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Why Interpret? Political Justification and American Constitutionalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Mark A. Graber
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Extract

This article offers a new understanding of political justification and American constitutionalism. Previous scholarship relies on philosophical justifications of constitutionalism which regard the American Constitution as the blueprint of the good society. Such claims fail to explain why persons should interpret a constitution that does not conform to their conception of political justice. Scholars could offer better reasons for interpreting an imperfect constitution if they placed greater emphasis on two other models of political justification. Institutional justifications of constitutionalism regard Constitutions as standard operating procedures for allocating the resources available for achieving the good society. Social justifications of constitutionalism regard constitutions as compromises among people of fundamentally different views. By combining philosophical, institutional and social perspectives, scholars might strengthen the case for constitutional obedience and provide better foundations for a theory of constitutional interpretation.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 56 , Issue 3: Special Issue on Public Law , Summer 1994 , pp. 415 - 440
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1994

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References

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