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Conceptual plausibility and the rationality of theistic belief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 May 2023

Ricardo Sousa Silvestre Open the ORCID record for Ricardo Sousa Silvestre [Opens in a new window]
Ricardo Sousa Silvestre*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Federal University of Campina Grande, Campina Grande-PB, Brazil
*
Email: ricardoss@ufg.edu.br
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Abstract

In this article, I present a defence of conceptual plausibility, understood as an epistemic way to qualify concepts that situates them between the merely possible and the actual. To show that there is such a thing as conceptual plausibility, I rely on what seems to lie at the heart of many uses of the phrase ‘plausible concept’: explanatory fruitfulness. To make an effective case for the claim that conceptual plausibility is of philosophical interest, I present an argument based on the debate over the rationality of theistic belief and the concept of God. To show that conceptual plausibility is philosophically feasible, I first show that it cannot be reduced to propositional plausibility. Next, I offer a minimally precise characterization of conceptual plausibility; I approach this from a qualitative and comparative perspective as well. Finally, I show how these qualitative and comparative criteria of conceptual plausibility might be applied to the debate over the rationality of theistic belief and the concept of God.

Keywords

Conceptual plausibilityinductive plausibilityexplanatory fruitfulnessconcept of God
Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , First View , pp. 1 - 20
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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