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This is a summary of the presentations and discussion of Surveillance, Early Warning Alert and Response at the Conference, Health Aspects of the Tsunami Disaster in Asia, convened by the World Health Organization (WHO)in Phuket, Thailand, 04–06 May 2005. The topics discussed included issues related to the surveillance, early warning alert, and response to communicable and vector-borne diseases as pertaining to the responses to the damage created bythe Tsunami. It is presented in the following major sections: (1) key questions; (2) needs assessment; (3) coordination(4) gap filling; and (5) capacity building. The key questions section is presented in six sub-sections: (1) communicable diseases; (2) early warning; (3) laboratory capacity and referral networking; (4) coordination of disease surveillance, early warning, and response; (5) health infrastructure rebuilding; and (6) using existing national surveillance plans toenhance disease surveillance and early warning systems.
This is a summary of the presentations and discussion of Panel 2.1 of the Conference, Health Aspects of the Tsunami Disaster in Asia, convened by the World Health Organization (WHO) in Phuket, Thailand, 04–06 May 2005. The topics discussed included issues related to assessing needs and measuring impact as pertaining to the responses to the damage created by the Tsunami. It is presented in the following major sections: (1) key questions; (2) assessing needs; (3) measuring impact; and (4) lessons learned and recommendations.
This is a summary of the presentations and discussion of Panel 2.13, The Role of Media and Communication, of the Conference, Health Aspects of the Tsunami Disaster in Asia, convened by the World Health Organization (WHO) in Phuket, Thailand, 04–06 May 2005. The topics discussed included issues related to the role of media and communication as pertain to the responses to the damage created by the Tsunami of 26 December 2004.
This is a summary of the presentations and discussion of Panel 2.17, Private Commercial Sector Partnerships for Health Action in Crises of the Conference, Health Aspects of the Tsunami Disaster in Asia, convened by the World Health Organization (WHO) in Phuket, Thailand, 04–06 May 2005. The topics discussed included issues related to private sector partnerships for health action in crises as pertain to the responses to the damage created by the Tsunami. It is presented in the following sections: (1) key questions; (2) issues and challenges; (3) lessons learned; (4) what was done well?; (5) what could have been done better?; and (6) conclusions and recommendations.
This Summary Report was prepared for Agenda item 13.3 for the meeting of the World Health Assembly convened at the World Health Organizationation (WHO) Headquarters in Geneva, Switzwitzerland on 20 May 2005. It was in part, prepared from the Reports generaged by the Conference, Health Actions in Relation to Crises and Disasters, convened by the World Health Organization in Phuket, Thailand, 04–06 May 2005.
This is a summary of the presentations and discussion of Panel 2.10, Reproductive, Mental, and Child Health of the Conference, Health Aspects of the Tsunami Disaster in Asia, convened by the World Health Organization (WHO) in Phuket, Thailand, 04–06 May 2005. The topics discussed included issues related to reproductive, mental, and child health as pertain to the responses to the damage created by the Tsunami. It is presented in the following major sections: (1) background; (2) key issues; (3) discussion; and (4) recommendations. Key issues discussed included: (1) coordination/collaboration; (2) provision of services; and (3) raising awareness and advocacy.
This is the text for the Opening Address for the Conference, Health Aspects of the Tsunami Disaster in Asia, convened by the World Health Organization (WHO) in Phuket, Thailand, 04-06 May 2005. The frightening reality of the costs (human and material) must be balanced by what has been and can be learned that, if applied, can make the world more resilient for the next event. At the time of this Conference, we are moving from response to recovery. The immediate conclusion relates to the consequences of the realization of a truly interdependent world. Given the huge resourcesmade available, there is an increased need for accountability. Several factors will bear heavily on the outcomes: (1) risk of loss of momentum; (2) ensuring that no gaps in services occur; (3) ensuring that already marginalized communities do not become forgotten or even more marginalized; (4) support and respect of national leadership; (5) commit to enhanced coordination; and (6) develop mechanisms for joint and shared assessments. The available resources must be used to stablize the livelihoods of people for years. Lastly, the reliability and sustainability of the important contributions of the military and the commercial private sectors for future events must be established
The Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (Hospital Emergency Incident Command System), nowin its third edition, has emerged asa popular incident command system model for hospital emergency response in the United States and other countries. Since the inception of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System in 1991, several events have transformed the requirements of hospital emergency management, including the 1995 Tokyo Subway sarin attack, the 2001 US anthrax letter attacks, and the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) outbreaks in eastern Asia and Toronto, Canada.
Several modifications of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System are suggested to match the needs of hospital emergency management today, including: (1) an Incident Consultant in the Administrative Section of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System to provide expert advice directly to the Incident Commander in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) emergencies as needed, as well as consultation on mental health needs; (2) new unit leaders in the Operations Section to coordinate the management of contaminated or infectious patients in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear emergencies; (3) new unit leaders in theOperations Section to coordinate mental health support for patients, guests, healthcare workers, volunteers, anddependents in terrorismrelated emergencies or events that produce significant mental health needs; (4) a new Decedent/Expectant Unit Leader in the Operations Section to coordinate the management of both types ofpatients together; and (5) a new Information Technology Unit Leader in the Logistics Section to coordinate the management of information technology and systems.
New uses of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System in hospital emergency management also are recommended, including: (1) the adoption of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System as the conceptual framework for organizing all phases of hospital emergency management, including mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery; and (2) the application of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System not only to healthcare facilities, but also to healthcare systems.
Finally, three levels of healthcare worker competencies in the Hospital Emergency Incident Command Systemare suggested: (1) basic understanding of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System for all hospital healthcare workers; (2) advanced understanding and proficiency in the Hospital Emergency Incident Command Systemfor hospital healthcare workers likely to assume leadership roles in hospital emergency response; and (3) special proficiency in constituting the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System ad hoc from existing healthcare workers in resource-deficient settings. The Hospital Emergency Incident Command System should be viewed asa work in progress that will mature as additional challenges arise and ashospitals gain further experience with its use.
The end of the Cold War vastly altered the worldwide political landscape. With the loss of a main competitor, the United States (US) military has had to adapt its strategic, operational, and tactical doctrines to an ever-increasing variety of non-traditional missions, including humanitarian operations. Complex emergencies (CEs) are defined in this paper from a political and military perspective, various factors that contribute to their development are described, and issues resulting from the employment of US military forces are discussed. A model was developed to illustrate the course of a humanitarian emergency and the potential impact of a military response. The US intervention in Haiti, Northern Iraq, Kosovo, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda serve as examples.
A CE develops when there is civil conflict, loss of national governmental authority, a mass population movement, and massive economic failure, each leading to a general decline in food security. The military can alleviate a CE in four ways: (1) provide security for relief efforts; (2) enforce negotiated settlements; (3) provide security for non-combatants; and/or (4) employ logistical capabilities.
The model incorporates Norton and Miskel's taxonomy of identifying failing states and helps illustrate the factors that lead to a CE. The model can be used to determine if and when military intervention will have the greatest impact. The model demonstrates that early military intervention and mission assignment within the core competencies of the forces can reverse the course of a CE. Further study will be needed to verify the model.