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Constitution, identity, and the Trinity: rebuttal to Leftow

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 May 2022

William Hasker*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Huntington University, Huntington, IN 46750, USA

Abstract

Brian Leftow continues to argue that the metaphysical concept of constitution cannot be used to explicate the doctrine of the Trinity, as I have attempted to do. He also defends his own, distinctive view of the relation of Jesus to the Father. I maintain that he fails on both counts.

Type
Original Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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