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Kuhn's Paradigm Thesis: A Two-edged Sword for the Philosophy of Religion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Cordell Strug
Affiliation:
Minnesota, U.S.A

Extract

Reflection on religion has, in the modern era, been intimidated by the conclusions and the (alleged) methods of science. The latter have been by far the most threatening, since they challenge not simply the conclusions but the possibility of theology. Happily, the philosophy of science has recently developed models of understanding which can be applied less destructively to other modes of thought. Yet the pattern persists: philosophers of religion and theologians receive these as they might receive new revelations from the deity (or, I suppose one must say, as they no longer would receive such revelations).

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1984

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References

page 270 note 1 Kuhn, Thomas S., The Structure of Scientc Revolutions (‘Phoenix Books’; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. X.Google Scholar

page 270 note 2 Ibid. p. 10.

page 271 note 1 Ibid. p. 44.

page 271 note 2 Ibid. p. 69.

page 271 note 3 Ibid. pp. 150–1.

page 271 note 4 Cf. Barbour, Ian, Myths, Models and Paradigms (New York: Harper & Row, 1974)Google Scholar and Mitchell, Basil, The Justification of Religious Belief (London: Macmillan, 1973).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 272 note 1 Kuhn, , pp. 99100.Google Scholar

page 272 note 2 Ibid. pp. 164–5.

page 273 note 1 Ibid. pp. 145–6.

page 273 note 2 Sherry, Patrick, Religion, Truth and Language Games (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1977), p. 108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 273 note 3 Cox, L. Hughes, ‘Why not drop the Theological-Falsification issue altogether?’, The Personalist, LVII, 1 (Jan. 1977), 1827.Google Scholar

page 274 note 1 For recent summary and critique of Hick, see Keeling, L. Bryant and Morelli, Mario F., ‘Beyond Wittgensteinian Fideism: An Examination of John Hick's Analysis of Religious Faith’, International, Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, VIII, 4 (1977), 250–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 274 note 2 Hick, John, God and the Universe of Faiths (London: Macmillan, 1973).Google Scholar

page 275 note 1 Veatch, Henry, ‘A Neglected Avenue in Contemporary Religious Apologetics’, Religious Studies, XIII, 1 (03 1977), 2948.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 275 note 2 Ibid. p. 47.

page 275 note 3 Hoffmann, John, ‘On Theology's Cognitive Claims: A. J. Ayer Revisited’, Studies in Religion, VI, 2 (19761977), 117–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 276 note 1 Kuhn, p. 152.Google Scholar

page 276 note 2 Ibid. pp. 156–7.