^{page 148 note 1} This and subsequent references to and quotations from The Confessions are from the translation by Albert C. Outler in Volume VII of The Library of Christian Classics (London: S.C.M. Press, 1955).

^{page 149 note 1} Augustine, St., The Confessions, XIII, 5.Google Scholar

^{page 149 note 2} Augustine, St., The City of God, XI, 32. This and subsequent quotations from The City of God are from the translation by Marcus Dods (New York: The Modem Library published by Random House, 1950).Google Scholar

^{page 149 note 3} The Confessions, XI, 13.

^{page 149 note 4} The City of God, XI, 6.

^{page 150 note 1} ibid., XII. Cf. XI, 6: ‘For if eternity and time are rightly distinguished by this, that time does not exist without some movement and transition, while in eternity there is no change, who does not see that there could have been no time, had not some creatures been made, which by some motion give birth to change—the various parts of which motion and change, as they cannot be simultaneous, succeed one another—and thus, in those shorter or longer intervals of duration time would begin.’

^{page 150 note 2} ibid., XI, 15.

^{page 150 note 3} ibid., XII, 16.

^{page 151 note 1} The Confessions, XI, 15.

^{page 151 note 2} ibid., XI, 16.

^{page 151 note 3} ibid., XI, 18–20.

^{page 151 note 4} ibid., XI, 23.

^{page 152 note 1} ibid., XI, 24.

^{page 152 note 2} ibid., XI, 27, 36. For a contemporary avowal of the Augustinian position, see Frank, Erich, Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth, pp. 65–67.Google Scholar

^{page 153 note 1} ibid., VII, 9, 13.

^{page 153 note 2} Portalié, E., A Guide to the Thought of St. Augustine, p. 95.Google Scholar

^{page 153 note 3} Henry, P., Plotin et L' Occident.

^{page 153 note 4} Theiler, W., Porphyrious und Augustin.

^{page 153 note 5} O'Meara, J., Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine.

^{page 154 note 1} Porphyry associates being in time with having a place—both of which characterise the material (sensible) world as opposed and inferior to the intelligible world. Like Plotinus, he thinks of time as in some sense an image of eternity: ‘For every (physical) image is the image of intellect. ’ And ‘… an intelligible essence is wholly present without interval, with all the parts of that which has interval, though they should happen to be infinite in number’ (‘Auxiliaries to the Perception of Intelligible Natures’ II, 35, translation by Thomas Taylor in Select Works of Porphyry, p. 224).

^{page 154 note 2} Plotinus, Enneads, III, 7, 2. This and subsequent quotations from The Enneads are from the translation by Stephen MacKenna (2 vols., Boston: Charles Branford Co., 1916).

^{page 154 note 3} loc. cit.

^{page 154 note 4} ibid., III, 7, 3.

^{page 154 note 5} loc. cit. Cf. III, 7, 5: ‘Thus a close enough definition of Eternity would be that it is a life limitless in the full sense of being all the life there is and a life which, knowing nothing of past or future to shatter its completeness, possesses itself intact forever … a Life instantaneously infinite.’

^{page 155 note 1} ibid., III, 7, 5.

^{page 155 note 2} ibid., III, 7, 7.

^{page 155 note 3} With one exception—the motion of the universe. But even this is accomplished in a time which is different from the time of motion.

^{page 155 note 4} ibid., III, 7, 8.

^{page 155 note 5} loc. cit.

^{page 156 note 1} ibid., III, 7, 9–10. For a critique of Plotinus' arguments, see Clark, G. H., ‘The Theory of Time in Plotinus’ in The Philosophical Review (1944), LII, 4, pp. 337–58.

^{page 156 note 2} ibid., III, 7, 11.

^{page 156 note 3} loc. cit.

^{page 156 note 4} loc. cit.

^{page 156 note 5} cf. Porphyry: ‘ … if all things are instantaneously perceived by it (the intellect), its perceptions have nothing to do with the past and the future, but subsist in an indivisible untemporal now; so that the simultaneous, both according to multitude, and according to temporal interval, are present with the intellect. Hence, too, all things subsist in it according to one, and in one, without interval, and without time. But if this be the case, there is nothing discursive or transitive in its intellections, and consequently they are without motion. Hence, they are energies according to one, subsisting in one, and without increase or mutation, or any transition.… But this is eternity. Hence eternity is present with intellect. That nature, however, which does not perceive intellectually according to one, and in one, but transitively, and with motion, so that in understanding it leaves one thing and apprehends another, divides and proceeds discursively—this nature (which is soul) subsists in conjunction with time. For with a motion of this kind, the future and the past are consubsistant. But soul, changing its conceptions, passes from one thing to another; not that the prior conceptions depart, and the posterior accede in their place, but there is, as it were, a transition of the former, though they remain in the soul, and the latter accede, as if from some other place. They do not, however, accede in reality from another place; but they appear to do so in consequence of the self-motion of the soul.… With the motion, therefore, of soul, time is consubsistant; but eternity is consubsistant with the permanency of intellect in itself’ (op. cit., III, 44).

^{page 157 note 1} Plato regards Time as the moving image or shadow of Eternity. While the language is similar, the meaning is different. Plato makes much of the connexion between time and number, which Plotinus ignores. The latter interposes soul between Eternity and Time, as the former does not. And he introduces the concept of life to explain how Time is the image of Eternity. Moreover, Plotinus is more concerned to show how Time and Eternity differ, Plato to show how they are alike.

^{page 157 note 2} loc. cit.

^{page 157 note 3} ibid., III, 7, 12.

^{page 158 note 1} loc. cit.

^{page 158 note 2} ibid., III, 7, 13.

^{page 158 note 3} loc. cit.

^{page 159 note 1} The Confessions, XII, 7.

^{page 160 note 1} Bréhier, E., The Philosophy of Plotinus, pp. 170–171, 180–1.Google Scholar

^{page 160 note 2} St. Augustine, op. cit., XII, 32.

^{page 160 note 3} Plotinus, op. cit., IV, 4, 16; VI, 5, 11.

^{page 161 note 1} To say that St. Augustine's concept is largely psychological is not to say that it is merely subjectivist. We have already noted that the extension of soul (which is time) is grounded in an encounter with physical objects as well as in the distended activity of mind—in which the before and after of things experienced are held together in the awareness of the present. For St. Augustine, time is essentially bound up with both the life of the soul and the world of changing objects (including the mind itself).

^{page 161 note 2} Gunn, J. Alexander, The Problem of Time, p. 37.Google Scholar

^{page 161 note 3} Plotinus, op. cit., IV, 3, 12.

^{page 162 note 1} The City of God, XII, 13.

^{page 162 note 2} ibid., XII, 20.

^{page 162 note 3} Frank, op. cit., p. 69.

^{page 163 note 1} Callahan, John F., Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy (1948). To claim that St. Augustine appropriates and transforms what is implied in Aristotle's theory of the relation of time to consciousness is possible only by misreading Aristotle. It is also to ignore the fact that motion has ontological priority over soul in Aristotle's system. In St. Augustine, the activity of the soul with regard to time goes far beyond quantification and spatialisation.

^{page 163 note 2} Dinkler, Erich, Die Anthropologie Augustins (1934).Google Scholar

^{page 163 note 3} Lampey, Erich, Das Zeitproblem nach Dem Bekenntnissen Augustins (1960).Google Scholar

^{page 163 note 4} F. R. Tennant protests as follows: ‘When the beginning of time is dealt with, Augustine, and later, the schoolmen rely on revelation rather than philosophy.’ (Quoted by W. Christian, ‘The Creation of the World’ in A Companion to the Study of Augustine, p. 338.)

^{page 163 note 5} cf. Frank:‘… the idea of creation also brought about a new interpretation of the phenomenon of time which is completely different from that of the Greek philosophers…’ (op. cit., p. 67).