To answer the question under what conditions during the transition to EMU will firms choose the Ecu as their currency for transactions, the paper develops a simple model of a firm’s choice of currency for pricing, invoicing and receiving payments for its product-its transactions currency. The focus of the model is the presence of network externalities derived from use of the same currency by others. The model points up the fallacy of focusing only on relative inflation performances of currencies when judging their likely adoption for transactions purposes.

The Maasstricht Treaty on EMU has generally been hailed as “a victory for the Ecu”. This is a misinterpretation. Maastricht is a victory for the EMU. EMU does not require the actual Ecu, and the actual Ecu did not receive a boost from the decision to call the future single currency “Ecu” rather than “Euromark”. Maasstricht has not nailed down the actual Ecu’s future and has left some uncertainties. Finally, it is not certain that the future Ecu will be at least as “hard” as the Deutschemark. The Maastricht Treaty went as far as practically possible in anchoring the Ecu’s stability. But performance will depend on factors outside of the Treaty’s scope.

Il est utile d’examiner l’impact de ITJEM sur la profession bancaire. Dans un premier temps, cet article distingue les conséquences immédiates du Traité de Maastricht des questions qui demeurent encore incertaines. Puis, en prenant comme objectif la sécurité et l’efficacité du futur Système Européen de Paiements, il envisage les voies de progrès ainsi que les rôles possibles du SEBC et des banques privées dans ce domaine. Il examine ensuite l’impact combiné du Marché Unique et de l’UEM sur les produits bancaires et sur la concurrence interbancaire. Enfin le lien entre mise en oeuvre de la politique monétaire et concurrence des centres financiers ainsi que le degré d’influence des banques privées et des autorités sur cette concurrence sont abordés.

Starting from the definition of “probability” which provides an approach to monetary and real determinants of exchange rates, that paper tries to explain the relation-ships between the investment choices, business and exchanges rates cycles. The methodological framework is based on the Engel and Hamilton (1991) statistical investigations and an expectation modelling according to Bernanke (1983) work. The empirical results point out, on one hand, a very high option value for the investors in the real sector with respect to the monetary and financial assets. On the other hand, an option value differential according to the countries involved in the international investment process is proved.

This paper asks how EMU will affect foreign-exchange markets, the demands for various key currencies, the behaviour of exchanges rates among them, and policy coordination. The advent of the Ecu as the single currency of the EC may reduce the vehicle role of the dollar in foreign-exchange markets. Yet the share of the Ecu in global reserves may be lower initially than the sum of the shares of the present EC currencies. The private demand for Ecu, domestic and foreign, may also be smaller initially than the demands for the present EC currencies. By helping to unify EC capital markets, however, advent of the Ecu may raise the flow demand for Ecu-denominated claims, causing the Ecu to appreciate in the early years of EMU. Finally, EMU may not help Europe to speak with one voice in international negotiations and may thus interfere with policy coordination.