1. The history of the doctrine, and the “unity” of the Aristotelian tradition, are matters that have not received adequate treatment from intellectual historians. For an interesting attempt to analyze the dimensions of recent “neo-Aristotelianism,” including the use of political naturalism, see Wallach, John R., “Contemporary Aristotelianism,” Political Theory 20 (11 1992): 613–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Acceptance of Aristotle's formulation of the naturalist thesis is ordinarily taken as a token of medieval Aristotelianism. See Burns, J. H., ed., The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 360–61 and 527–31.Google Scholar Even such unlikely modern figures as Locke, John, Two Treatises of Civil Government, II.Google Scholar 15 show a fondness for the teaching that “we are naturally induced to seek Communion and Fellowship with others.”

2. Among those who raise this problem (if only to resolve it) are: Mulgan, Richard G., “Aristotle's Doctrine that Man is a Political Animal,” Hermes 102 (1974): 438–45Google Scholar; Kullmann, Wolfgang, “Der Mensch als politisches Lebenwesen bei Aristoteles,” Hermes 108 (1980): 419–43Google Scholar (translated in A Companion to Aristotle's Politics, ed. Keyt, D. and Miller, F. D. Jr. [Oxford: Blackwell, 1991], pp. 94–117Google Scholar); Ambler, Wayne, “Aristotle's Understanding of the Naturalness of the City,” Review of Politics 47 (1985), 163–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pellegrin, Pierre, “Naturalite', excellence, diversité: Politique et biologie chez Aristote,” in Aristoteles' “Politik”, ed. Patzig, G. (Göttingen: Vanderhoeck and Reprecht, 1990), pp. 124–51Google Scholar; Cooper, John M.,” Political Animals and Civic Friendship,” in Patzig, , Aristoteles' “Politik”, pp. 220–41.Google Scholar

3. David Keyt, “Three Basic Theorems in Aristotle's Politics,” in Keyt, and Miller, , A Companion to Aristotle's Politics, p. 118Google Scholar; this is a revised version of an essay entitled “Three Fundamental Theorems in Aristotle's Politics,” originally published in Phronesis 32 (1987): 54–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4. Keyt, , “Three Basic Theorems in Aristotle's Politics,” p. 140.Google Scholar

5. Keyt singles out A. C. Bradley and Ernest Barker as proponents of this view (Ibid., pp. 199–20). But the tradition for this reading is very old; Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on the Politics already adopted essentially the same interpretation. See Burns, , Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, p. 527.Google Scholar

6. I do not mean to argue that this position is philosophically indefensible in any version whatsoever; on a weaker, less-teleological view of history, such as is adopted by Cicero and some medieval Ciceronians, artifice and nature can be seen as compatible and mutually reinforcing. See Wood, Neal, Cicero's Social and Political Thought: An Introduction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 70–104Google Scholar; also Nederman, Cary J., “Nature, Sin and the Origins of Society: The Ciceronian Tradition in Medieval Political Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas 49 (1988): 3–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar and “The Union of Wisdom and Eloquence Before the Renaissance: The Ciceronian Orator in Medieval Thought,” Journal of Medieval History 18 (1992): 75–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7. In addition to what follows, there are several unpublished replies to Keyt of which I am aware, including those by Ronald Polansky, “What Aristotle Means by the Naturalness of the Polis” and David Depew, “Does Aristotle's Philosophy Rest on a Contradiction?” (read to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy in 1989) and “Political Animals.”

8. Miller, Fred D. Jr., “Aristotle's Political Naturalism,” Apieron 22 (12 1989): 216Google Scholar.

9. Chan, Joseph, “Does Aristotle's Political Theory Rest on a ‘Blunder’?”, History of Political Thought 13 (Summer 1992): 201.Google Scholar

10. Ibid., pp. 196–97.

11. Ibid., p. 196.

12. Miller, , “Aristotle's Political Naturalism,” p. 211.Google Scholar

13. Translations are based on the Greek text of Aristotle found in the Loeb Classical Library editions; translations are my own, unless otherwise noted, although I have consulted standard English renderings.

14. A detailed examination of orexis has been given by Richardson, Henry S., “Desire and Good in De Anima,” in Essays on Aristotle's De anima, ed. Nussbaum, M. C. and Rorty, A. O. (Oxford: Clarendeon Press, 1992), pp. 381–99.Google Scholar

15. See Furley, David J., “Self-Movers,” in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Rorty, A. O. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 55–67.Google Scholar

16. The nature of thought in relation to the other elements of nous is analyzed by Kahn, Charles H., “Aristotle on Thinking,” in Nussbaum and Rorty, Essays on Aristotle's De anima, pp. 359–79.Google Scholar

17. Akrasia (usually translated as “incontinence” or “weakness of will”) counts as a special case for Aristotle, which he takes up at length in the seventh book of NE. For an appraisal of the problems posed by the weak-willed character (whom, in any case, Aristotle regards as a relatively rare aberration), see David Wiggins, “Weakness of Will, Commensurability and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire” and Amélie O. Rorty, “Akrasia and Pleasure: Nicomachean Ethics Book 7,” in Rorty, , Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, pp. 241–84.Google Scholar

18. On the whole issue of hekon in Aristotelian ethics, see Siegler, Frederick A., “Voluntary and Involuntary,” The Monist 52 (04 1968): 268–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19. This demonstrates the importance of the practical intellect: for the moving principle to be in the agent, the agent must know accurately the particular circumstances of his action (NE 1111 a23–24). In some sense, the agent must know what he is doing. If I sleep with a married woman not knowing that she is married, I may (depending on whether I regret my conduct) be excused and my conduct regarded as involuntarily. However, if I sleep with a married woman knowing that she is married, but not knowing that adultery is wrong, my action is voluntary and hence worthy of blame, according to NE 1110b18–35.

20. See Bondeson, William, “Aristotle on Responsibility for One's Character and the Possibility of Character Change,” Phronesis 19 (1974): 59–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21. This subject has been a topic of intense discussion in its own right, which cannot directly concern us here. See Cashdollar, Sanford, “Aristotle's Politics of Morals,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 11 (04 1973): 145–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bodéüs, Richard, Le philosophie et la cité: Recherches sur les rapports entre morale et politique dans la pensée d'Aristote (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982)Google Scholar (English trans.: The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics, trans. Garrett, J. [Albany: SUNY Press, 1993]Google Scholar); Vander Wendt, P. A., “The Political Intention of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy,” Ancient Philosophy 5 (Spring 1985): 77–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tessitore, Aristide, “Making the City Safe for Philosophy,” American Political Science Review 84 (1991): 1251–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

22. On the Aristotelian conception of the good, and its relation to political life, see Kraut, Richard, Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), esp. chaps. 1 and 6Google Scholar; Irwin, Terence, “The Good of Political Activity,” in Patzig, , Aristoteles' “Politik”, pp. 73–98Google Scholar; and Homiak, Marcia L., “Politics as Soul-Making: Aristotle on Becoming Good,” Philosophia 20 (07 1990): 167-93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23. The need for reinforcement presumably exists on the grounds that dispositions not occasionally acted upon may eventually atrophy.

24. Aristotle in effect states this position at Pol. 1280a31–34: “The polis was formed not only for the sake of life but for the sake of the good life (for otherwise a collection of slaves or lower animals could form a polis, yet this could not be, since slaves and animals have no share in happiness or a life according to choice).” I cannot defend my interpretation of natural slavery here, but it would certainly diverge from the range of views currently on display. Two differing understandings of the doctrine may be found in Nicholas D. Smith, “Aristotle's Theory of Natural Slavery,” in Keyt, and Miller, , A Companion to Aristotle's Politics, pp. 142–55Google Scholar and Ambler, Wayne, “Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery,” Political Theory 15 (08 1987): 390–410.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25. Miller, , “Aristotle's Political Naturalism,” p. 211.Google Scholar

26. Ibid., pp. 207–208.

27. These texts are collated by Keyt, , “Three Basic Theorems in Aristotle's Politics,” p. 119Google Scholar and notes 3–5.

28. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the 1993 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Savannah, Georgia. The author wishes to thank Timothy Duvall, Arlen Feldwick, George Klosko and an anonymous reader for this Review for their suggestions and aid. Many ideas incorporated into this paper were first visited in discussions with Bonnie Kent which occurred nearly twenty years ago.