“I was afraid. Some mornings I would get up and my mama would say ‘you know you don't have to do this thing.' My words to her were ‘yes ma'am I do’, because if they make me quit anyone who follows would have a rough road. I got to do this thing.” —Ulysses O. Bryant, Jr., the first African-American graduate of Savannah High School

How do citizens respond to the reallocation of authority across levels of government? This article investigates the relative importance of economic versus identity bases of citizen support for the most far-reaching example of authority migration—European integration.

Yogi Berra might have said it: the best predictor of an election is, well, an election. Not a trial-heat conducted by opinion polls, but a real election of voters going to the polls. In the U.S., at least, what is known as a “general” election is preceded by a “primary” election, and that has been the case for presidential contests since 1912. So is the voting in presidential primaries a leading indicator of the vote in November? Remarkably so, as it turns out. How well presidential candidates do in primary elections foretells their prospects in the November election with great accuracy. What is more, the use of primaries as a vote predictor makes it possible to include in the forecast model both the candidate of the incumbent party and the candidate of the party out of the White House. The forecast for 2004 uses candidate vote shares in primaries, not just a win-lose dichotomy as done in the model used to predict the vote in 2000 (Norpoth 2001).

As human populations and their demands on natural resources continue to grow, citizens and officials from around the world search ever more intensely for effective solutions to environmental problems. Various factors conspire to make natural resources difficult to govern well. First, since many larger scale natural resources can be common pool resources, they pose different—and arguably more difficult—challenges to governance than private or public goods. Second, the use of natural resources can produce significant externalities. Third, the complex spatial and temporal boundaries of natural resources along with their potential externalities rarely conform to existing political institutions. Environmental problems often take decades or even centuries to emerge; their solutions may take equally long.

Forecasting provides the opportunity to put one's self to the test. Are our models of voting behavior accurate? It is easy to retrofit an explanation for what has happened in the past. Taking a chance on a forecast that can go wrong does not afford us that luxury. Forecasting can also teach a lesson in humility. Over the last decade, political scientists have been willing to gamble on their models. We have had some success. Everyone on the forecasting panel at the 1996 APSA Annual Meeting correctly forecast a Clinton victory. The forecasting of the 2000 presidential election was clearly a lesson in humility (at least for this author). None of the authors of this symposium forecast a Bush victory. Moreover, many forecast a rather substantial victory for Al Gore.

Though this be madness, yet there is method in 't.

—Hamlet, Act II, Scene II

“Democracy is not a silent business.”—Anthony D. Romero, American Civil Liberties Union

Despite mediocre approval ratings and below average economic growth, George W. Bush has a good chance of winning a second term in the White House according to the time-forchange forecasting model.

As authority over public expenditures has shifted from central to provincial and local governments in countries around the world over the last two decades, prevailing approaches to the study of decentralization in welfare economics and public choice from the 1970s and 1980s have given way to new political economy approaches. The first generation of theories envisioned central and lower-level governments as distinct sovereigns within their own spheres of activity. Recognizing a more complex reality, the political economy literature is rethinking the notion of sovereignty in multi-tiered systems. Motivated by recent difficulties with fiscal decentralization and fiscal discipline, this essay rethinks the notion of fiscal sovereignty, viewing it as an evolving set of beliefs in the context of a dynamic game of incomplete information played between central and subnational governments. Provincial or local governments, along with their creditors and voters, attempt to assess the credibility of the central government's commitment to abide by pre-specified intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. When higher-level governments dominate the field of taxation and take on heavy co-financing obligations—as central governments do in virtually all newly decentralizing countries—the central government's commitment not to bail out subnational governments in the event of debt-servicing crises is not credible. In other words, subnational governments without significant tax autonomy will not be viewed as sovereign borrowers, and this has important implications for their fiscal behavior.

Each year political scientists publish many excellent new books, some with an empirical focus on the politics of the United States. Very few of these books, however, offer serious, theoretically engaged analyses of the political foundations of major U.S. public policies. One reason works in this genre are so rare is that such books are extraordinary demanding to write. Their authors must have a policy analyst's command of the technical features of complex government programs together with a political scientist's skill at investigating the value choices and material conflicts that are at the heart of politics.

As the experience of 2000 shows, forecasting presidential elections is an inexact science. Everybody knows that “the economy” matters, but simple projection from economic conditions at the time of the forecast is not enough. And the most important economic shocks to the economy are the late shocks, which may arrive too late to be measured by the forecaster. Other events also impact, such as (in 2004) the Iraq war. Incorporating presidential approval into the model helps to control for “other” events that economic indicators ignore, but obviously only those that are observable by the time of the latest approval reading. They also don't reveal much about voters' comparative judgments of the two candidates. Of course one can forecast the presidential race from trial-heat polls available at the moment rather than trying to capture the fundamentals that will matter on Election Day. But the whole purpose of forecasting is to present information about the voters' future behavior that is not yet evident in the trialheat polls. Besides, early polls only tell us little about the final election outcome.

During spring 2000, we released to the press a preliminary forecast of a Gore victory. Indeed, one of us, in a widely-read quotation, declared, “It's not even going to be close” (Washington Post, May 26, 2000, p. 1). We were wrong, as were all of our fellow modelers. Indeed, among “five of the best forecasters” identified by Robert Kaiser (Washington Post, May 26, 2000, p. 1), the Gore projection ranged from 53% to 60% of the two-party popular vote, pointing to a Democratic landslide. Such gross error raises the question: Should the models be junked? Some journalists, pundits, and scholars have suggested the answer is “yes.” We disagree. Remember that forecasters of all stripes—modelers, pollsters, marketers, campaign experts—failed to call 2000. (See the review of 49 forecasts, from multiple and international sources, in Lafay and Lewis-Beck 2000). The virtually total inability to predict the Bush-Gore result also reminds us that no model will ever be perfect, that electoral behavior can never be fully determined. Still, while falling short of perfection, we believe that modeling can be improved.

Policymaking for Social Security is a wonderful book—perhaps the best book ever written on American social policy. Derthick's achievement is all the more remarkable when it is considered as the middle book of a “social policy trilogy,” along with Uncontrollable Spending for Social Services Grants (1975) and Agency Under Stress (1990). Taken together, these books provide as fine an introduction to American social policy as I can imagine; taken together with The Politics of Deregulation (1985), which Derthick wrote with Paul Quirk in this same period, they provide an incomparable overview of American politics.