Suppose there are possible worlds in which God exists but Anselm
not. Then (I argue) there are possible worlds in which Anselm does not
God cannot even entertain the thought that he does not. In such worlds
not exist, but God does not know that. This, I argue, is incompatible with
straightforward construal of) the doctrine of God's essential omniscience.
involving negative existentials also call into question a certain picture
creation, on which God chooses which particular (possible) individuals
They suggest that there is an element of brute contingency about which
Mediaeval philosophical theologians held – so far as I know without
that God was essentially omniscient. In what follows, I shall argue
that the existence of individuals whose non-existence is compossible with
God's existence raises serious difficulties for the doctrine of God's
omniscience. If there are individuals that might not have existed even
God did, then – I shall try to show – questions arise about
would have been omniscient, if He had existed, but they hadn't.