22 August 2024: Due to technical disruption, we are experiencing some delays to publication. We are working to restore services and apologise for the inconvenience. For further updates please visit our website: https://www.cambridge.org/universitypress/about-us/news-and-blogs/cambridge-university-press-publishing-update-following-technical-disruption
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
This journal utilises an Online Peer Review Service (OPRS) for submissions. By clicking "Continue" you will be taken to our partner site
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pdm.
Please be aware that your Cambridge account is not valid for this OPRS and registration is required. We strongly advise you to read all "Author instructions" in the "Journal information" area prior to submitting.
To save this undefined to your undefined account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your undefined account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save this article to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
During the last decade, Japan has experienced the largest burden of chemical terrorism-related events in the world, including the: (1) 1994 Matsumoto sarin attack; (2) 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack; (3) 1998 Wakayama arsenic incident; (4) 1998 Niigata sodium-azide incident; and (5) 1998 Nagano cyanide incident. Two other intentional cyanide releases in To kyo subway and railway station restrooms were thwarted in 1995. These events spurred Japan to improve the following components of its chemical disaster-response system: (1) scene demarcation; (2) emergency medical care; (3) mass decontamination; (4) personal protective equipment; (5) chemical detection; (6) information-sharing and coordination; and (7) education and training. Further advances occurred as result of potential chemical terrorist threats to the 2000 Kyushu-Okinawa G8 Summit, which Japan hosted. Today, Japan has an integrated system of chemical disaster response that involves local fire and police services, local emergency medical services (EMS), local hospitals, Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and the Japanese Poison Information Center.
Sweden has a long tradition in planning for disaster situations in which the National Board of Health and Welfare has a key responsibilty within the health sector. One important part of this disaster preparedness is education and training. Since 11 September 2001, much focus has been placed on the acts of terrorism with special reference to the effects of the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear/radiological (CBNR) agents. In the health sector, the preparedness for such situations is much the same as for other castastrophic events. The National Board of Health and Welfare of Sweden is a national authority under the government, and one of its responsibilities is planning and the provision of supplies for health and medical services, environmental health, and social services in case of war or crises. “Joint Central Disaster Committees” in each County Council/Region in the country are responsible for overseeing major incident planning for their respective counties/regions. The “Disaster Committee” is responsible for ensuring that: (1) plans are established and revised; (2) all personnel involved in planning receive adequate information and training; (3) equipment and supplies are available; and (4) maintenance arrangements are in place.
Sweden adopts a “Total Defense” strategy, which means that it places a high value in preparing for peacetime and wartime major incidents. The Swedish Emergency Management Agency coordinates the civilian Total Defense strategy, and provides funding to the relevant responsible authority to this end. The National Board of Health and Welfare takes responsibility in this process. In this area, the main activities of the National Board of Health and Welfare are: (1) the establishment of national guidelines and supervision of standards in emergency and disaster medicine, social welfare, public health, and prevention of infectious diseases; (2) the introduction of new principles, standards, and equipment; (3) the conducting education and training programmes; and (4) the provision of financial support. The budget for National Board of Health and Welfare in this area is approximately 160 million SEK (US$18 million). The National Board of Health and Welfare also provides funding to the County Councils/Regions for the training of healthcare professionals in disaster medicine and crises management by arranging (and financing) courses primarily for teachers and by providing financial support to the County Councils/Regions for providing their own educational and training programmes. The National Board of Health and Welfare provides funding of approximately 20 million SEK (US$2.4 million) to the County Councils/Regions for this training of healthcare professionals in disaster medicine and crises.
The events of 11 September 2001 became the catalyst for many to shift their disaster preparedness efforts towards mass-casualty incidents. Emergency responders, healthcare workers, emergency managers, and public health officials worldwide are being tasked to improve their readiness by acquiring equipment, providing training and implementing policy, especially in the area of mass-casualty decontamination. Accomplishing each of these tasks requires good information, which is lacking. Management of the incident scene and the approach to victim care varies throughout the world and is based more on dogma than scientific data. In order to plan effectively for and to manage a chemical, mass-casualty event, we must critically assess the criteria upon which we base our response.
This paper reviews current standards surrounding the response to a release of hazardous materials that results in massive numbers of exposed human survivors. In addition, a significant effort is made to prepare an international perspective on this response.
Preparations for the 24-hour threat of exposure of a community to hazardous material are a community responsibility for first-responders and the hospital. Preparations for a mass-casualty event related to a terrorist attack are a governmental responsibility. Reshaping response protocols and decontamination needs on the differences between vapor and liquid chemical threats can enable local responders to effectively manage a chemical attack resulting in mass casualties. Ensuring that hospitals have adequate resources and training to mount an effective decontamination response in a rapid manner is essential.
Recent acts of terrorism have ranged from the dissemination of anthrax spores to intentional contamination of food to the release of chemical weapons to suicide attacks using explosives. The prediction of such events is difficult, if not impossible. The recent attacks that have generated massive numbers of injured and dead may signal the crossing of a new threshold from multi-casualty events to the use of weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, the medical and healthcare infrastructure must be able to prevent and treat illness and injury resulting from such events. Thus, a first step in improving the preparation for and responses to such events must include a sustained commitment to training physicians, nurses, identification specialists, pathologists, and other first responders. The rapid spread of SARS gives reason to believe that the distribution of such agents has potential advantages over the use of other weapons. Investments in the public health and healthcare systems provide the best defense against terrorism.
To review and analyze the cumulative two-year, Israeli experience with medical care for children victims of terrorism during the prehospital and hospital phases.
Methods:
Data were collected from the: (1) Magen David Adom National Emergency Medical System Registry (prehospital phase); (2) medical records from the authors’ institutions (pediatric triage); and (3) Israel Tr auma Registry (injury characteristics and utilization of in-hospital resources). Statistical analyses were performed as appropriate.
Introduction:
During the recent wave of violence in Israel and the surrounding region, hundreds of children have been exposed to and injured by terrorist attacks. There is a paucity of data on the epidemiology and management of terror-related trauma in the pediatric population and its effects on the healthcare system. This study focuses on four aspects of terrorism-related injuries: (1) tending to victims in the prehospital phase; (2) triage, with a description of a modified, pediatric triage algorithm; (3) characteristics of trauma-related injuries in children; and (4) utilization of in-hospital resources.
Results:
During the study period, 41 mass-casualty events (MCEs) were managed by Magen David Adom. Each event involved on average, 32 regular and nine mobile intensive care unit ambulances with 93 medics, 19 paramedics, and four physicians. Evacuation time was 5–10 minutes in urban areas and 15–20 minutes in rural areas. In most cases, victims were evacuated to multiple facilities. To improve efficiency and speed, the Magen David Adom introduced the use of well-trained “first-responders” and volunteer, off-duty professionals, in addition to “scoop and run” on-the-scene management. Because of differences in physiology and response between children and adults, a pediatric triage algorithm was developed using four categories instead of the usual three. Analysis of the injuries sustained by the 160 children hospitalized after these events indicates that most were caused by blasts and penetration by foreign objects. Sixty-five percent of the children had multiple injuries, and the proportion of critical to fatal injuries was high (18%). Compared to children with non-terrorism-related injuries, the terrorism-related group had a higher rate of surgical interventions, longer hospital stays, and greater needs for rehabilitation services.
Conclusion:
Terrorism-related injuries in children are severe and increase the demand for acute care. The modifications in the management of pedi-atric casualties from terrorism in Israel may contribute to the level of preparedness of medical and paramedical personnel to cope with future events. Further studies of other aspects of traumatic injuries, such as its short- and long-term psychological consequences, will provide a more comprehensive picture of the damage inflicted on children by acts of terrorism.
This article reviews the implications of mass-casualty, terrorist bombings for emergency department (ED) and hospital emergency responses. Several practical issues are considered, including the performance of a preliminary needs assessment, the mobilization of human and material resources, the use of personal protective equipment, the organization and performance of triage, the management of explosion-specific injuries, the organization of patient flow through the ED, and the efficient determination of patient disposition. As long as terrorists use explosions to achieve their goals, mass-casualty, terrorist bombings remain a required focus for hospital emergency planning and preparedness.
In the wake of 11 September 2001, many public health agencies are reassessing their institutional capabilities and procedures to respond to mass-casualty incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Prior to the fall of 2001, planning by the public health and other sectors addressed more conventional or naturally occurring events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, tornados, and chemical spills, although attacks with weapons of mass destruction were a growing concern. While the nature of natural versus intentional events differs, the management and coordination of response activities to them follows the same incident command system.
A major lesson learned during the response operations to the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York City was the value of disaster planning, conducting exercises, and developing relationships among the various response agencies. Although New York City's physical Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at 7 World Trade Center was destroyed in the attack, the medical and health response community was able to react effectively to the possibility of mass casualties as well as to the more usual needs. This was enabled by the pre-existing relationships that had been developed between city, state, federal, and non-governmental agencies while planning and exercising for such events and their aftermaths.
This article characterizes the epidemiological outcomes, resource utilization, and time course of emergency needs in mass-casualty, terrorist bombings producing 30 or more casualties.
Methods:
Eligible bombings were identified using a MEDLINE search of articles published between 1996 and October 2002 and a manual search of published references. Mortality, injury frequency, injury severity, emergency department (ED) utilization, hospital admission, and time interval data were abstracted and relevant rates were determined for each bombing. Median values for the rates and the inter-quartile ranges (IQR) were determined for bombing subgroups associated with: (1) vehicle delivery; (2) terrorist suicide; (3) confined-space setting; (4) open-air setting; (5) structural collapse sequela; and (6) structural fire sequela.
Results:
Inclusion criteria were met by 44 mass-casualty, terrorist bombings reported in 61 articles. Median values for the immediate mortality rates and IQRs were: vehicle-delivery, 4% (1–25%); terrorist-suicide, 19% (7–44%); confined-space 4% (1–11%); open-air, 1% (0–5%); structural-collapse, 18% (5–26%); structural fire 17% (1–17%); and overall, 3% (1–14%). A biphasic pattern of mortality and unique patterns of injury frequency were noted in all subgroups. Median values for the hospital admission rates and IQRs were: vehicle-delivery, 19% (14–50%); terrorist-suicide, 58% (38–77%); confined-space, 52% (36–71%); open-air, 13% (11–27%); structural-collapse, 41% (23–74%); structural-fire, 34% (25–44%); and overall, 34% (14–53%). The shortest reported time interval from detonation to the arrival of the first patient at an ED was five minutes. The shortest reported time interval from detonation to the arrival of the last patient at an ED was 15 minutes. The longest reported time interval from detonation to extrication of a live victim from a structural collapse was 36 hours.
Conclusion:
Epidemiological outcomes and resource utilization in mass-casualty, terrorist bombings vary with the characteristics of the event.
The [US] Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act (the WMD Act of 1996) heralded a new wave of spending by the federal government on counter-terrorism efforts. Between 1996 and 2000, the United States of America (US) federal government allocated large sums of funding to the States for bioterrorism preparedness. Distribution of these funds between institutions involved in first-responder care (e.g., fire and safety departments) and hospitals was uneven. It is unknown whether these additional funds had an impact on the level of hospital preparedness for managing mass casualties involving hazardous materials at the local level, including potential terrorist attacks with chemical agents.
Objectives:
(1) To compare 1996 and 2000 measures of preparedness among hospitals of a major US metropolitan area for dealing with hazardous material casualties, including terrorism that involved the use of weapons of mass destruction; and (2) To provide guidance for the improvement of emergency preparedness and response in US hospitals.
Methods:
In July 1996 and again in July 2000, 21 hospitals in one major US city were surveyed by questionnaire. A survey was used to assess the amounts of antidote stocks held available for treatment of casualties caused by toxic chemical agents and institutional response capabilities including the number of showers for decontaminating patients, the level of worker protection, and the number of staff trained to decontaminate patients.
Results:
Hospital preparedness for treating and decontaminating patients exposed to toxic chemical agents was inadequate in 1996 and in 2000. From 1996 to 2000, there was no statistically significant change in the lack of hospital preparedness for stocking of nerve agent and cyanide antidotes. Capacity for decontamination of patients, which included appropriate hazardous material infrastructure and trained staff, generally was unimproved from 1996 to 2000 with the exception of an increase of nearly 30% in hospitals with at least one decontamination shower facility.
Conclusion:
Hospitals surveyed in this study were poorly prepared to manage chemical emergency incidents, including terrorism. This lack of hospital preparedness did not change significantly between 1996 and 2000 despite increased funds allocated to bioterrorism preparedness at the local level.
Before the sarin incidents in Tokyo and Matsumoto, the Aum Shinrikyo (now Aleph) had tried to conduct bioterrorism with botulinum toxin and Bacillus anthracis. Followers of the Aum could not overcome technical difficulties inherent in developing biological weapons, and the perpetrators had not been prosecuted for their failed attempts of bioterrorism. But the Aum's biological attack revealed several shortcomings in the Japanese law that regulated biological weapons. Since the missile experiment of North Korea conducted in 1998, the Japanese government has come to consider the threat posed by biological weapons more seriously. In 2001, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the series of anthrax letter scares in the United States of America, the Japanese government established its Five Basic Principles for Chemical and Biological Weapons Terrorism and several measures were taken at the central and local levels. Activities of the Aum have been monitored by the Public Security Investigation Agency and the National Police Agency under the Anti-Aum Law since 2000.
Penetrating cardiac injuries commonly occur secondary to gunshot or stab wounds. This is a report an unusual case of a patient who sustained a penetrating cardiac injury due to a nail from a terrorism-related, nail-bomb explosion. Associated problems included pericardial tamponade, penetrating cardiac injuries, acute, traumatic, myocardial infarction, and a penetrating lung injury. Prompt diagnosis and aggressive surgical intervention resulted in full recovery of the patient.
The purpose of this editorial is to explore the relationship between the new global emphasis on terrorism and the developing academic and practical fields of disaster management. It includes an appraisal of the place of terrorism among the various forms of disaster, a consideration of its relationship to risk assessment and its place in the practical handling of risks and incidents, and some reflections on the role of the private sector in security management. The influence on the current attitude toward managing the terrorism threat by the evolution of the disaster management field is considered and some of the problems with defining scenarios for counter-terrorism planning also are discussed.
South Korea has experienced >30 suspected terrorism-related events since 1958, including attacks against South Korean citizens in foreign countries. The most common types of terrorism used have included bombings, shootings, hijackings, and kidnappings. Prior to 1990, North Korea was responsible for almost all terrorism-related events inside of South Korea, including multiple assassination attempts on its presidents, regular kidnappings of South Korean fisherman, and several high-profile bombings. Since 1990, most of the terrorist attacks against South Korean citizens have occurred abroad and have been related to the emerging worldwide pattern of terrorism by international terrorist organizations or deranged individuals.
The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games provided a major stimulus for South Korea to develop a national emergency response system for terrorism-related events based on the participation of multiple ministries. The 11 September 2001 World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks and the 2001 United States of America (US) anthrax letter attacks prompted South Korea to organize a new national system of emergency response for terrorism-related events. The system is based on five divisions for the response to specific types of terrorist events, involving conventional terrorism, bioterrorism, chemical terrorism, radiological terrorism, and cyber-terrorism. No terrorism-related events occurred during the 2002 World Cup and Asian Games held in South Korea. The emergency management of terrorism-related events in South Korea is adapting to the changing risk of terrorism in the new century.
The lack of a universally applicable definition of terrorism has confounded the understanding of terrorism since the term was first coined in 18th Century France. Although a myriad of definitions of terrorism have been advanced over the years, virtually all of these definitions have been crisis-centered, frequently reflecting the political perspectives of those who seek to define it.
In this article, we deconstruct these previously used definitions of terrorism in order to reconstruct a definition of terrorism that is consequence-centered, medically relevant, and universally harmonized. A universal medical and public health definition of terrorism will facilitate clinical and scientific research, education, and communication about terrorism-related events or disasters.
We propose the following universal medical and public definition of terrorism: The intentional use of violence — real or threatened — against one or more non-combatants and/or those services essential for or protective of their health, resulting in adverse health effects in those immediately affected and their community, ranging from a loss of well-being or security to injury, illness, or death.
Even though Mexico is considered internationally as a pacifist country, its economic, social, and geopolitical characteristics during the last half of the 20th century have resulted in internal events that can be considered acts of terrorism.
Most of the acts of terrorism during the last 15 years have had to do either with political movements or drug-dealing actions. After the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, Mexican Health Authorities have strengthened the epidemiological surveillance system. More than 1,372 calls asking for information or reporting suspicious envelopes were received between 16 October and 21 October 2001.
Following the earthquake in 1985 that caused great damage and many deaths in Mexico, the National Civil Protection System was created in 1986. This protection system is led by the President and the Secretary of Government. It was developed to improve preparedness for disaster coordination more than for terrorism responses. In addition, the emergency medical systems continue to lack organization, even though some states have shown significant progress in their emergency medical system.
This report illustrates Croatia's experience with the terrorist attack in the city of Rijeka in October 1995. Also, the intention of this report is to outline how emergency services were functioning in this sudden-onset situation.
Methods:
The medical documentation of 27 wounded citizens in the attack was analyzed and the appearance of bodily wounds, severity of wounds, and the mechanisms of injury are described. From the forensic medical report, the wounds and damages sustained by the terrorist also were analyzed. All findings were compared with similar cases from around the world.
Results:
In the 27 wounded citizens, three (11%) had head injuries, and injuries of the abdomen in only two cases (7%) were found. The most common injuries sustained involved one or more extremities: 16 (59%) persons had wounds of an upper or lower extremity or a combination of multiple wounds. The main cause of death of the terrorist was explosive wounds to the chest and abdomen with destruction of multiple inner organs (primarily kidneys, liver, abdomen, and lung). Furthermore, the terrorist had a fracture of the skull base and multiple injuries to the brain.
Conclusion:
Comparing the findings with other data from the literature, the distribution in the percentages of wounded is almost the same as reported in many bomb attacks. In this case, the walls of the building protected many citizens, which is why so few were seriously injured. Forensic examination of the terrorist's body showed all of the characteristics of blast injuries.
Two major domestic terrorist groups have plagued Peru over the past 20 years, the Sendero Luminoso or “Shining Path” (SL) and the Revolutionary Movement Túpac Amaru (MRTA). On 28 August 2003, the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission reported that an estimated 69,280 persons were killed in the internal conflict in Peru from 1980 to 2000. Most of the victims were farmers (56%), most attacks occurred in rural settings (79%), and the SL was responsible for mostof the deaths (54%). Aggressive anti-terrorism efforts by police and military during this period, often at the expense of basic human rights, also contributed to this large burden of terrorism on Peru. During the 1990s, terrorist attacks in Peru had spread to its urban areas. On 17 December 1996, 22 members of MRTA took over the Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima, holding 72 hostages until the grounds were stormed by Peruvian special forces on 23 April 1997.
Until recently, emergency planning and preparedness for terrorism-related events in Peru were largely underdeveloped. In the last five years, Peru has taken two key steps towards developing a mature emergency response system, with the establishment of the country's first emergency medicine residency training program and the construction of the first dedicated trauma center in Lima.