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Tough choices still



Some argue that an omniprescient being cannot choose between mutually exclusive actions none of which is known to be uniquely reasonable. The view assumes that faced with such a choice one must believe each alternative to be epistemically possible, thereby precluding foreknowledge of what one will do. E. J. Coffman (2011) has challenged this assumption, but I argue that not only does he fail to undermine it, there are independent reasons why choice – and intentional agency generally – entails a presumption of epistemic possibility. The apparent incompatibility between omniprescience and intentional agency continues to pose a tough choice for theists.



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Religious Studies
  • ISSN: 0034-4125
  • EISSN: 1469-901X
  • URL: /core/journals/religious-studies
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