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How much horrific suffering is enough?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2023

Bryan Frances Open the ORCID record for Bryan Frances [Opens in a new window]
Bryan Frances*
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Independent Scholar, Puerto Rico, USA
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Email: bryan.frances@yahoo.com
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Abstract

Isn't there something like an amount and density of horrific suffering whose discovery would make it irrational to think God exists? Use your imagination to think of worlds that are much, much, much worse than you think Earth is when it comes to horrific suffering. Isn't there some conceivable scenario which, if you were in it, would make you say ‘Okay, okay. God doesn't exist, at least in the way we thought God was. We were wrong about that’? Pursuing this question leads to what I call the Problem of Absurd Evil.

Keywords

problem of evilsufferingastrophysics
Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 60 , Issue 2 , June 2024 , pp. 290 - 301
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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