ibid.

111 Alexseev and Hale, “Rallying ‘Round the Leader.”

112 Natalia Yudina and Vera Alperovich, “Ukraine Upsets the Nationalist Apple-Cart: Xenophobia, Radical Nationalism and Efforts to counteract it in Russia during the First Half of 2014,” August 6, 2014, at http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reportsanalyses/2014/08/d30003/ (last accessed April 22, 2016).

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