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The British Elections

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Extract

The british elections of October 25 gave the Conservative Party a small majority of 17 members in the House of Commons, although the popular vote provided a majority of 200,000 for the Labour Party. Parliament, however, is the supreme power in the British government and the discrepancy between popular vote and parliamentary results will not seriously shake the self-confidence of the Conservative Party. Members of the Labour Party, less sober and responsible in opposition, will doubtless characterize the Conservative government as a freak and an accident. But British traditions sanction the illogical workings of electoral machinery.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1952

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References

1 The returns of the voting on Oct. 25 gave the Conservatives 321, Labour 294, the Liberals 6 and there were three others. This meant an overall majority of 18, which was reduced to 17 when an election at Barnsley (Nov. 8) returned a Labour candidate.

2 The Economist emphasized the “shirking of the issues” by both parties throughout the summer and up to the election.

3 The two major British parties, unlike American parties, have social classes at their core. The small island does not foster the sectional, historical blocs such as support American parties. Economic levelling, the dwindling of the Liberal Party, the appeal of the welfare state, and Labour's electoral need of middle class votes, have contributed to broadening the party programs and to making them national in the American party sense.

4 Hogg, Quintin, The Case for Conservatism (Penguin Books, 1947).Google Scholar

5 The suggestion here is that men may reject an institution on moral grounds withoul having an explanation of the institution's origin and destiny. In a May Day parade of 1890 London workers carried, side by side, pictures of Karl Marx and Cardinal Manning.

6 Attlee, Clement, The Labour Party in Perspective (London, 1949)Google Scholar, and his selected speeches, Purpose and Policy (London, 1947)Google Scholar; SirCripps, Stafford, Democracy Alive (London, 1946).Google Scholar

7 Shils, E. A., “Britain and the World,” Review of Politics, VII (1945), 505524.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 McCallum, R. B. and Readman, Alison, The British General Election of 1945 (New York, 1947).Google Scholar

9 Fitzsimons, M. A., “British Labour in Search of a Socialist Foreign Policy,” Review of Politics, XII (1950), 197214.Google Scholar

10 It is difficult for a debtor nation to continue to play the lordly role of imperialism. These British debts to Egypt have played a part in rousing Egypt to defiance. Churchill's suggestion (when out of office) that the debts represented money spent in the defense of Egypt who should gratefully reduce them, seems to betray surprising naivete.

11 Nichols, H. G., The British General Election of 1950 (London, 1951)Google Scholar; Brand, Carl F., “The British General Election of 1950,” The South Atlantic Quarterly, L (1951), 478498Google Scholar; “Political Behaviour,” The Times Literary Supplement, 07 6, 1951, pp. 413415Google Scholar; Richards, Peter G., “The General Election,” The Political Quarterly, XXI (1950), 114121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12 Labour Party discipline in the Commons is very strict. This involves compulsory attendance and voting. The strain of the obligation during the spring and early summer may explain a ridiculous multiplication of petulant Labour complaints against breaches of parliamentary privilege.

13 The Bevanite group issued two pamphlets; One Way Only and Going Our Way (1951).Google Scholar

14 The author does not believe that a Churchill Government would have had notable success in achieving economic union in Europe. Commonwealth ties (which the Conservatives emphasize) pose serious obstacles to Britain's participation in a European economic union. The Conservatives would not have been hampered by the doctrinaire nationalist planning bias of the Labour Party, but they would have been plagued by the restrictionist practices of their own supporters. Of the Schuman Plan, Attlee said that Britain would not participate in it but was in favor of such a European project, especially for France and Germany. Churchill's taunt that the British should at least have been on hand to say “no,” was, in final analysis, more negative. The Labour Party's pamphlet, European Unity (London, 1950)Google Scholar, revealed the nationalist planning bias in striking form. This nationalism, of the Party contributed to the reorganization and new program of the Socialist International at Frankfurt in early July, 1951. The strong nationalism is revealed in the rule that majority decisions are not binding on the member parties. On the other hand, the new program of the Socialist International was more democratic than ideological. It allowed for private enterprise, and, more important, insisted that “Socialism is not inevitable. It is only one of the choices open to man. But it is the best alternative of those available.” There is a striking contrast between Denis Healey's radical internationalism in 1945 and his patronizing attitude to the Socialist parties of all countries except the Scandinavian in “The International Socialist Conference, 1946–1950,” International Affairs, XXVI (1950), 363373.Google Scholar

15 See the author's “Britain and the Middle East, 1944–1950,” Review of Politics, XII (1951), 2138.Google Scholar

16 SirLawther, William, fraternal delegate from the Trades Union Congress to the Conference, contrasted “Those who weave theories” with “the horny-handed trade union- ists who keep the party in operation.” The Times, 10 3, 1951.Google Scholar

17 The Times, 10 6, 1951Google Scholar. This is a summary of the Communist election manifesto. There were a number of Conservative and Labour1 manifestoes. The emphases of Labour's “Our First Duty—Peace” and the Conservative “Britain Strong and Free” are revealing. The compromise Labour manifesto drafted by Morgan Phillips (general secretary of the Party), Hugh Dalton, Aneurin Bevan and Sam Watson (trade unionist) was of antiquarian interest and without importance even before its composition.

18 The Times, 10 2, 1951.Google Scholar

19 The Observer, 09 23, 1951Google Scholar; The Times, 10 1, 1951.Google Scholar

20 The Times, 10 1, 1951.Google Scholar

21 The Observer, 09 23, 1951.Google Scholar

22 The Times, 10 22, 1951.Google Scholar

23 The Times, 10 9, 1951.Google Scholar

25 The Times, 10 12, 1951.Google Scholar

26 The Times, 10 1, 1951.Google Scholar

27 The Observer, 10 14, 1951.Google Scholar

28 The Times, 10 9, 1951.Google Scholar

30 The Times, 10 2, 1951.Google Scholar

31 The Times, 10 10, 1951.Google Scholar

32 “British Labour Movement—Retrospect and Prospect,” Ralph Fox Memorial Lecture, Fabian Special No. 8, p. 18.

33 Speech delivered to the Oxford University Labour Club, shortly after the election.