The role that China is perceived to present for the global economy—much less global security—has changed remarkably since China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001. During the height of neoliberalism and third-wave democracies, China appeared more open to foreign capital than the developmental states of East Asia, which had restricted foreign direct investment (FDI) in favor of domestic industrialization during a comparable stage of economic development. Through the first 15 years of China’s WTO membership, many in academia and the policy world depicted a modernizing China undergoing market transition, in parallel to Eastern European countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the spring of 2018, Sheena Greitens and I conducted the China Scholar Research Experience Survey, a survey of 562 China scholars in the social sciences.1 The goal of the survey was to understand the incidence rate of different repressive experiences in the conduct of research. We found that at the time, such incidents were a “rare but real” phenomenon. Approximately 9% of respondents stated that they had been “invited to tea” by authorities within the past 10 years; 26% of scholars who conduct archival research reported having had issues with access; and 5% of researchers cited some difficulty obtaining a visa (Greitens and Truex 2020).