Our work Is our words, but our words do not work any more. They have not worked for some time. We can obviously start with the misleading label—‘International Politics’—which is given to our subject. As a result of this problem, I have wanted to use increasing numbers of inverted commas; but most have never seen the light of day because copy-editors have regarded them as an over-indulgence. Even so, the very temptation of these little scratches indicates that words at the heart of the subject are i n trouble:

Students of the European Community in the early 1990s cannot but be struck by an apparent paradox. On the one hand, pressures towards an increasing centralization of arrangements under the heading of political and monetary union seem to have increased, and are frequently linked in public discussion with the concept of federalism. On the other hand, a number of members, most obviously Spain, Portugal and Greece, even the new Germany, are obviously using the Community to develop a sense of their own identity as separate states, and, although the British have been most prominent in opposing federalism, no member government has shown any inclination in speciic terms to abandon its sovereignty. This paradox is hard to understand and is perhaps too easily dismissed with the retort that the Community is sui generis, or that the supporters of further integration have simply not understood its constitutional implications, as the Bruges Group has argued.

One of the major themes explored by the late Hedley Bull and others in their studies of the expansion of the European society of states across the globe is the entry of extra-European states into that society. It has given rise to two challenging and inescapable questions: when was each extra-European state drawn and accepted into the expanding European international society, and how? The answers to these questions are central to understanding when and how the contemporary global society which embraces states belonging to every culture and civilization emerged. Research in this area also raises questions about the future of the now universal international society. Can a global society of states devoid of cultural homogeneity survive? If so, how? Will the acceptance of common rules and institutions foster the perception of common interests by states of different cultural systems? Or conversely, will the perception of common interests move member states to work out new rules, institutions, and values to cement the structure of a universal international society? The inquiry into the historical process in which an extra-European state was drawn into the expanding international society cannot provide answers to these questions. Historical illumination is only capable of suggesting the direction in which those answers can be productively sought.

Introduction

After years of retirement in the academy, macro’historical commentary on contemporary events has returned to fashion. Radical domestic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and new patterns ofEast’West relations-in short, the collapse of communism and the end othe Cold War’mark the end of an era and present an invitation to international theorizing.1 Few would deny that these changes are momentous, but there is little consensus concerning their origins, trajectory, and implications. Explaining these events will necessitate a reweighing of fundamental theoretical issues. Thesize and speed of these changes were largely unexpected,reminding us how primitive our theories really are and encouraging us to broaden our theoretical perspective. To capture these events, theorists must reach across the disciplinary divides of Sovietology, international relations theory political economy, and political sociology.

I doubt whether the history of mankind is yet complete enough, if ever it can be so, to furnish grounds for a sure theory on the internal causes which necessarily affect the fortune of a state. I am far from denying the operation of such causes: but they are infinitely uncertain, and much more obscure, and much more difficult to trace, than the foreign causes that tend to raise, to depress, and sometimes to overwhelm a community.

Edmund Burke

Late in the summer of 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the US administration adopted a policy paper entitled NSC 68. This paper was drafted in February and March and it paved the way for the most comprehensive re-armament programme the United States had ever undertaken in time of peace. US defence expenditure was increased from 6.9% of the US GNP in Fiscal 1951 to 12.7% in Fiscal 1952, rising to 13.8% in Fiscal 1953; NSC 68 thus ushered in the post-World War II peak of US defence spending as percentage of GNP. In his admirable work on US defence strategy, John Lewis Gaddis has called NSC 68 ‘a deeply flawed document’. He concludes his analysis of NSC 68 by saying that the US Administration adopted measures which

The dominant role of the realist paradigm in international relations theory has left little room for the study of the role of cultural variables in world politics. The two central tenets of the realist theoretical game-plan—the primacy of the sovereign state system, and the autonomy of that system, from domestic political, social and moral considerations—focus our attention on the vertical division of the world into sovereign states, rather than on the horizontal forces and ties that cut across state frontiers. The result is the metaphor for the interaction of states as the mechanical one of the billiard table, with power politics as the primary dynamic.

The use of game theory to study international conflict has seen peaks and troughs of enthusiasm, high hopes alternating with disillusionment. A revival in recent years is evidenced by the wide interest aroused by non-technical, accessible applications—notably Axelrod’s work on cooperation. Meanwhile, the increasing use of computers to analyze many types of decision lends credence to the notion that with this new-found analytical power, one can move beyond the simplified models previously on offer. Indeed, several pieces of game-based software are now commercially available. The enthusiastic might claim that we stand on the threshold of an age in which no important decision involving conflict should be made without the backing of powerful, on-line analysis. The even more enthusiastic (of whom more below) are prone to claim that the threshold has already been crossed. However, there remain those for whom such claims cut very little ice, and there Is little consensus amongst theorists as to what sort of practical help can be offered to decision-makers.

Introduction

The Idea of national security is pervasive because it lies at the heart of the condition of statehood and the nature of the international system. But although the idea of national security is universally on the political agenda, it is difficult to find an unambiguous or uncontested usage of the concept.

Working definitions exist, of course:

a nation is secure to the extent which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.

Introduction

Prior to the Suez crisis of 1956, the United Nations found itself restricted in its military response to threats to international peace and security. The authors of the UN Charter had originally called for member states to make armed forces available to the UN Security Council under a set of special agreements to be concluded in the post-war period. These would furnish the UN with the military means to take collective action against aggression which was to be the essential precondition of the success of the UN. The body responsible for the conclusion of these special agreements under Article 43 of the UN charter was the Military Staff Committee (MSC), which comprised the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council. However, the divisions of the developing Cold War permeated the MSC from 1946 and it became clear that there were major differences amongst the permanent members on the military role that the UN should play in the post-war international system. As a result, the Article 43 special agreements were stillborn and the UN was left without a formal system to provide it with its own armed forces.

‘Anarchy is one of the most vague and ambiguous words in language.’ George Coreewall Lewis, 1832.

In much current theorizing, anarchy has once again been declared to be the fundamental assumption about international politics. Over the last decade, numerous scholars, especially those in the neo-realist tradition, have posited anarchy as the single most important characteristic underlying international relations. This article explores implications of such an assumption. In doing so, it reopens older debates about the nature of international politics. First, I examine various concepts of ‘anarchy’ employed in the international relations literature. Second, I probe the sharp dichotomy between domestic and international politics that is associated with this assumption. As others have, I question the validity and utility of such a dichotomy. Finally, this article suggests that a more fruitful way to understand the international system is one that combines anarchy and interdependence.

[L]ittle research has addressed whether, and in what ways, regimes ‘matter’. Do regimes have Independent influence on state behaviour and, if so, how?

One of the more surprising features of the emerging literature on regimes is the relative absence of sustained discussions of the significance of regimes . . . as determinants of collective outcomes at the international level . . . The ultimate justification for devoting substantial time and energy to the study of regimes must be the proposition that we can account for a good deal of the variance in collective outcomes . . . in terms of the impact of Institutional arrangements. [H]owever, this proposition is relegated to the realm of assumptions rather than brought to the forefront as a focus for analytical and empirical investigations.

This essay is about the response by the United Nations system to financial pressures in the 1980s and early 1990s. These pressures resulted from two developments: the decision of the main contributing states to adopt a policy of zero growth in real terms in the budgets of the organizations; and the additional withholdings by the United States which resulted from the Kassebaum Amendment to the Senate Foreign Relations Act of August 1985. This required a 20 per cent underpayment by the United States of its assessed financial contributions until a range of reforms in budgetary procedures, judged acceptable by the US Administration, had been introduced. The impact of the resulting financial squeeze is considered with particular reference to three Specialized Agencies: the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

The crisis in Communism and the apparent end of the Cold War have provoked a resurgence of liberal optimism and Western triumphalism. Recent visions of a peaceful world have been conjured up, only to be overtaken by war in the Persian Gulf and the threat of global recession. Awareness of the dark side of international relations in the twentieth century persists despite the irrepressible hopes of many of its students. At this juncture in history, therefore, when eternal hope once again collides with recurrent despair, it is timely to consider the international relations thought of Oswald Spengler, the author of The Decline of the West and ‘pessimist extraordinary’.